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MANCHESTER AND ITS PRESS UNDER THE BOMB. BRITAIN’S 
‘OTHER FLEET STREET’ AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO A MYTH 
OF THE BLITZ 
 
 
Guy Richard Hodgson 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Manchester Blitz was relatively short, lasting two nights in December 
1940, when around 1,000 people were killed and more than 3,000 injured in 
the city centre, Salford and the residential areas near Old Trafford. This 
thesis focuses on the reaction to this heavy bombing by the local and 
regional newspapers of Manchester, which was Britain’s second press 
centre at the time.  
The newspapers, the Manchester Guardian, Manchester Evening News and 
Evening Chronicle, are studied over an eight-week period from mid 
December 1940. According to these editions, Mancunians were unbowed by 
the death and destruction wrought by the Luftwaffe and had a steely 
determination to win the war. Contemporary writing, including individual 
diaries and reports from Mass Observation and Home Intelligence, tells a 
more complicated and nuanced story.    
The thesis finds that the Manchester newspapers submitted their coverage to 
more self-imposed censorship than was being demanded even by a 
government desperate to maintain morale. They did so partly because they 
feared they would be closed down if they offended the censor, but also 
because they felt that patriotism had a greater priority than maintaining the 
news values of the time.  
The newspapers could have exposed local authority incompetence and 
shortcomings in the emergency services but chose instead to paint a rosy 
picture of defiance by omission, distortion and, in some cases, deceit. They 
did not do so independently, but in accordance with the reporting norms in 
Fleet Street and other British provincial cities during the Second World 
War.   
Circulations rose for both national and local newspapers during the war, but 
the cost was a further severing of the confidence people had in their press. 
When readers themselves became the story by being the victims of the Blitz 
they discovered there was often a gap between the truth and what appeared 
in print. It is a trust that has not been recovered to this day. 
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Introduction 
The author John Steinbeck was not complimentary when he reviewed the 
work of journalists in the Second World War. ‘We were all part of the war effort,’ he 
wrote. ‘We went along with it, and not only that, we abetted it.’ He added: ‘I don’t 
mean the correspondents were liars… It is in the things not mentioned that the untruth 
lies.’1 Steinbeck was a special war correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune 
from June to December 1943 and in this relatively short time, his work had followed 
that of other reporters in avoiding writing about the reality of war and, instead, he had 
subscribed to an idealised view of the Allied war effort in which ‘our’ people were 
eternally stoic, ‘our’ soldiers impeccably brave and ‘our’ bombers unerringly 
accurate. He went where British journalists had travelled before. Several academics, 
such as Angus Calder, Phillip Knightley, James Curran and Jean Seaton, have noted 
that the writing of the myth of the war against Adolf Hitler had begun from the 
moment Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain formally announced the opening of 
hostilities on BBC radio on 3 September 1939.2 It encompassed, among what appear 
often to be other rose-tinted distortions and half truths, the ‘triumph’ of Dunkirk, 
‘we’re all in this together’, the ‘few’ of the Battle of Britain, genial Uncle Joe Stalin 
and, perhaps the most potent of all, the all-encompassing Blitz Spirit.  
This thesis will help bring a further understanding of the British press and the 
experience of bombing during the Second World War. It will examine the myth of 
that Blitz Spirit that has become so engrained in the UK’s popular perception that, 70 
                                            
 
1 John Steinbeck, Once There was a War (New York: Viking, 1958), cited in Paul Fussell, Wartime: 
Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 
285. 
2 Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz, (London: Cape, 1991); Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: 
The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq, 3rd edn (London: Hopkins, 
2002); J. Curran and J. Seaton, Power Without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in 
Britain, 6th edn (London: Routledge, 2003). 
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years on, it is used as a metaphor of first resort for politicians and the media whenever 
the nation is under threat, be it from war, natural extremes such as floods, sharp 
economic down-turns, or attacks by terrorists. It will study the relatively neglected 
area of the role of newspapers in the Second World War, with a particular reference to 
Manchester, showing that the Manchester Guardian, Evening Chronicle and 
Manchester Evening News not only subscribed to the narrative of unyielding fortitude 
in the face of the Luftwaffe’s assault, but also contributed to it.  
The first bomb to land on Manchester was dropped on 8 August 1940 and the 
city was attacked throughout the Second World War, but its Blitz, concentrated and 
prolonged bombing, lasted only two nights, 22/23 and 23/24 December 1940, when 
nearly 1,000 people were killed and 3,500 injured.3 In excess of 50,000 homes in the 
area were damaged along with Manchester’s cathedral and other important public 
buildings.4 ‘Manchester will remember the horrors of that attack as long as the heart 
of the north continues to beat,’ a contemporary Co-Operative Wholesale Society 
newsreel reported, before adding the eulogy typical of the reporting in 1940 and 1941, 
‘but she will remember its glories too.’5 The newsreel glossed over the fact that troops 
were filmed with their bayonets attached to their rifles, suggesting an over-reaction by 
the authorities at the very least and, more likely, an indication of the undercurrent of 
lawlessness in a city with its infrastructure in ruins and its population struggling to 
cope with, in Manchester’s experience, unprecedented levels of destruction.  
There has been much research into the capital’s Blitz – a search of the British 
Library catalogue using the key words ‘Manchester Blitz’ in December 2012 revealed 
two, largely pictorial, books, an article and a journal, while ‘London Blitz’ produced 
                                            
3 Stuart Hylton, A History of Manchester, 2nd edn (Andover: Phillimore, 2010), p. 253.  
4 Clive Hardy, Ian Cooper, Henry Hochland, Manchester at War (Bowdon: Archive, 1986), p. 44. 
5 Co-Operative Wholesale Society, The Manchester Blitz: Manchester Took it Too (Imperial War 
Museum) <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fte9DpZRfwo> [accessed 3 January 2012]. 
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187, 35 and three respectively – but relatively little about cities elsewhere in the UK.6 
By most criteria this is justified in that London suffered nearly half the British deaths 
caused by the Luftwaffe’s bombing, 29,890 to 30,705, but the narrative of the chirpy 
East Ender has become pervasive, so that other, provincial, tales have been 
overwhelmed.7 In a book that asserted a distinctive northern English cultural identity, 
Stuart Maconie noted that South Shields, in the north east of England, suffered 200 air 
raids in the Second World War and 156 people were killed:  
One direct hit on the marketplace killed more than 40 people sheltering in tunnels 
below the square. These are statistics to remember next time you watch a 
programme about the Blitz. It will be about London as always and feature 
Piccadilly Circus in flames and cheery Cockneys making their way to Tube 
stations. If you trusted the London media you could be forgiven for thinking that 
the south won the war single-handed and that northern England was as quiet as 
Switzerland. It wasn’t, as the people in South Shields will testify.8  
 
This thesis differs from other studies on the wartime press in that it focuses on 
the region to which Maconie was referring, the north of England, and in particular the 
newspapers of Manchester, which was Britain’s second press centre at the time, and 
which would have become the principal one in the event of irreparable damage to 
Fleet Street. It was a city so important for national and provincial newspapers in 
Britain that when the Berry brothers, Lords Camrose and Kemsley, formed Allied 
Northern Newspapers in 1924 its Withy Grove site was described as Europe’s largest 
single print hub, employing 3,000 people.9 ‘Manchester is far and away the largest 
newspaper centre outside London,’ Camrose wrote. ‘Indeed, it closely rivals the 
metropolis itself.’10 Other studies have concentrated on national newspapers but this 
thesis will show that the provincial press played a role as a conduit for government 
propaganda. It will ask three questions. Firstly, did the Manchester press submit its 
                                            
6 British Library <http://www.bl.uk> [accessed 27 December 2012]. 
7 T. H. O’Brien, Civil Defence (London: HMSO, 1955), p. 677. 
8 Stuart Maconie, Pies and Prejudice: In Search of the North (London: Ebury, 2007), p. 303. 
9 Robert Waterhouse, The Other Fleet Street (Altrincham: First Edition, 2004), p. 9. 
10 Viscount Camrose, British Newspapers and their Controllers (London: Cassell, 1947), p. 116. 
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coverage to self-imposed censorship as it strived to achieve a difficult balance 
between journalists’ traditional belief that they were obliged to report ‘facts’ and 
government exhortations that popular morale had to be maintained and information 
useful to the enemy edited out? Second, were there reasons, other than self and 
official censorship, for the editorialising of news of the war? Third, did the reporting 
of the war impact negatively on the reputation of Manchester’s newspapers? 
According to Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky: 
Media coverage of wars is notable for the way in which views that run counter to 
official sources are deemed unacceptable, ideological alternatives are ignored and 
discussion is ‘bounded’. Mainstream media reproduce the frameworks of political 
and military leaders and in so doing provide propaganda rather than ‘disinterested’ 
journalism.11  
 
Herman and Chomsky were writing about the Vietnam War but this thesis will show 
that their assertions also pertained to the period between 1939 and 1945, and a 
consequence of this relationship between newspapers and Britain’s leaders was the 
creation of many myths and semi-truths that have obscured ‘the way Britain survived 
and the other stirring events’.12 It also led to the further severing of the bond between 
newspapers and their audience. Harold Evans, a schoolboy in Manchester during the 
Second World War and a future editor of The Times and Sunday Times, noted that 
people used to quote newspapers to establish fact: ‘Oh, but it was in the papers.’ He 
asked: ‘What if you could not trust the newspapers to tell the truth, and nothing but 
the truth? Which institution was more trustworthy, the state or the press?’13 The 
answer would be equivocal because this investigation states that newspapers became 
organs of optimism, purveying what Michael Billig described as banal nationalism, in 
                                            
11 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the 
Mass Media, 2nd edn (London: Bodley Head, 2008), cited in War and the Media, ed. by Daya Kishan 
Thussu and Des Freedman (London: Sage, 2003), p. 6. 
12 Clive Ponting, 1940: Myth and Reality (London: Sphere, 1990), p. 1. 
13 Harold Evans, My Paper Chase: True Stories of Vanished Times (London: Little, Brown, 2009), p. 7. 
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which the ‘mass media daily brings the flags home to the citizenry’.14 Importantly in 
view of the language used by the newspapers in the study, he added: ‘the crucial 
words of banal nationalism are often the smallest: “we”, “this” and “here”.’15 
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first provides an historical and 
historiographical perspective, which is divided into two chapters to allow a clearer 
focus on the main aspects. Their purpose is to provide a holistic view of the 
relationship between the British government, the press and the newspaper-buying 
public before and during the Second World War. The first chapter puts this thesis into 
context, charting the rise of mass circulation newspapers from the turn of the 
twentieth century and the journey towards a culture of self-censorship, escapism and 
kow-towing to the government that developed between 1939 and 1945. This mapping 
includes research into newspaper coverage of the international situation in the four 
weeks before the declaration of war.  
As Antonio Gramsci, Ruth Wodak, Norman Fairclough and others have stated, 
power and newspaper discourse are synonymous and the second chapter explores the 
complex pressures that are applied before a report appears in print.16 This provides an 
analytical framework for the thesis, examining the notion and origins of the myth of 
the Blitz and the place of myth in historical analysis. This establishes a starting point 
for further discussion of other, psychological, pressures on journalists, including the 
news values of the 1940s, the movement towards a claimed objectivity in reporting, 
and the internal news selection process. It also examines the historiography of the 
subject to ask, among other questions, what is the role of the press in times of war?  
                                            
14 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 2008), p. 94. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2005); 
Language, Power and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse, ed. by Ruth Wodak, (Amsterdam: 
Benjamins, 1989) and Norman Fairclough, Language and Power, 2nd edn (Harlow: Pearson, 2001). 
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The second part of the thesis explains how the study is conducted in 
methodological terms, why the newspapers, 144 editions of the Manchester 
Guardian, the Manchester Evening News and the Evening Chronicle, were selected 
and how their influence and audience reach meet the requirements for the aims of this 
study. The time frame, eight weeks from December 1940 to February 1941, will also 
be specified and an explanation will be given for the choice of editions for the 
quantitative section of the study.  
The third part consists of chapters focusing on a specific set of themes and so 
provides the analysed core of this thesis. Each chapter, typically, is organised into two 
main sections, the first providing a national or theoretical context before the second 
studies the newspapers specifically. Chapter 4 focuses on Manchester at the start of 
the Second World War, a city comprising multiple different communities, and its 
Blitz. The internal reporting structures of the newspapers in the study are also 
considered, with a particular emphasis on the Manchester Guardian, for which an 
archive of internal memos and correspondence exists.  
Censorship is a key element of this thesis. The government created the 
Ministry of Information (MOI) within hours of the declaration of the war and one of 
its prescribed functions was to control the flow of news. Chapter 5 shows that 
casualty numbers were suppressed, bomb damage minimised and geographical details 
obscured so they became virtually meaningless. Manchester, for example, was 
described as an ‘inland town in North West England’ for fear of letting the Luftwaffe 
know where it had been bombing. Studying The Guardian Archive demonstrates, 
however, that while the editorial staff contested these strictures, conversely they also 
conducted self-censorship to go beyond what was demanded by the MOI.  
  
7
Propaganda, the deliberate manipulation by means of symbols (words, 
gestures, images, flags and so on) of other people’s thoughts, behaviour, attitudes and 
beliefs, was also a responsibility of the MOI.17 Historians, including Knightley and 
Niall Ferguson, have shown that the lesson of the importance of newspapers during 
times of conflict had been learned during the First World War and Chapter 6 
demonstrates how between 1939 and 1945 the press mirrored the distorted reporting 
of 25 years earlier.18 Headlines and copy are analysed to show that newspapers were 
enlisted just as much as other industries so that propaganda was delivered on a daily 
basis.19 This applied to Manchester newspapers as much as the rest of Fleet Street. 
Part of this propaganda was the promotion of the unity of purpose and 
equality of suffering. But was the Second World War the democratic and classless 
experience the newspapers portrayed? Modern historians, Calder, Juliette Gardiner 
and Max Hastings among them, have demonstrated that the wealthy could diminish 
the deprivations or avoid them all together by living outside the industrial centres or 
even abroad.20 Chapter 7 examines this inequality of experience and a parallel rise in 
crime rates as the disassociated and the selfish took advantage of reduced police 
numbers and the blackout.21 Newspapers reported the court cases but did not make the 
link between the war and a sense of lawlessness that thrived in some areas. 
Chapter 8 assesses the reliability of what was published in Manchester’s 
newspapers by comparing the press to the contemporary accounts in the archives of 
Mass Observation, Home Intelligence and Stockport Library. These show that there 
was a more complex reaction to the bombing than that reflected in newspapers and 
                                            
17 James Watson and Anne Hill, Dictionary of Media and Communication Studies, 6th edn (London: 
Arnold, 2003), p. 234. 
18 Knightley; Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (London: Penguin, 1998). 
19 Angus Calder, The People’s War: Britain 1939-45 (London: Cape, 1969), p. 505. 
20 Calder, Myth, Juliette Gardiner, The Blitz. The British Under Attack (London: Harper, 2010), Max 
Hastings, All Hell Let Loose: The World At War 1939-45. (London: Harper, 2011). 
21 Bandits of the Blitz, prod. by Liz Carney (BBC Radio 4, Broadcast 8 September 2010). 
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that the journalists’ eagerness to play up the pluses and ignore minuses had the 
opposite effect to that intended because Mancunians became bitter that their suffering 
was not being acknowledged.22 
Not surprisingly, the public wanted an escape from the hardship of war and 
demands for entertainment rose between 1939 and 1945, including for newspapers.23 
Circulations rose in Manchester and the non-war and lighter elements in the press 
were important elements behind this increase. A quantitative analysis of the studied 
newspapers is conducted in Chapter 9 that examines how much emphasis Manchester 
newspapers gave to these ‘lighter’ items. Statistical evidence is also used in the 
following chapter to demonstrate how the Manchester Blitz quickly disappeared from 
the news agenda. To assess whether Manchester’s newspapers were exceptions to the 
norm, these findings are compared to similar research into two national publications, 
The Times and the Daily Mirror, and a local weekly, the Salford City Reporter.  
Traditional news values, David Randall asserted, insist that a newspaper’s role 
is to ‘find out fresh information on matters of public interest and to relay it as quickly 
and as accurately as possible to readers in an honest and balanced way’.24 This thesis 
will demonstrate that the work of the censor, the eagerness to print government 
propaganda and compliance meant that the press, Manchester and national, fell short 
of those self-proclaimed standards, meeting these ideals of speed, accuracy, and 
balance only when there was good news to spread. Even then there were occasional 
delays. The thesis will also show that even those who were wholly behind the war 
effort had their support tested. There was bravery but there were also severe and 
understandable psychological problems caused by the bombing. Morale was not 
always high, defeat was contemplated and some used the chaos caused by the 
                                            
22 Mass Observation Archive, FR 538, Liverpool and Manchester, January 1941. 
23 Fussell, Wartime, p. 189. 
24 David Randall, The Universal Journalist, 2nd edn (London: Pluto, 2000), p. 22. 
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Luftwaffe to perpetrate crimes, preying even on the dying and the dead. Manchester 
suffered these aberrations from the accepted version just as any other major British 
city did and, ironically, for a short time after the Christmas Blitz, its newspapers’ 
eagerness to promote the positive and move on to other news hindered rather than 
supported the public’s curative process. 
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Part I: Theoretical Framework/Literature Review 
Chapter 1 
Historical Perspective 
 
1. The Age of the Press Barons  
Although the oldest surviving news pamphlet in Britain was printed in 1513 to 
announce the Battle of Flodden, the era of the mass circulation newspaper did not 
arrive in Britain until nearly 400 years later when a combination of rising literacy 
levels, improved technology and the development of the railways provided a national 
market that Alfred Harmsworth, later Lord Northcliffe, could supply.1 He launched 
the Daily Mail in 1896 and created a template that was followed by the Daily Express 
(1900) and, another Northcliffe paper, the Daily Mirror (1903), but it was the first 
issue of the Daily Mail that ‘may be taken as the beginning of modern journalism’.2 
The Mail used interviews, photographs and typographical innovations such as bold 
headlines to break up a page, allowing for ‘the gist of a piece to be taken at speed’, 
and was rewarded with a million, mainly lower middle-class, readers within four 
years of its launch.3 Sub-editors were urged to ‘explain, simplify and clarify’, a 
formula removed from the serious but dull competition, and, while it did not print 
news on its front page until the outbreak of the Second World War, it was entertaining 
rather than sensationalist, paving the way for modern tabloids.4 Northcliffe, according 
to Lord Beaverbrook, ‘the greatest figure who ever strode down Fleet Street’, 
increased his newspaper empire in 1905 when he obtained The Observer and he 
                                            
1 Martin Conboy, Journalism: A Critical History (London: Sage, 2004), p. 9; Peter Clarke, Hope and 
Glory: Britain 1900-1990 (London: Penguin, 1997), pp. 112-15. 
2 Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, p. 23; Political and Economic Planning, Report on 
the British Press: A Survey of its Current Operations and Problems with Special Reference to National 
Newspapers and their Part in Public Affairs (London: PEP, 1938), p. 9. 
3 Martin Conboy, Journalism in Britain: A Historical Introduction (London: Sage), p. 17. 
4 R. Pound and G. Harmsworth, Northcliffe (London: Cassell, 1959), p. 200.  
  
11
purchased The Times three years later, so that by the First World War he controlled 
approximately 40 per cent of morning, 45 per cent of the evening and 15 per cent of 
Sunday total newspaper circulations.5  
Northcliffe and his newspapers were at the centre of the rise of the political 
press. The need for newspaper publicity had been recognised by British political 
parties from the mid-Victorian period and the press ‘became a tool of party 
management, used to communicate with the public, foreign powers and other 
politicians’.6 Northcliffe’s effect on the political class was significant and he was 
made a baronet in 1904, a peer a year later and a viscount in 1918, reflecting the rise 
of proprietors, editors and reporters to positions ‘of unprecedented influence on the 
political decision-making process’.7 
Northcliffe’s political zenith came during the First World War when he 
became part of David Lloyd George’s government and was made responsible for 
propaganda in enemy countries, a post he filled with sufficient success that a German 
destroyer was sent to shell his house on the Kent coast in an attempt to assassinate 
him.8 Northcliffe’s role in the First World War was merely the most prominent among 
journalists because Fleet Street became a propaganda tool of the British government, 
never fully reporting the horrors of the Western Front. Knightley wrote:  
To enable the war to go on, the people had to be steeled for further sacrifices, and 
this could not be done if the full story of what was happening on the Western Front 
was known. And so began a great conspiracy. More deliberate lies were told than 
                                            
5 Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War, 1914-16, I (London: Oldbourne, 1928), p. 93, cited in A. 
J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 27; J. M. 
McEwen, ‘The National Press During the First World War: Ownership and Circulation’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 17 (1982), 466-74 (pp. 466-67, 470-01, 474).  
6 J. Lee Thompson, ‘Fleet Street Colossus: The Rise and Fall of Northcliffe, 1896-1922’, 
Parliamentary History, 25, 1 (2006), 115-38 (p. 116).  
7 Ibid. 
8Trove Digitised Newspapers, Bendigonian (State Library of Victoria, 10 May 1917) 
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killed. 
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in any other period of history, and the whole apparatus of the state went into action 
to suppress the truth.9  
 
The politicians were aware that a true account of the Western Front was being hidden 
from the public and so did the men who could have remedied that omission, the press 
barons. ‘If the people really knew,’ Lloyd George told the editor of the Manchester 
Guardian, C. P. Scott, in December 1917, ‘the war would be stopped tomorrow... But 
of course they don’t, and can’t know. The correspondents don’t write and the 
censorship would not pass the truth.’10 This thesis will further examine the 
propaganda of the First World War in later chapters, but the value that the British 
government placed in the co-operation of the press between 1914 and 1918 was 
reflected in the offices awarded. Apart from Northcliffe’s elevation, his brother 
Harold became a baron in 1914 and Viscount Rothermere in 1919, Sir Max Aitken, 
proprietor of the Daily Express, became Lord Beaverbrook, Waldorf Astor, of The 
Observer, became a viscount, Sir George Riddell, owner of the News of the World, 
became a peer and at least 12 press knighthoods were conferred.11  
Northcliffe was the first of the kind but the true era of the press barons came 
after his death in 1922. Lords Rothermere and Beaverbrook symbolised the age in 
which, according to many contemporary commentators, proprietors ensured their 
newspapers became ‘engines of propaganda’ to further their own political 
ambitions.12 The leader of the Conservative Party, Stanley Baldwin, articulated the 
concern this generated most stridently in a speech in 1931 when he said: ‘What the 
proprietorship of these papers is aiming at is power, and power without responsibility 
— the prerogative of the harlot through the ages.’13 Journalism historians have 
                                            
9 Knightley, First Casualty, p. 84. 
10 Ibid, pp. 116-17.  
11 Ibid, p. 104. 
12 ‘St George’s: Mr. Baldwin’s Speech’, Times, p. 17.  
13 Ibid. 
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challenged those verdicts since the 1980s, including Curran and Seaton, who argued 
that Beaverbrook and Rothermere did not break with tradition by using their 
newspapers for political purposes, but rather they downgraded propaganda in favour 
of entertainment: 
Nor did they subvert the role of the press as a fourth estate; on the contrary it was 
they who detached the commercial press from the political parties and, 
consequently, from the state. What actually happened is, in some ways, the exact 
opposite of historical mythology.14  
 
While the motives and the actions of the proprietors are open to debate, there 
is no doubt about the effect in terms of sales and reach. Between 1920 and 1939 the 
combined circulation of the national daily press rose from 5.4 million to 10.6 million 
and by 1937, together with Camrose and Kemsley, Beaverbrook and Rothermere 
owned nearly 50 per cent of every national and local paper sold in Britain.15 Their 
predominance would have been greater but for the re-emergence of the press that 
supported the political left, spearheaded by the Co-operative Movement buying the 
Reynolds News in 1929, the TUC joining Odhams to re-launch the Daily Herald that 
same year and the Communist Party establishing the Daily Worker in 1930.16  
The dominant figure in this period was Beaverbrook and no UK newspaper 
increased its circulation in the inter-war years more than his flagship publication, the 
Daily Express. The Canadian bought the newspaper, a ‘derelict property’, in 1916 
when its daily sale was of 400,000, less than half the 900,000 of the Daily Mail, and 
by 1939 it had a circulation of 2.49 million, representing nearly a quarter of all 
national daily newspaper sales in Britain.17 Targeted at the popular end of the market, 
it was unlike the Daily Mail in that its readership was spread over all income groups, 
                                            
14 Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, p. 38. 
15 Ibid. p. 40. 
16 Franklin R. Gannon, The British Press and Germany 1936-9 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), p. 42. 
17 Taylor, English History, p. 235; T. B. Browne, Advertiser’s ABC 1910-40, reprinted in David Butler 
and Anne Sloman, British Political Facts 1900-1975, 5th edn (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 452. 
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although around 60 per cent of its sales were in the next-to-lowest group.18 It was also 
the first national paper to put news on the front page for a prolonged time.19  
Beaverbrook is one of the most intriguing figures of the twentieth century and 
hugely significant in the history of British newspapers, his character, according to 
Matthew Engel, continuing ‘to exercise an extraordinary fascination’ to the current 
day.20 He was a mass of contradictions, who was summed up thus by Robert Edwards, 
twice the editor of the Daily Express: ‘He was kind, brutal, considerate, selfish, 
honest, eccentric and a bit mad, but utterly sane in his judgement of newspapers.’21 
Roy Greenslade stated that he came to personify a form of press ownership that had 
profound effects on the public perception of the press: ‘The insistent calls from 1945 
for restrictions on the powers of proprietors and a brake on the growth of media 
monopolies were largely traceable to hostility to Beaverbrook. He was the lightning 
rod for every complaint about press misbehaviour.’22  
There are many imperatives at work, commercial as well as political, in the 
behaviour of the press, which will be examined later in this thesis, and even in peace 
time news values were not as straightforward as might be imagined. This complexity 
was demonstrated by the Daily Express, which built its success peddling hope in the 
face of facts. The newspaper supported Hitler in the early 1930s but then largely 
neglected events in Europe. Engel wrote: ‘Beaverbrook was never attracted by 
Nazism; the only -ism he wanted to believe in was optimism. The flaw in the 
Express’s coverage of Europe was indifference, shading into self-deception and then, 
                                            
18 Gannon, British Press, p. 34. 
19 British Library, Concise History of the British Newspaper in the Nineteenth Century (British Library 
Newspaper Library) 
<http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelprestype/news/concisehistbritnews/britnews19th/index.html> 
[accessed 27 December 2012]. 
20 Matthew Engel, Tickle The Public: One Hundred Years of the Popular Press (London: Gollancz, 
1996), p. 114. 
21 Robert Edwards, Goodbye Fleet Street (London: Cape, 1988), p. 3.  
22 Roy Greenslade, Press Gang: How Newspapers Make Profits from Propaganda (London: Pan, 
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perhaps, to more wilful deception.’23 A prime example of this optimism appeared on 
23 May 1938 when the Express printed a comment piece by Beaverbrook. ‘Britain 
will not be involved with war,’ he wrote. ‘There will be no major war in Europe this 
year or next year.’24 This message was repeated on several occasions over the 
following 18 months, the penultimate occasion in August 1939, three weeks before 
the outbreak of hostilities, when the lead headline on the front page read ‘No War 
This Year’.25 It was indicative of the newspaper’s self-regard that the report was 
based solely on the opinions of 12 of its correspondents, all of whom would have 
been aware of the newspaper’s policy on pessimism. Ten of the 12 expected peace 
and even the two who demurred were undecided. It repeated the message for the 
eighth and last time on 11 August.26  
 
 
2. British Newspapers in the Countdown to War 
British newspapers began the Second World War in a paradoxical position. 
Gannon argued that, in terms of circulation and influence, they were at their zenith, 
yet there are counter arguments that readers were losing trust in the press.27 There was 
also criticism that newspapers were too hostile to Germany, most notably from Sir 
Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador to Berlin, who wrote on 16 August 1939, less 
than three weeks before Britain declared war: ‘History will judge the press, generally 
to have been the principal cause of war.’28 He was writing from an exceptional 
position, in Germany and from the political crucible that was Berlin in 1939 in 
                                            
23 Engel, Tickle the Public, p. 137.  
24 ‘Go About Your Business’, Daily Express, 23 May 1938, p. 1.  
25 ‘No War This Year’, Daily Express, 7 August 1939, p. 1. 
26 ‘No War says Lord Beaverbrook’, Daily Express, 11 August 1939, p. 1.  
27 Gannon, British Press, p. 1; Anthony Adamthwaite, ‘The British Government and the Media 1937-
1938’, Journal of Contemporary History, 18 (1983), 281-97. 
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particular, but there was also criticism closer to home and 15 days earlier the 
Manchester Guardian reported a speech in Parliament by Arnold Wilson, the 
Conservative MP for Hitchin. In it he said: ‘I would seriously suggest the time has 
come to consider whether we should not take voluntary powers to enable the press to 
control itself – at least the headlines.’29 Interestingly in respect of this thesis, he 
added: ‘We would do so without the smallest hesitation on the outbreak of war. Is it 
not better to do it now?’30 
These comments reflect Fleet Street’s position as the primary provider of news 
in Britain in the 1930s. The BBC gave limited bulletins on its fledgling radio service 
(which would improve dramatically during the war), but that outlet apart, the only 
sources of news outside the press came in the form of out-of-date newsreels – many 
of which were owned by newspaper groups – shown at the cinema. Franklin Gannon 
wrote: 
The late 1930s… were the golden age of newspapers in Great Britain. More 
newspapers reached more people than ever before, or than anywhere else in the 
world… The newspaper press was the only means of information about the outside 
world for the vast majority of people.31  
 
To meet the public’s eagerness for news there were, in 1938, 52 morning newspapers 
in Great Britain, 85 evening, and 18 Sundays. In 1934 every 100 British families 
bought 95 morning and 57.5 evening newspapers every day and 130 Sunday 
newspapers every week.32 Yet, despite this potential power, historians have argued 
that newspapers failed in two fundamentals of journalism: in holding the government 
to account in its foreign relations and in reflecting public opinion.33 Lance Price 
                                            
29 ‘Premier and the Moscow Negotiations’, Manchester Guardian, 1 August 1939, p. 12.  
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stated: ‘When Downing Street sought the help of the press to reassure the public and 
downplay the threat to Britain too many editors and proprietors were willing to 
comply.’34 
Much of this criticism has focused on the response of the British press to the 
Munich Agreement in that it failed properly to reflect public opinion. Adrian 
Bingham and Martin Conboy have argued that by the summer of 1938 the Daily 
Mirror was ‘already articulating a vigorous populist critique of appeasement’, but 
Fleet Street’s and the public’s reaction to Chamberlain’s accord with Hitler, agreed in 
September 1938, was initially favourable.35 An opinion poll taken almost immediately 
afterwards showed 51 per cent of the public ‘satisfied’ by the settlement, with 39 per 
cent ‘not satisfied’.36 A. J. P. Taylor wrote that when Chamberlain announced to 
Parliament that he was to meet Hitler at Munich: ‘The House broke into hysterical 
relief – at any rate on the Conservative side. “Thank God for the Prime Minister”.’37 
William W. Hadley, the editor of the Sunday Times, also concluded, after analysing 
50 newspapers, that they were all-but unanimous in praising the Prime Minister for 
preserving peace.38 Yet, while the press lauded Chamberlain, indicators of an 
alternative public mood emerged elsewhere. Alfred Duff Cooper, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, resigned from the Cabinet over Czechoslovakia within a matter of days 
and Chamberlain and the Conservatives lost voting share in seven by-elections held in 
October and November 1938, losing Dartford to Labour on 7 November and 
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Bridgwater to an independent candidate 10 days later.39 The press did not reflect this 
opposition and, with the cajoling of Downing Street, was largely supportive of the 
Prime Minister throughout the winter of 1938-39 until Hitler marched into Prague the 
following spring.40 Indeed, Anthony Adamthwaite argued, newspapers failed to 
reflect a significant body of opinion critical of British foreign policy: 
It used to be thought, that Hitler’s Prague coup produced a sudden and lasting 
change in British opinion to Germany. Now it is conceded that this change was 
under way in the winter of 1938-39. The evidence of deeply divided opinion in the 
spring and summer of 1938 warrants the conclusion that a reappraisal had begun 
before Munich.41  
 
The inability of the press at large to reflect this opinion was principally 
because of the overbearing presence of the government. Whereas Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere had campaigned for Baldwin’s removal as Conservative leader in 1931, 
Chamberlain was seen in a more favourable light. Chancellor of the Exchequer from 
1931 to 1937, he was widely regarded as the man responsible for encouraging the 
growth of the British economy after the Great Depression and as the natural choice to 
replace Baldwin.42 Although he was 68 when he became Prime Minister, he was seen, 
David Dutton wrote, ‘as one of the most dynamic forces in a government which, as 
the years went by, seemed increasingly to be plagued by inertia’.43 Chamberlain allied 
that approval to personal friendships with leading newspaper figures so that he did not 
use compulsion, but rather influence on the men who mattered, the opinion makers 
such as press barons, leading journalists and the BBC. This, Richard Cockett argued, 
allowed Chamberlain ‘to mask the real divisions that lay within the government and 
society’, the main consequence of which was:  
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No alternative policy to appeasement as pursued by Chamberlain could ever be 
consistently articulated in the British press, nor were the facts and figures that 
might have supported such an alternative policy ever put in front of the majority of 
the British public.44  
 
James Margach, the political correspondent of the Sunday Times, described 
Chamberlain as the first British Prime Minister to employ news management on a 
grand scale:  
His aim had nothing remotely to do with open government, access to information 
and the strengthening of the democratic process; it had everything to do with the 
exploitation of the press to espouse and defend government thinking. From the 
moment he entered No. 10 in 1937 he sought to manipulate the press into 
supporting his policy of appeasing the dictators. As he became increasingly 
passionate over appeasement and the more it came under attack from the media, 
the more he abandoned persuasion, turning instead to the use of threats and 
suppression to coerce the Press into co-operation. 45 
 
When he was asked difficult questions by the press lobby, Chamberlain would 
retaliate with a long, pointed, silence, then would turn away from the inquirer and 
demand: ‘Next question, please’.46 Margach wrote: ‘He was the only Prime Minister 
in my experience who could use this weapon of the total freeze. He was completely 
immobile, not merely for a fleeting second but for a long pause: an extraordinary 
show of silent intimidation.’47 
A study of newspapers in the four weeks before the start of the Second World 
War suggests that either by accident or by design, the growing crisis in Europe was 
not given its due attention until after the announcement of the signing of the Nazi-
Soviet Pact on 21 August 1939 when war was considered inevitable. On 15 August 
the Daily Mail reported that the ‘Danzig question will be settled without a conflict’ 
and it believed that there were ‘far bigger matters to be discussed’.48 A day later The 
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Times, whose editor had close links to the government, wrote that the German and 
Italian governments were putting into shape their own ideas of a settlement in Europe. 
‘Its first object is, manifestly, to prevent a war.’49 On 19 August the Daily Mirror 
reported that an American dancer, Miriam Verne, might be romantically linked to 
Hitler, following it up with a reported quote: ‘I think Herr Hitler’s absolutely the 
nicest man I know.’50 The Daily Express mocked the ‘jitter-mongers’ who had long 
predicted that 15 August would be ‘crisis day’, noting that England had enjoyed a day 
in the sun.51 Three days later its front page carried the benign headline: ‘Hitler the 
joker’, over an interview with Verne. ‘When Hitler goes to a party “he’s great fun”,’ it 
reported.52 Stephen Koss argued that this urge by newspapers to provide distractions 
from the harsh realities led to editors getting involved in frequent discussions and 
arguments with foreign correspondents, who complained about their copy being 
watered down or suppressed: ‘Consequently the bright spots were made to glow and 
the areas of darkness were left un-illuminated as they spread.’53  
The optimism dimmed with the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. ‘We 
have done our best to preserve peace,’ the Daily Mail commented, ‘and are ready now 
for whatever may befall.’54 An editorial in The Times on 2 September 1939, the day 
before the declaration of war, read: ‘This nation has never in its history been so 
unanimous in support of any decision taken by its leaders as it is now.’55 The 
Manchester Guardian, on the same day, wrote that it was for ‘the overthrow of this 
dictator [Hitler] and his system of government that we enter the war.’56 The mood had 
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changed from meek collusion with government policy to reluctant resignation that 
war was inevitable, but Cockett argued it was too late: ‘By September 1939, the press 
had become not so much the watchdog of democracy as the harlots of democracy.’57  
 
3. Conclusion 
The years between the formation of the Daily Mail and the end of the Second 
World War marked when Fleet Street was at the height of its influence. There was an 
enormous increase in national newspaper circulation and, with it, the political 
significance of the proprietors rose. At the times of national crisis, during the world 
wars, Northcliffe and Beaverbrook became members of the government, but in the 
intervening years the latter combined with Northcliffe’s brother, Rothermere, to 
launch a political party to challenge the ruling elite.58 The key message that can be 
derived from this is that the relationship between Downing Street and the press was 
more complex than mere compliance to orders. The press could and did confront the 
government in the 1920s and 1930s, yet once Chamberlain became Prime Minister 
Fleet Street largely followed where his administration pointed. The motivation for this 
will be further examined in later chapters, but in adopting this approach the press 
muted voices questioning Britain’s foreign policy, in particular, appeasement. This set 
the template for the reporting of the Second World War by British newspapers. Price 
was damning: ‘The media were subjected to the most sustained campaign of official 
bullying they had ever seen and almost in unison they rolled over and asked for 
more.’59 
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Chapter 2 
Analytical Concepts and Historiography 
 
1. Mythology and the Blitz 
Myth, Roland Barthes stated, is ‘a system of communication… a 
message’ and one of the ways that nations establish and determine the 
foundations of their own being, their values and their morality.1 George 
Schopflin wrote: ‘Myth is a set of beliefs, usually put forward as a narrative, 
held by a community about itself.’ 2 The on-going narrative of the Blitz of 
Britain was given its definition on 4 June 1940 when the Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill addressed Parliament with a speech that has become the 
oral shorthand for Britain’s boldness against Hitler:  
We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, and we shall fight on 
the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing 
strength in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, 
we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we 
shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we 
shall never surrender.3 
 
The BBC recorded that, when Churchill spoke on the radio, 70 per cent of 
the population listened, and in doing so they became witnesses to one of the 
great mythical constructions.4 Churchill’s rhetoric was wishful thinking as 
Britain’s army was defeated and short of weapons, and only the Royal Navy 
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and the RAF stood in the way of invasion.5 As Clive Ponting put it, the 
choice looming for Britain was to ‘become a dependency of the United 
States or it would have to seek peace from a victorious Germany’.6 
Churchill was painting a picture of ideals, not facts, but Schopflin has 
argued that myths are perceptions rather than historically validated truths: 
Members of a community may be aware that the myth they accept is not 
strictly accurate, but, because myth is not history, this does not matter. It 
is the content of the myth that is important, not its accuracy as a 
historical account.7  
 
The creation of the myth of unwavering fortitude by Britain’s 
civilian population in the Second World War was borne out of an anxiety 
that had a comparatively long pedigree. As early as 1908 H. G. Wells had 
predicted the effects of blanket bombing in The War in the Air, writing: ‘No 
place is safe, no place is at peace… People go out in the morning and see 
air-fleets passing overhead – dripping death – dripping death!’8 Newsreels 
from the Spanish Civil War and subsequent writing had intensified fears 
that had derived initially from fiction and had been articulated by Stanley 
Baldwin in a speech in the House of Commons in 1932: ‘I think it is 
well…for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth that 
can prevent him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the 
bomber will always get through.’9 In 1937 British experts predicted 60 days 
of bombing if war broke out with Germany, with 600,000 people killed and 
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twice that number injured.10 David Dilks wrote: ‘If ministers took literally 
all that was recommended to them by the best expert opinion, they would 
have had to expect from concentrated air bombardment something like the 
effects which we should now anticipate from limited nuclear warfare.’11 It 
was, therefore, a climate of extreme fear in which the British braced 
themselves when war was declared in September 1939, an anxiety that 
declared itself in a mass evacuation of the big cities within days. Around 
827,000 children were taken from threatened areas, including Donald Read, 
a Manchester schoolboy, who wrote: 
Two years earlier, the bombing of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War 
and of Canton by the Japanese in China had been reported in the British 
press with great alarm. The widely held impression was that cities could 
now be destroyed from the air almost at will.12 
 
The Blitz, the sustained bombing of Britain, is commonly considered 
to have started on the night of 7/8 September 1940 when London was 
bombed for the first of 58 consecutive nights before the Luftwaffe switched 
its attention mainly to industrial centres in the provinces.13 Over the entire 
war, according to British official figures, more than 60,000 civilians were 
killed, 86,182 people were admitted to hospital, most of them seriously 
injured, and 150,833 were recorded as ‘slightly injured’.14 Derek Wood and 
Derek Dempster stated that, of five aims for the attacks listed by Hermann 
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Goering, Air Minister and commander in chief of the Luftwaffe, the fourth 
was demoralisation of the civilian population.15  
To counter this, the British press, under concerted pressure from the 
government, facilitated what Mick Temple described as ‘the creation of 
“necessary myths” which helped boost morale and unify the nation’.16 This 
propaganda had it that the nation rallied behind Churchill and calmly 
endured the horrors inflicted on the population by Hitler’s bombers. It is a 
myth that endures, so that the ‘Blitz Spirit’ has become an expression used, 
lazily, to describe any signs of British fortitude. For example, in recent 
times Prime Minister Gordon Brown invoked it to rally the population to 
overcome the country’s economic problems; it was utilised when the West 
Country was flooded in 2007; more bizarrely, David Lloyd tried to resurrect 
it when he played recordings of Churchill’s speeches to inspire greater 
efforts from the England cricket team when he was the national coach 
during the 1990s.17 These examples are constructions that underline 
Barthes’s assertion that myth is a ‘conjuring trick’ in which reality is turned 
inside out and ‘emptied it of history’.18 Barthes stated: ‘Mythical speech is 
made of material that has already been worked on’, and Brown and Lloyd 
were using concepts that were 60 years old.19 
The establishment of that myth began with the word Blitz itself. The 
Oxford English Dictionary definition is: ‘an attack or offensive launched 
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suddenly with great violence with the object of reducing the defences 
immediately’, which overstates what happened even at the height of the 
Luftwaffe’s action.20 London and Coventry were damaged but were not 
reduced to rubble and if ‘Blitz’ could be applied to any bombing operations 
it would be to Hamburg in July 1943, that killed an estimated 42,000, and 
Dresden in February 1945, when British and American aircrews destroyed 
13 square miles of the city and killed, by conservative estimates, at least 
35,000.21 Britain escaped lightly when set in this context. The word Blitz 
had been appropriated from the word Blitzkrieg, lightning war, applied by 
the world’s press to Germany’s rapid conquest of Poland, and was used in 
anticipation of Hitler’s attempt to bomb Britain out of the war. Taylor 
pointed out that a nine-month bombardment was the very opposite of 
lightning war but Terence O’Brien stated ‘as heavy bombing began in the 
late summer [of 1940], Blitz became almost overnight a British 
colloquialism for an air raid’.22 But from the first it suggested more than 
that. ‘It was instantaneously and spontaneously “mythologised”.’23 This, 
academics have pointed out, was not the result of the widespread destruction 
of official documents in Britain or wilful misinformation as in Soviet 
Russia, where historians dated the start of the Second World War as 22 June 
1941 deliberately ignoring the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 that protected 
Hitler’s eastern flank for nearly two years of the war, but from other 
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requirements.24 There was no great cover-up, but rather an acquiescence in 
order to search for a simple narrative. This typified Barthes’s definition of 
mythologies in that they are without depth and they deny more nuanced 
reactions to events:  
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about 
them; simply it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a 
natural and eternal justification, it gives them clarity which is not that of 
an explanation but that of a statement of fact… In passing from history to 
nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human 
acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all 
dialectics, with any going back beyond what is immediately visible.25 
 
The notion of a Blitz Spirit was an example of this simplicity 
because it ignored the more complicated reaction to being bombed that will 
be outlined in this thesis. Its economic use of the facts also allowed the 
British to draw a direct, and convenient, line with another myth from the 
First World War a quarter of century earlier when, rather than the individual 
hero, literature, the arts and folklore found ways to make everyone in the 
armed services heroic. This, Calder argued, set a precedent for those who, 
two decades later, wished to eulogise the entire British population, who, 
apart from a few areas of London and, briefly, in other places like 
Manchester, suffered an experience far less extreme than that of the soldiers 
in the trenches of the Somme.26 Yet, perhaps people struggling to make 
sense of their suffering needed to find a connection with the phlegmatic 
infantry of 1914-18: 
The language of pre-existing mythologies, including the Myth of the 
Tommy at the Front, adapted itself to events with remarkable 
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‘naturalness’ and fluency and stories were generated with such success 
that we, born since, have ignored how frightening and confusing the 
period from April 1940 through to June 1941 was for the British people. 
27 
 
A Home Intelligence report in February 1941 revealed that the 
British public felt impotent under the onslaught of the Blitz and irrelevant to 
the conduct of the war.28 This reinforced the need for a mythology because, 
Schopflin argued, myth is a tool used by the ruling elites to explain 
misfortunes ‘that are beyond our control’. Having to stand up to the ‘Nazi 
regime, with almost all Europe writhing and starving under their heel,’ as 
Churchill put it to Parliament, was a prime example.29 Schopflin listed the 
elites as: ‘The political and intellectual elites in the community, those who 
are able to gain the ear of society, those who control the language of public 
communication – politicians, the monarch, the bureaucracy, perhaps the 
priesthood, writers and so on.’30 Churchill, as Prime Minister, was clearly a 
member of this elite, and so were newspaper proprietors and editors who 
amplified and repeated his message. Barthes asserted that myth is not 
confined to oral narrative but can consist of reporting, publicity and 
photographs, any of which ‘can serve as support to mythical speech’.31 And 
if Churchill’s ‘never surrender’ urgings (followed by the ‘finest hour’ 
rhetoric a fortnight later) provided the soundtrack, the photograph (below), 
taken by Herbert Mason on 29 December 1940 and published in the Daily 
Mail two days later, encapsulated it as an image.32 
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To use Barthes’s framework, the signifier was the dome St Paul’s Cathedral 
miraculously appearing undamaged as the rest of the capital burned, while 
the signified was the indestructibility of Britain, the popular image of the 
inhabitants accepting everything the Luftwaffe could throw at them and 
emerging from the wreckage with the inevitable joke on their lips.34 The 
caption in the Mail read: ‘It symbolises the steadiness of London’s stand 
against the enemy: the firmness of Right against Wrong.’35 It is one of the 
most famous examples of photojournalism – it was billed in the newspaper 
as the ‘War’s greatest picture’ – and, like the Blitz Spirit, did not wholly 
withstand scrutiny. St Paul’s did not escape unscathed. A bomb demolished 
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the high altar and the crypt and some stained-glass windows were 
damaged.36  
Barthes stated that myth stands in the way of the historian, and, in 
the British context, nowhere more so than in assessing the Blitz, which has 
taken on near religious significance in British history.37 As Calder wrote: 
‘The heroism of the British under bombardment was quasi-Christian – its 
great symbol, after all, was St Paul’s dome flourishing.’38 It was a myth, 
too, that was selective in that it neglected to acknowledge that Bomber 
Command was inflicting the same death and destruction on German 
civilians and would multiply it several times over in the latter stages of the 
war. Calder wrote: ‘Its construction involved putting together facts known 
or believed to be true, overlaying these with inspirational values and 
convincing rhetoric – and leaving out everything known or believed to be 
factual which didn’t fit.’39 Proving that the message could be altered to suit 
the propaganda, the Germans also used Mason’s picture on 23 January 1940 
with the headline: ‘The City of London is burning’.40 
This thesis will show that, contrary to the positivist version of 
events, the effects of the Blitz on London, and other parts of Britain, were 
varied. Academics have reported that contemporary memoirs and 
documents testify to ‘panic, to horrified revulsion, to post-raid depression, 
to antisocial behaviour,’ and, while the big picture was that Britain was 
bombed and endured, these variations to the mythologised story should be 
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acknowledged.41 Curran and Seaton wrote that the mythology has 
encouraged the belief that the British people closed ranks behind the 
unchallenged leadership of Churchill, but this has hidden less palatable 
truths:  
This mythical view obscures the political and social crisis of the early 
war years, which led to a major confrontation between the government 
and the left press. Many senior politicians and officials doubted the 
commitment of the British people to winning the war. A significantly 
named Home Morale Emergency Committee of the Ministry of 
Information reported in June 1940 on ‘fear, confusion, suspicion, class 
feeling and defeatism’. Even the Ministry’s parliamentary secretary, 
Harold Nicolson, confided in his diary during this period: ‘It will now be 
almost impossible to beat the Germans’. For at least the first two and a 
half years of the war, the relationship between the authorities and the 
press was dominated by a constant and probably misplaced concern 
about the state of public morale.42 
 
Claude Levi-Straus asked the question: ‘When does mythology end and 
history begin?’ His answer was that myth is a static feature that works for a 
moment in time but, as new information is uncovered that does not sit easily 
with that mythological framework, a new mythology has to be developed so 
that the community can retain its coherence.43 The following section will 
examine how historiography of the Blitz has travelled from accepting the 
patriotic myth of 1940 to challenging it. This scrutiny will expand from the 
Blitz, Manchester, morale, newspapers and the Second World War in 
general. 
 
2. The Literature 
This thesis fills a gap in the neglected area of the role of newspapers 
in the Second World War. Specific literature on newspapers and the Blitz is 
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limited and the focus on Manchester’s press between 1939 and 1945 is 
virtually absent from published studies. There are books that look at broader 
themes in which the press and the Second World War are part of a larger 
perspective, but Manchester, the ‘other Fleet Street’, gets only scant 
mention if it is recorded at all. Instead, the field of study is broadly 
categorised as histories of the conflict, biographies of prominent newspaper 
men, studies of the social consequences of the bombing, general research 
into the press, and cultural theorising on why and what appeared in print.  
 
2.1 The Blitz 
In terms of the printed word, the creation of a mythical stoicism 
began from the start of the Second World War. Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony argued that the state and ruling classes cannot enforce control 
over any group or structure unless other, more intellectual, methods are 
entailed and the media play a central role in creating an ‘acceptable’ 
consensus.44 The earliest government publications had the dual purpose of 
maintaining morale while purporting to be publications of record, including 
Front Line 1940-41, which was published by the MOI in 1942, and was 
typical in combining the facts the government was prepared to release and 
simple propaganda. On the Blitz it stated: ‘The failure to disturb civil morale 
or to reduce appreciably the flow of production was complete. The great 
German offensive against the back gardens and front parlours of Britain met 
with total defeat.’45 This was premature, simplistic and misleading, and this 
thesis will show that it conformed to the propaganda model adopted by 
                                            
44 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, pp. 21-43. 
45 Ministry of Information, Front Line 1940-41: The Official Story of the Civil Defence of 
Britain (London: HMSO, 1942), pp. 158-59. 
  
33 
newspapers in 1940 and 1941. The emphasis of the German offensive, it 
suggested, was on gardens and houses, the front parlours where people 
spent most of their time at home, not the factories and warehouses fuelling 
the war effort that were the real targets of the Luftwaffe. Notwithstanding 
Goering’s ambition to demoralise the British population, why would the 
Germans prioritise front parlours over the means of war production? That 
Britain had not been bombed into submission was correct, although the 
writers had no way of knowing that was going to remain the case at the 
time, but to dismiss the effects on morale was to distort the case, as the 
following chapters will show.  
Front Line’s view on Manchester was similarly rose tinted, stating 
the city had been ‘big enough to take the raid without much upset or 
disturbance’.46 It added:  
Manchester typifies many of the elements in British democracy to which 
Hitlerism is most repugnant… The city had been early to perceive the 
threat from Germany and to respond to the government’s call for civil 
defence preparations. When the test came the wardens, rescue and 
casualty services were ready.47  
 
This was a fabrication. The MOI knew this because Home Intelligence 
inspectors had sent a report in January 1941 that had highlighted the 
dramatic fall in morale in the city after the Christmas Blitz.48 The same 
Home Intelligence report was also critical of the local authority and a lack 
of preparation of the city’s facilities for the homeless, something Front Line 
barely registered.  
On the fires that rampaged through the city, Front Line admitted 
‘Manchester, like the rest, was caught off guard’ and, later, it conceded that 
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the fire fighters lacked cohesion: ‘The auxiliary firemen and their regular 
comrades had not yet had an opportunity to become welded into a single, 
well-exercised unit. The problems of mobilisation, command and water-
relay were therefore the more formidable.’49 Buried in a mound of eulogies, 
this was the only suggestion that Manchester’s emergency services had 
lacked organisation in December 1940. Yet contemporary witnesses wrote 
of fires raging out of hand, buildings were dynamited to stop the flames 
spreading and 700 fire fighters had to be rushed from London and its 
outskirts to help put out the blazes.50 These accounts strongly counter the 
assertion the city took the raid (singular, it should be noted) without upset or 
disturbance. The MOI had received reports from Manchester, Coventry and 
other British cities emphatically stating that civilian morale had been 
disturbed to the point that some people were questioning whether it was 
worth continuing the fight.51  
Front Line typified the tone of publications during the war, 
reinforcing the idea that the British ‘could take it’, a necessity if the fight 
against Hitler was to be maintained. It was a precondition, after all, of 
Britain not suing for peace when its allies, Poland and France, were swept 
aside by Hitler’s Blitzkrieg. The historiography for the two decades after the 
war reflected this narrative, taking its lead from Churchill, whose ‘finest 
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hour’ speech had created the template. Churchill’s own six-volume 
apologia, The Second World War, was typical: 
These were the times when the English, and particularly the Londoners, 
who had the place of honour, were seen at their best. Grim and gay, 
dogged and serviceable, with the confidence of an unconquered people in 
their bones, they adapted themselves to this strange new life, with all its 
terrors, with all its jolts and jars. 52 
 
As the war leader, Churchill had a vested interest in exaggerating the 
stoicism of the public, but even he hinted that the above was an idyllic 
portrayal, and by no means universal, when he added that the Blitz had 
brought ‘so many problems of a social and political character’.53 Yet his 
positivist argument was so persuasive that historians subscribed to the tale 
of unyielding morale and tenacious determination until the late 1960s and, 
as this thesis shows, the imagery endures in the popular mind-set. Taylor, 
normally a challenger of historical clichés, recorded that, for every civilian 
killed, 35 were made homeless, with all the social problems that implied, 
yet wrote of ‘the unshaken spirit of the British people’ and that the raids 
‘cemented national unity’ in his English History 1914-1945, first published 
in 1965.54 Taylor’s evidence for this fortitude did not come from analysis of 
contemporary correspondence but was inferred by two votes in Parliament: 
the defeat by 341 to four in December 1940 of a motion by the Independent 
Labour Party for a negotiated peace, and a similarly overwhelming majority 
of 297 to 11 backing the suspension of the Daily Worker the following 
month.55 ‘Not a dog barked,’ he wrote of the latter, failing to take into 
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account the ‘deep sense of disturbance’ expressed by the National Council 
for Civil Liberties, concerns on the political left and a series of readers’ 
letters that appeared in the Manchester Guardian and other newspapers.56 
He also failed to ask whether either vote by MPs in the relative safety and 
comfort of the House of Commons was a true reflection of the mood in the 
bombed out streets of London, Manchester and Coventry.  
 Churchill’s interpretation of the resilience of the British people was 
endorsed by official sources, among the first of which was framed by 
Richard Titmuss in 1950. His study argued that not only was morale 
sustained throughout the war but also the mental health of the nation 
improved thanks to a universal will created by national necessity.57 O’Brien 
was equally sanguine, writing of the Blitz: ‘The phrase “London can take it” 
became current and there is small doubt that this reflected the reality of the 
situation.’58 He added that the evacuation was relatively small and that there 
was no panic, assertions that have since been contested by historians who 
have studied contemporary accounts. 
This canonisation of the British civilian in the Second World War, 
‘the grotesque angelism’ as Trevor Harris described it, was first confronted 
by Calder with The People's War: Britain 1939-1945.59 This book, 
published in 1969, was the first extended challenge to the positivist reading 
of the Second World War and was hugely influential on the subsequent 
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historiography and the arts, the director Richard Eyre citing 20 works, films, 
television and theatre, that emerged from its conclusions.60 The People’s 
War drew on oral testimony and the work of Mass Observation that moved 
beyond London and the semi-mythological construction of deepest England 
to the industrial cities of the north, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Calder stated that the conventional version of events, while true in parts, did 
not remain intact when confronted by the evidence and that the popular 
image was created by propagandists with the willing acquiescence of the 
press: ‘Some journalists of the period created a myth of the Cockney 
wisecracking over the ruins of his world, which is as famous as the myth of 
the Few soaring into battle with laughter on their lips, and equally 
misleading.’61  
Surprisingly given that he was challenging myths, Calder subscribed 
to that of Dunkirk in People’s War, something he eschewed when he 
returned to the subject in 1991 with The Myth of the Blitz, a more relentless 
debunking of the image of the plucky Londoner. Calder argued that the Blitz 
Spirit formed the third part of a wartime trilogy of semi-truths that also 
included Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain. Dunkirk, he stated, was hailed as 
snatching victory from catastrophe, and while 199,000 British and 139,000 
French soldiers were evacuated across the Channel, it was a defeat, as even 
Churchill acknowledged when he described it as a ‘colossal military 
disaster’.62 The Battle of Britain was won by ‘the Few’ although the 
numbers were not as balanced against Fighter Command as the myth insists, 
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an assertion that has since been endorsed by other academics, including 
Ferguson, who wrote: ‘Britain was not the underdog; the odds were about 
even.’63 The army, the RAF, the Royal Navy and a flotilla of small ships 
had defied Hitler, the Blitz represented the British people’s turn and in 1940 
there were many examples contributing to the narrative of defiance. Calder 
cited Mollie Panter-Downes, of the New Yorker, who wrote: 
It would be difficult for an impartial observer to decide today whether the 
British are the bravest or merely the most stupid people in the world… 
The individual Englishman seems to be singularly unimpressed by the 
fact that there is now nothing between him and the undivided attention of 
a war machine such as the world has never seen before. Possibly it’s a 
lack of imagination, possibly again, it’s the same species of dogged 
resolution which occasionally produces an epic like Dunkirk.64 
  
Leaving aside the transformation of Dunkirk from a defeat to an ‘epic’, 
another voice might have asked: did the individual Englishman, or Briton, 
have any choice?  
Instead, fuelled by an anger caused by Margaret Thatcher’s co-
option of the ‘Blitz Spirit’ for the Falklands War, Calder argued that the 
chirpy East Ender and ‘we’re all in this together’ were stereotypes that hid 
the reality of an inequality of suffering and concealed less than heroic 
stories of despair, xenophobia and rising crime levels.65 He also unpicked 
the unanimity of purpose, noting that Celtic nationalists, communists and 
conscientious objectors had different reasons for questioning the fighting of 
the war, while miners and other trades unionists did not need long memories 
to find supporting Churchill, a prominent government figure in the General 
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Strike of 1926, a debatable prospect. Calder quoted a letter from Beryl, 
Lady Mayhew, in which she painted an idyllic Norfolk country scene 
inhabited by ducks, turtledoves and kingfishers. He asked: 
Gulls wheeled over Dover cliffs; kingfishers darted in alders; Britain 
awaited invasion with quiet confidence. Thus, it is clear, was the ‘finest 
hour’ prepared for. So why were thousands of innocent aliens interned? 
Why were people in high places obsessed with the danger of a British 
fifth column?66  
 
Calder’s assertions provoked a fierce counter-reaction. John Ray 
claimed that the 12-month period from September 1940 was an ‘annus 
mirabilis in British history’ and asked what would have happened if the 
British had failed to repulse Hitler?67 He added: ‘Sometimes these lessons 
are evaded by denigrators whose pens inscribe with metaphorical glee on 
the graves of the dead.’68 Author Phil Craig in the Daily Mail stated that the 
‘so-called Myth of the Blitz’ contained much that is true, and the 
‘debunking version contains much that is exaggerated, contrary and just 
plain wrong’.69 Craig also noted that the report of East Enders booing the 
Royal family was based on one entry in the diary of Harold Nicolson.70 
Craig was correct in that Calder did not provide further substantiating 
evidence to back Nicolson’s assertion, although he failed to ask why one of 
Churchill’s ‘strongest supporters’ would record this in his diary if it were 
unreliable?71  
This drawing of the historiographical battle lines has moved in 
recent years as modern academics, most of whom were born after the war, 
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have used Mass Observation and Home Intelligence reports to revise the 
story of steadfast morale. None has suggested that British morale was 
broken by the Blitz, but they have attempted to qualify the exaggerated 
claims of universal selflessness and enthusiastic cooperation that were 
made, frequently by the press. Typical of this approach is Ponting’s 1940: 
Myth and Reality, which was published just before Calder’s Myth of the 
Blitz but owed a debt to People’s War and Calder’s collaboration with 
Dorothy Sheridan, Speak for Yourself, an anthology of Mass Observation 
reports from 1937 to 1949.72 Ponting also reported that morale fluctuated, 
the Ministry of Information recording ‘depression’ and ‘open signs of 
hysteria’ in Coventry, Bristol citizens feeling ‘let down’, looting and 
‘wanton destruction’ in Portsmouth and Plymouth people questioning 
whether it was worth fighting on.73 In his introduction Ponting wrote that his 
purpose was to strip away the myths created by Churchill’s memoirs and in 
this he succeeded, although the claims on the cover that it was a ‘startling 
account of the ineptitude and propaganda’ in 1940 was overblown given the 
number of books in his bibliography in which these same myths had already 
been confronted. Ponting approached his subject with the premise that the 
existence of the myth meant that there was a mass of lies that needed 
uncovering, a position as strong and simplistic as the myth of 1940 itself. 
But this was not the only fault as he frequently failed to provide references 
when he made bold statements. For example, when he quoted the senior 
royal naval officer at Dunkirk as saying: ‘The French staff at Dunkirk feel 
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strongly that they are defending Dunkirk for us to evacuate, which is largely 
true,' no attribution was made, a surprising omission given that it differed so 
strongly from the accepted British version.74 Similarly, when he claimed 
that civilians in provincial cities left in large numbers, where was the 
evidence when he stated: ‘In parts of Southampton after the bombing only 
one in five of the people were left’?75 Which parts? Who did the counting? 
Where did they go?  
Nevertheless, Ponting provided a detailed account of the revisionist 
position, focusing on one year. Malcolm Smith’s Britain and 1940: History, 
Myth and Popular Memory offered a longer a view, stretching back to the 
pre-war period when the myths of 1940 and 1941 found their origins in the 
extreme fears about the effects of intensive bombing.76  
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His aim, too, was to ‘trace the changing construction of what 1940 and the 
war have come to mean in the subsequent 60 years’.78 Smith’s main premise 
was that 1940 was the watershed that exposed the failure of Conservative 
government in the 1930s and underpinned the consensus for social change 
between 1945 and the 1960s. He also entered an interesting debate about 
Britain’s international position, in which he claimed that the, albeit 
qualified, victory in 1945 coloured the attitude towards the European Union. 
‘Very well, alone’, the caption to David Low’s cartoon in London’s Evening 
Standard (above) read in the wake of France’s surrender and Smith 
employed this to draw a line from that to the solitary position adopted by 
opponents to European integration since. This was a stretched connection 
and there were others too. His suggestion, for example, that the appeal of 
soaps such as Coronation Street and EastEnders derived from the story that 
began in 1940 – ‘it was the Blitz which made the community story a 
principal argument in the interior monologue of the nation’ – overlooked 
several other factors such as class and locality.79 The neighbourhood, urban 
and rural, had been a feature of working class culture and literature since the 
nineteenth century and to dismiss it is to forget, in addition to many more 
mundane local milestones, the villages bonded in grief at the destruction of 
the Pals Regiments in the First World War, mining communities during and 
after the General Strike, and the Tyneside support that propelled the Jarrow 
March.  
Gardiner underlined the state of fear that existed in 1939 when she 
noted that within minutes of Chamberlain announcing the declaration of war 
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the British public were given a reminder that they would be in the front line. 
Sirens wailed over the capital, Londoners rushed to find the nearest shelter 
and braced themselves for an attack. But they were not in danger; it was a 
false alarm and the all clear soon sounded.80 The terror and subsequent relief 
that would mark the Blitz had begun without a bomb being dropped or a 
bullet fired. That first alert, just 30 minutes into the war, was a metaphor for 
‘expectation and fearful anticipation’.81 Gardiner used many of the same 
sources as Calder, including Mass Observation, but covered the bombing of 
provincial cities in greater detail and provided greater thoroughness and 
statistics to chart the rise in crime between 1939 and 1945. She noted:  
The Blitz has given the British – politicians in particular – a storehouse 
of images on which to draw at times of crisis… There were thousands of 
examples of extreme bravery, fortitude and selflessness. There was also a 
pervasive sense of exhaustion, uncertainty and anxiety, and acts of 
selfishness, intransigence and contumely.82 
 
Gardiner insisted that: ‘The war did change Britain... the Blitz powerfully 
shaped that change,’ and while this claim was ill-defined, and her 
conclusion did not properly engage with the inherent contradiction in much 
of the content of her book, which was dominated by anecdotes of the 
continuity of British daily life, she was correct.83 Attitudes to authority were 
altered by the pettiness of much of the regulation and provided an impetus 
for small crime and a fall in respect of authority. 
Stuart Hylton’s Their Darkest Hour, while lacking the depth of 
research in Calder or Gardiner’s books, expanded on the effects of the 
bombing, including an increase in sexual activity, consumption of alcohol 
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and crime. He wrote: ‘My idealised picture was replaced by a reassuringly 
mixed view of the people and the times, in which grumbles, incompetence, 
bureaucracy and opportunism lived alongside the sacrifice and bravery.’84 
He asserted that the possibility of introducing total press censorship was 
seriously considered by the wartime government, ‘but it was felt to sit too 
uneasily with their self-appointed role as guardians of civil liberties in the 
world’.85 This was over-generous. 
Since 2000 the theme of several new national studies on the Blitz 
has been to return to contemporary accounts, including Simon Garfield, 
Carol Harris and Frank and Joan Shaw. Garfield’s We Are at War recorded 
a more nuanced reaction to the Blitz when he examined the diaries of five 
Mass Observation diarists, including the Preston salesman Christopher 
Tomlin whose powers of description brought a vivid colour to his reports.86 
Tomlin described his customers as having ‘the clammy touch of the grave 
on their souls. They are full of dread, of terror at the sound of an aeroplane. 
Children scream – they daren’t go to bed’.87 When Coventry was badly 
bombed on 14 November, the Daily Express reported the city was stricken 
‘but keeps its courage and sanity’.88 In contrast, Tomlin reacted: ‘Some of 
my customers say: “If they mention 1,000 killed you can take it for granted 
there are lots more”.’89 The following day he concluded: 
If we cannot stop the massacre of the innocents we must ask for peace. 
It’s the only way. A preventative must be found immediately for the 
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night bomber or our towns and cities will very soon be in ruins. We keep 
up the pretence of cheerfulness but in reality we are terrified.90 
 
This was an authentic British voice far removed from the Churchillian 
message of ‘never surrender’.  
Like Garfield, Harris’s Blitz Diary: Life Under Fire in World War II 
and Shaw and Shaw’s We Remember the Blitz eschewed drawing 
conclusions and instead allowed diarists, letter writers and correspondents to 
speak for their own experiences. Harris noted that the first civilian war-
related deaths recorded in Britain were the result of a Heinkel bomber 
crashing into the home of Mr and Mrs W. Gill of Victoria Road, Clacton-
on-Sea, killing husband and wife in May 1940.91 When the Luftwaffe turned 
its attention to London Harris chronicled the horror and the tedium, 
including a letter from a teacher and ARP warden in Leytonstone, London, 
in September 1940: ‘I must confess that the long weary hours of waiting and 
listening through the night, quite alone in the house with not a soul to talk 
to, are very trying, but I am profoundly glad that Rube and the kiddies are 
away. This is no place for women and children.’92 Shaw and Shaw wrote to 
local newspapers appealing for accounts of the Blitz and were rewarded 
with 150 responses, many of them poignant or humorous. These included 
Elizabeth Godwin, whose grandfather paused on his way to church to shake 
the hand of a friend, keeping her long enough for her to be killed by a 
delayed action bomb, and the milkman losing patience after being 
repeatedly berated by a warden for not taking cover: ‘Take cover? Take 
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cover? An’ wot am I supposed to do wiv me ‘orse?’93 Usefully, We 
Remember the Blitz catalogued the casualty figures for every British city 
and perhaps illustrated the confusion surrounding the death tolls in that it 
recorded 1005 deaths for the Manchester Blitz. Less forgivable was the 
mistake that listed the second night of the city’s bombing as 25 December 
1940.94 
In another, slightly older, study published in the 1990s, Tom 
Harrisson was more forthright in constructing his own arguments from the 
contemporary correspondence, using the Mass Observation Archive to give 
an account of British life under bombardment, chronicling that the public 
lived ‘often in distress but often, also, in something approaching apathy’.95 
Living Through the Blitz asserted that most surviving citizens had either a 
collective amnesia about the Blitz or, more usually, ‘to see those nights as 
glorious’.96 Harrisson, a founder of Mass Observation, countered this 
‘public glossification’ by recalling an account in which a Southampton 
resident remembered King George VI being jeered when he toured the city 
in 1940. ‘But we were not booing the King and Queen. It was all the town’s 
top brass who were with them.’97 This apathy to the local authorities, he 
noted, was a reaction that was repeated in Bristol, Liverpool and 
Manchester. He quoted one man as saying Mancunians had a low level of 
interest about the city’s war experience ‘because the essence of the story 
was that morale in Manchester was low because local leaders were inept’.98 
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Harrisson argued that the most important finding by Mass Observation 
during the Blitz was that those who had suffered severe bombing raids 
tended not to call for attacks of a similar nature on Germany. ‘Champions of 
reprisals were conspicuously more numerous in the unblitzed places and the 
countryside’, he wrote, advocating the theory that those who believe that air 
raids work are most often those who have no first-hand experience of 
them.99  
 The challenge of the continuing historiographical debate has been to 
balance the recorded failings of a few in the Blitz with the recorded and 
presumed merits of the many. This thesis will mirror the generation of 
historians born since 1939, who have written with a more critical 
detachment regarding the popular image that Britain could take it, and, at 
the same time acknowledge the overall perspective: Britain was bombed 
relentlessly in 1940 and 1941 and endured. The key question going forward 
will be whether the Manchester press, by failing to accurately report the 
Blitz, devalued the many acts of courage. If everyone is defined as a hero, 
how do the truly heroic stand apart? 
    
2.2 Manchester and other British Cities 
Calder, Gardiner and Ponting, unlike Harrisson, neglected the 
Manchester Blitz, a pattern that has been repeated by much of the literature, 
which was surprising since the death toll was disproportionally high, but the 
city’s newspapers brought out pictorial souvenirs, the tone mirroring the 
language seen earlier in Front Line. This chapter will go on to discuss the 
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imperatives that dictated what appeared in national newspapers and the local 
press was more constrained because to criticise would have been to attack 
its target audience. The Daily Dispatch and Evening Chronicle, both 
Kemsley newspapers printed in Manchester, produced Our Blitz: Red Skies 
over Manchester in 1945, and Manchester at War, which used the archive 
of the Manchester Evening News, was published in 1986.100 Both provided 
valuable photographic records, but the tone of their text repeated the 
unrealistic optimism that was typical of what appeared in the local press in 
1940 and 1941: ‘It is in pride but not vain-glory, in humility but not self 
depreciation, we tell the story of the two nights of the Blitz.’101 They told a 
very selective story because analysis of other sources will suggest that 
despair, not pride, was a dominant emotion in the aftermath in bombed out 
areas of Manchester.  
Simon Wright’s Memories of a Salford Blitz and Read’s A 
Manchester Boyhood In The Thirties and Forties were more grounded in 
reality.102 Wright’s pamphlet was short, only 30 pages, and was a series of 
recollections. Mrs L. McGuire spoke of her mother ‘being hysterical’ with 
fear: ‘It was really terrible’.103 Read recalled the sense of shock as 
Manchester’s complacency was shattered by the Luftwaffe’s bombs in the 
Christmas Blitz but had no recollection of the consequent plummeting 
morale in the city reported by Home Intelligence, a possible example of a 
child being shielded from his parents’ darkest feelings. Ron Freethy’s 
Lancashire v Hitler also lacked detail of the Christmas 1940 raids but was 
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informed by interviews with people who lived through and beyond the 
bombardment, most notably recalling the insensitive dropping of leaflets by 
British bombers on the first anniversary of the Manchester Blitz, an incident 
that led to the panicked onlookers being criticised in the Manchester 
Guardian.104 This will be returned to at the end of the thesis. 
 That incident, as this thesis will show, was indicative of the gap 
between reality and what was appearing in newspapers, a theme examined 
by Evans, a Manchester schoolboy in 1940 who would become ‘arguably 
Britain's greatest editor of the second half of the 20th century’.105 His faith 
in what he saw in print was undermined when he encountered listless and 
demoralised soldiers on a beach in Rhyl, north Wales. Evans, who would 
become deputy editor of the Manchester Evening News in the 1950s en 
route to editing the Sunday Times and The Times, was 12 when he met 
‘still’, ‘pale’ men lying on the beach. He recalled that his father tried to 
strike up a conversation with soldiers who, he subsequently learned, had 
been evacuated from the beaches of Dunkirk.106 The response was muted 
and dispirited. It was also illuminating for a boy with ambitions to be a 
journalist. Evans wrote: 
We had been encouraged to celebrate Dunkirk as some kind of victory. A 
Daily Mirror front page I’d seen pinned up in our boarding house had the 
headline ‘Bloody Marvellous!’ How was it then Dad found nothing 
marvellous, only dejection, as he moved among them? 107 
 
His reaction articulated many of the questions that will be confronted in this 
thesis: 
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Later in adulthood it was easier to understand how predictive headlines 
could turn out to be wrong than to reconcile what we had experienced at 
Rhyl… How did newspapers come to conclusions? Were they acting at 
the request of the government? Was there a deliberate and widespread 
gloss on Dunkirk? Would that have been justified as a means of 
sustaining morale at a crucial time? Should newspapers take account of 
such imperatives or just report things as they see them?108 
 
Coventry has received more attention than Manchester. An 
estimated 568 people died in November 1940 on a night that has led to 
myths and fallacies of its own, the most poignant being that Churchill had 
been informed the raid was coming but failed to forewarn the city for fear of 
letting the Germans know their codes had been broken.109 Norman 
Longmate exonerated Churchill, writing: ‘No citizen was left to die, no 
humble home left to burn for reasons of high strategy’, and the Prime 
Minister’s private secretary appeared to bear that out.110 John Colville 
recalled being told to go to a deep shelter by Churchill with the words: 
‘You’re too young to die. Tonight London is going to be flattened.’111 That 
night the capital was spared and the huge bombing force flew north to 
Coventry. Allan Kurki also debunked that myth but spent too little time on 
this and other controversies, although he did underline the psychological 
effect the raid (code-named Moonlight Sonata by the Germans) had on 
Britain.112 Coventry was regarded as a Nazi atrocity in Britain and in the 
United States, something that Frederick Taylor stated was an over-reaction. 
Coventry was a centre for light manufacturing and engineering, including 
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bicycles, cars, airplane engines and – ‘fatally’ – munitions.  ‘A city of more 
than 320,000 inhabitants, was therefore, in terms of what little law existed 
on the subject, a legitimate target for aerial bombing.’113 Taylor was being 
deliberately pragmatic, the human voice from Coventry was revealed by 
Joshua Levine who mined interviews collected in the 1970s by the Imperial 
war Museum Sound Archive. Thomas Cunningham-Boothe described 
firemen, blinded by the ferocity of the heat, having to be led away from the 
fires; Dilwyn Evans spoke of those same fire fighters impotently having to 
watch the blazing buildings as water ran out; and Joan Batt could not 
forgive: ‘I still feel hatred for the Germans. They took everything off me.’ 
114  
Levine also included interviews from Liverpool that demonstrated 
that the picture of resilience painted by the newspapers was not universal. 
Leslie Hyland’s mother would scream and shout during the raids – ‘She felt 
every explosion was coming towards her’ – while Herbert Anderson stated 
that the city was the only place where he witnessed peace demonstrations: 
‘There were small groups marching with banners indicating that they 
wanted an end to the war.’115 This was refuted by a Liverpool Echo 
journalist Arthur Johnson in a secret diary in which he denied the existence 
of the peace marches or that the city was placed under martial law: ‘A man 
was sent to prison for a month at Manchester for spreading such rumours, 
all of which were completely baseless.’116 This was a rare exception in an 
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impersonal account that was strong on the bomb damage – most of which 
was not reported in his newspaper – but surprisingly weaker when it came 
to describing the minutiae of personal lives caught up in world events and 
the raw emotions exposed by the Merseyside Blitz. Pat Ayers, too, produced 
a factual account, focusing on Liverpool’s women, many of whom went to 
work in the city’s factories at rates of pay around half those of men. She 
concluded that British women were victims of a ‘confidence trick’ on a 
massive scale:  
Their economic need and their patriotism were exploited by men in 
positions of power; by the government, the trade unions, by private 
employers and by a nation anxious to win a war but not prepared to 
facilitate… equal pay or adequate facilities.117 
 
Ayres did concede there were positives accrued, however, listing: an 
acceptance of married women in the workplace, the regularisation of part-
time working in factories, and a revision generally of women’s place in 
British society.118 
Ayers’s arguments underlined that, while most cities in Britain were 
bombed by the Luftwaffe, the experience between 1939 and 1945 was not 
uniform and could be determined by gender, geography and timing. The 
literature viewing the Second World War from a regional perspective shows 
that, while it was the Many as much as the Few who sustained the drive to 
defeat Nazism, it was also a struggle that involved the United Kingdom as a 
whole (rather than just south-east England). This thesis concentrates on 
Manchester, but individual regions, cities and towns had versions of the 
Second World War that were uniquely their own.  
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2.3 Morale, Propaganda and Censorship 
The emphasis on the Home Front in the first two years of the war 
ensured that morale was a key component in all the above literature and, 
indeed, in most books about the British experience in Second World War. 
Defining what was meant by the word was complex, however, Paul Addison 
describing it in his painstakingly researched The Road to 1945 as ‘the 
woolliest and most muddled concept of the war’.119 Edgar Jones et al 
adopted the template of Stephen Taylor, a director of Home Intelligence, 
who stated that it should be defined ‘not by what a person thinks or says, but 
by what he does and how he does it’, a suspect approach given that much of 
what people did remained unreported, even to Home Intelligence, and, 
furthermore, it was not until 1943 that the Home Office recognised that 
factors affecting post-raid morale must be located within a broad conceptual 
framework.120 Jones et al’s evaluation of the psychological effects of the 
Blitz concluded that mental illness did not increase significantly during the 
bombing but agreed a question had been raised about the high incidence of 
psychosomatic disorders, such as ‘effort syndrome and non-ulcer 
dyspepsia’.121 Their research lacked the robustness that a detailed analysis 
of hospital admission and out-patient records would have brought – 
something they themselves admitted – but they did offer two reasons why 
civilians did not suffer shell shock on the scale of soldiers in the First World 
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War. First, the casualty rates were far higher in the trenches, and second, the 
civilian had less incentive to go into hospital. For the soldier it meant a 
transfer to a safer, non-combatant, role; the civilian, who was rarely 
transferred far away from his or her home, was still at danger from falling 
bombs. 
Robert Mackay’s definition of morale was drawn from what he 
described as the contemporary consensus, ‘a composite of attitude and 
behaviour’, and one of the stated ambitions of Half the Battle was to reassert 
‘the basic veracity of the received picture of the British people in the 
war’.122 While accepting there were exaggerations, he compiled a 
comprehensive amount of evidence to press his case, although a lack of 
statistical backing undermined his assertions that work by women 
volunteers ‘far outweighed the negative features of civilian behaviour on the 
home front –absenteeism, strikes, looting, blackmarketeering, and the 
like’.123 Brad Beaven and D. Thoms provided a counter argument, noting 
steep falls in morale in Hull and Manchester when they used Mass 
Observation reports to analyse the public mood between 1940 and 1942 in 
three northern cities. While there were city and regional differences, they 
argued, the principal factor governing morale was the impact bombing raids 
had upon the infrastructure of a community.124 Thus Manchester and Hull 
suffered because many city-centre shops were destroyed and gas, light and 
water supplies disrupted, while Liverpool, whose public utilities largely 
escaped damage, was surprisingly upbeat at the start of 1941. Yet five 
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months later, when Liverpool’s centre came under intense attack and some 
people had to sleep under tarpaulins in fields, ‘the grimness of the people 
had a menacing note’.125 It was a compelling argument but it failed to take 
into account other factors such as the efficiency of local authorities, 
economic factors and the role of the church and other spiritual leaders in 
maintaining civilian spirits.    
The responsibility for maintaining morale lay with the Ministry of 
Information, a creation that inspired the Ministry of Truth in Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four.126 Ian McLaine used the MOI’s official documents 
and other primary and secondary sources to write a history of the unloved 
institution, acknowledging the part it played in improving social surveys in 
Britain by co-ordinating the efforts of Home Intelligence, Mass 
Observation, the Royal Institute of Public Opinion and others.127 The 
outcome was a further contribution to the existing knowledge of anti-
German feeling, anti-Semitism and reactions to air raids, although 
McLaine’s assertion that the MOI became more effective when it became 
less manipulative and produced ‘full and honest news’ does not sit easily 
with his converse opinion that it was maligned and ridiculed without 
mercy.128  
Part of the MOI’s remit was propaganda, a concept described by 
Michael Balfour as the art of ‘inducing people to leap to conclusions 
without adequate examination of the evidence’ and the debt owed to 1914-
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18 by Britain’s propagandists in the Second World War was examined by 
Ferguson’s The War of the World, a book that excelled in finance and 
statistics yet neglected social and cultural history.129 For example, 
Ferguson’s eagerness to attribute economic and demographic reasons for the 
worst genocides of the twentieth century meant that he neglected to do full 
justice to the impact of political decision-making or the role of mass media. 
Philip Taylor’s British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, a book, 
compiled from journal articles and book chapters, engaged with the 
dilemma that confronted the Chamberlain and Churchill governments, that 
professed to be fighting for freedoms while at the same time suppressing the 
domestic press.130 Citing G. N. Gordon, Taylor noted: ‘A common cultural 
conceit in liberal democracies is the belief that the amount of censorship at 
any given time is decreasing and that speech is becoming increasingly free, 
while quite the opposite obtains’.131 
Censorship, as envisaged by the British government in 1939, was 
described by Price as something ‘of which any totalitarian state would be 
proud’, but as he added, reality did not match intent.132 The Ministry of 
Information, he wrote, got off to a poor start and was ‘better known to 
journalists as the ministry of aggravation’.133 Price’s interest was the 
relationship between Downing Street and Fleet Street, something that he 
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described as entering its ‘darkest period’ during the Second World War.134 
This was not because they were a loggerheads, he added, but because ‘they 
were too cosy, too complacent and too ready to join in a conspiracy of 
misinformation’.135  It was surprising, therefore, that he did not engage more 
with the motivation of editors who exceeded the demands of the censor.  
George Thomson, a rear admiral who was chief censor from 1940 
until the end of the war, articulated the Ministry of Information’s side of the 
relationship with the press in Blue Pencil Admiral, an account that, 
inevitably, was subjective, and avoided tackling the threat of suspension of 
the Daily Mirror in 1942, but nevertheless shed light on the rationale and 
motivation behind much of the censorship. Censorship, he argued, was a 
necessary evil. ‘It was, and always will be, distasteful to the British people. 
For Britain was the birth-place of a free press.’136 This is debatable, both as 
a fact and an opinion, and has been challenged by many academics, 
including John Street, who stated: ‘No state, whatever its constitution, 
tolerates complete freedom of expression.’137 Temple’s The British Press 
gave more extensive coverage to Churchill’s threat to close the Daily 
Mirror in 1942 stating that the Prime Minister was surprised by the 
resistance of the mainstream press and MPs, who ‘turned the affair into a 
critique of his potentially dictatorial actions’.138 That resistance by Fleet 
Street suggested a strength to resist controls that was hardly ever called 
upon and that the relationship between Fleet Street and Downing Street was 
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more sophisticated than mere kow-towing, something Temple did not fully 
examine.  
Paul Fussell was an American and much of Wartime concentrated on 
the United States rather than Britain. Nevertheless, he provided a valuable 
insight into the psychological and emotional journey travelled by British 
civilians and troops in the Second World War and the lies, distortions and 
euphemisms needed to endure life between 1939 and 1945. To have a 
Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, he wrote, it was 
necessary for an atmosphere to exist where presentation replaced actuality 
so that things are conventionally asserted to be true even though ‘smart 
people’ knew them to be false. ‘Goebbels conceived that absolutely 
anything could be believed as long as it was asserted officially with a 
straight face.’139 He added: 
The Goebbels world, or something like it, is one of the noticeable 
legacies from the Second World War to the present. And in wartime 
outright lies were not necessary. Just a little shading, a little tinting, a 
little withholding of unpleasant facts would do.140 
 
What he did not ask was whether there was a more complex reaction, other 
than gullibility and compliance, from the audience in general. 
 
2.4 Newspapers, Press Barons, and the BBC 
Many Prime Ministers have attempted to control newspapers and the 
history of this fraught affiliation was examined by Margach, a political 
correspondent for almost 50 years, in The Abuse of Power: the War Between 
Downing Street and the Media.141 The title of the book indicated this was a 
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narrow study, and the word ‘war’ suggested the subject was approached 
from a preconceived position that denied more complicated relationships, 
yet in it Margach detailed the ‘battles between the two empires’ from David 
Lloyd George in 1916 to James Callaghan 60 years later. He was 
particularly harsh on Chamberlain, describing him as ‘the most 
authoritarian, intolerant and arrogant’ of Prime Ministers’, but made no 
concession to the pressure the international situation was bringing to bear on 
his subject, naturally a shy man who was nearing 70 when he was flying 
between London and Munich in 1938.142 Also, Margach’s book was written 
before the publication of government papers that has led to a revision of the 
verdict prevalent on Chamberlain in the last 25 years. Margach was more 
kind to Churchill even though the war leader shared Chamberlain’s distaste 
for the press despite having been a journalist in his younger years. Margach 
explained: 
The reason for this was perfectly simple: during his astonishingly long 
career at Westminster he never had any direct personal contact with the 
press in general or with political correspondents in particular. He was a 
journalist who loved journalism but who never mixed with journalists 
and who had no understanding or sympathy with the job they were 
doing.143  
  
Churchill first made his name as a war correspondent at the end of 
the nineteenth century, becoming a member of what William Howard 
Russell, a founder member of the breed, described as a luckless tribe.144 
Fortune was the least of the shortcomings in those reporting the conflict 
from 1939 to 1945 according to Knightley, whose The First Casualty gave a 
generally damning verdict. His book examined war reporting from the 
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Crimea to the Balkans in the 1990s and, in his view, reporters in the Second 
World War became pedlars of propaganda. This, and a failure to 
acknowledge it, had implications: ‘If sufficient correspondents had 
undertaken a critical look at their performance, some improvement in the 
whole standard of war reporting might have followed,’ he wrote.145  
The reasons behind newspapers’ lack of interrogation in the build-up 
to the Second World War were examined by Koss, who provided an 
extensively researched account of the press barons in The Rise and Fall of 
the Political Press in Britain. He argued that this was a legacy of 1914 
when newspapers believed they had helped propel Britain into the First 
World War and as a consequence editors were too circumspect 25 years 
later.146 Editors, he wrote, did not need prompts from Downing Street:  
Rightly, or wrongly, inflammatory journalism was considered to have 
been one of the principal causes of the previous war. That harrowing 
experience cast as long a shadow in Fleet Street as in Downing Street, 
and no one wanted to repeat it.147  
 
Gannon’s The British Press and Germany 1936-9 suggested this 
stance had financial as well as moral imperatives. Newspapers, he argued, 
emerged from the Depression with good economic reasons to encourage 
recovery by creating a good psychological atmosphere.148 For this purpose 
they tended to emphasise contentment at home and security abroad. Both 
financially and intellectually it was unwise or impossible for the British 
press to adopt a strongly critical line towards Nazi Germany. Gannon stated: 
‘The readers did not want to read it, and the intellectuals did not want to 
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write it.’149 This interpretation was open to criticism on at least two 
grounds: Firstly, on what basis were the readers’ opinions judged? Second, 
who and where were these intellectuals refusing to write for newspapers? 
Equally contentious was Gannon’s assessment of the standing of the foreign 
correspondent, which he described as the ‘veritable ideological James 
Bonds of their time’. He added that the foreign correspondent ‘became a 
knowledgeable, romantic and ultimately reassuring figure’, which was too 
strong given the doubts about the press sown in the public’s minds by the 
reporting of the First World War.150  
The hand of the government was evident in the headlines and copy 
between 1914 and 1918 and Stanley Harrison detected the influence of 
Downing Street in the build-up to the Second World War, claiming in Poor 
Men’s Guardians that the ‘There will be no war’ optimism in the Daily 
Express throughout 1938 and 1939 was ‘carefully orchestrated’ by Sir 
Samuel Hoare.151 Harrison wrongly described Hoare as the Foreign 
Secretary (he had resigned from that post in December 1935 and had 
become Home Secretary in May 1937) but cited the former editor of the 
Daily Herald Francis Williams in describing the gentle pressures applied at 
confidential meetings arranged by Hoare with newspaper proprietors.152 As 
a consequence, Harrison wrote: ‘Many British newspapers established close 
relations with the Nazis and played Hitler’s game.’153 
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There are many biographies about these press magnates and the men 
they employed as editors of national newspapers. J. Lee Thompson’s 
Northcliffe: Press Baron in Politics and Reginald Pound and Geoffrey 
Harmsworth’s Northcliffe charted the narrow line between genius and 
megalomania that were characteristics of the founder of the Daily Mail and 
Daily Mirror while Beaverbrook, which was an official biography by the 
subject’s friend Taylor and was lacking in proper critical analysis, provided 
insights into the mind of another great newspaper proprietor.154 There are 
also histories of national newspapers, but, perhaps because paper rationing 
curtailed the number of memos, David Ayerst’s The Manchester Guardian 
(22 pages out of 700), the internally produced The History of The Times, 
and Lord Burnham’s The Story of the Daily Telegraph failed to devote the 
pages to the war period that might be anticipated.155 Surprisingly, Ayerst, 
whose scrupulous searching of The Guardian Archive provided much of his 
material and covered important information about the running of the 
newspaper in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, did not mention the numerous 
important stories that the editor, William Percival Crozier and the Guardian 
chose not to print during the war. These will be examined later in the 
thesis.156  
 The history of British journalism is far more trodden ground, with 
Engel’s Tickle the Public, and Conboy’s Journalism: A Critical History 
typical in providing assiduous background on the rise of the press barons in 
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the twenties and thirties.157 Engel’s idiosyncratic account described the 
alliance of Beaverbrook and Rothermere that led to the formation of a 
political party as ‘barely credible’, adding ‘the two press lords really did 
seem to think they could take over the country’.158 Conboy argued that this 
had important implications because the effect of the two lords’ political 
interventions was to persuade the government to set up the BBC as a public 
service ‘without a hectoring proprietor or the commercial demands of 
advertisers’.159 He reported that the war was pivotal for the media as the 
public looked to the BBC for news: 
The Second World War was the defining moment in the prestige of the 
BBC both nationally and internationally and, more importantly, of radio 
journalism as a medium which could deliver a quality and speed of 
information which were to become admired as a model of democratic 
discourse to counter the flow of broadcast totalitarianism.160 
 
The BBC has divided historians. None doubted that the corporation 
emerged from the Second World War with an enhanced reputation, but the 
verdict on its output is less clear-cut. Curran and Seaton credited the BBC 
with inventing propaganda ‘in its British form’ and stated that the 
corporation was ‘almost certainly the most important instrument of 
domestic propaganda during the war’, adding it ‘seldom lied if it could 
avoid doing so’.161 Nicholas Pronay was more fulsome, arguing that the 
British news media, with the BBC to the fore, ‘managed to maintain the 
trust of the British public at home and gained a reputation for Britain abroad 
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for having even in wartime an honest, free and truthful media’.162 This, Sian 
Nicholas found remarkable: ‘British people were only told what their war 
leaders wanted them to know, were told much that was deliberately false, 
and were denied knowledge of much more that they may have wished to 
know.’163 Perhaps Richard Crossman summed it up best when he wrote: 
‘You must hate propaganda to do it well.’164 Kevin Williams was largely 
complimentary about the UK’s national broadcaster, stating that the conflict 
was a war of words ‘with the BBC at its heart’, but also noted that 
government pressure meant that programmes on post-war reconstruction 
were shelved or broadcast in a diluted form.165 Most damningly, the 
Beveridge Report, which led to the formation of the National Health 
Service, was ignored thanks to the overtures of the government after initial 
enthusiastic coverage.166 Williams also noted a watershed for newspapers, 
writing that Churchill’s attempt to suspend the Daily Mirror in 1942 proved 
to be a turning point as the Prime Minister had to back down in the face of 
pressure in Parliament and the wider country. Williams wrote: ‘This was the 
last attempt to use Regulation 2D to prevent the publication of material in 
the press that the government did not like.’167  
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3. News Values, Objectivity and Reporting in War 
An important element of this thesis is news values and whether the 
coverage of 1940 can be judged by twenty-first century criteria. News 
values are the benchmarks by which journalists measure the worth of stories 
and are used to prioritise the collection and production of news, and, 
although they ‘may not be written down or codified by news 
organisations… they exist in the daily practice and in knowledge gained on 
the job’.168  
Certainly, a reporter covering the Second World War was not short 
of advice in terms of the function of his trade or what made news. C. P. 
Scott, the editor of the Manchester Guardian for 50 years, writing to 
commemorate the Guardian’s centenary in 1921, defined the press’s 
function thus: 
The primary office is the gathering of news. At the peril of its soul it 
must see that the supply is not tainted. Comment is free, but facts are 
sacred… The voice of opponents, no less than of friends, has a right to be 
heard. Comment also is justly subject to a self-imposed restraint. It is 
well to be frank; it is even better to be fair.169 
 
Seventeen years on, a leader in The Times stated that a newspaper’s role was 
to ‘help form an opinion, guide it, give it articulate expression, endeavour to 
make it prevail’.170 Even during the war, Home Intelligence gave a 
contemporary definition of the function of the press as ‘to gather, to make 
known, and to interpret news of public interest’.171 But these definitions, 
while noble in intent, are not as simple as they might seem. What is the 
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definition of a fact, for example, and who judges what is fair or what is of 
public interest? And who would originate opinion? Frequently in the Second 
World War the answer to the last question was: the government or other 
elites such as newspaper proprietors. This section will look at the key issues 
affecting journalism and news values: objectivity, impartiality, balance and 
truth. It will also ask what is the role of newspapers in times of war? This is 
a key question in regards to this thesis. Knightley wrote:  
From the very beginning, war correspondents faced a dilemma that 
remains unresolved to this day: whose side are they on? Correspondents 
have to choose because the aims of the military and the media are 
irreconcilable.172 
 
  
3.1 News values 
Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge first brought an academic approach to 
the understanding of news values when they published a landmark paper 
‘The Structure of Foreign News’ in 1965, but it is important for this thesis 
that Tony Harcup and Deirdrie O’Neill felt the need to update these pre-
requisites when they revisited, and applied domestic parameters to, Galtung 
and Ruge’s criteria nearly 40 years later.173 Harcup and O’Neill stated that 
news stories must generally satisfy one or more of the following criteria: 
1) The Power Elite. Stories concerning powerful individuals, 
organisations or institutions. 
2) Celebrity. Stories concerning people who are already famous. 
3) Entertainment. Stories concerning sex, show business, human 
interest, animals, an unfolding drama, or offering opportunities for 
humorous treatment, entertaining photographs or witty headlines. 
4) Surprise. Stories that have an element of surprise and/or contrast. 
5) Bad News. Stories with particularly negative overtones, such as 
conflict or tragedy. 
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6) Good News. Stories with particular positive overtones such as 
rescues or cures. 
7) Magnitude. Stories that are perceived as sufficiently significant 
either in the numbers of people involved or in potential impact. 
8) Relevance. Stories about issues, groups and nations perceived to be 
relevant to the audience. 
9) Follow-up. Stories about subjects already in the news. 
10)  Newspaper Agenda. Stories that set or fit the news organisation’s 
own agenda.174 
 
Harcup and O’Neill’s need to make adjustments to Galtung and Ruge’s 
litany showed that news values alter with time and, certainly, the 2001 list 
would not have been wholly applicable in 1940 – witty headlines and 
celebrity gossip were either a rarity or largely publicity-driven, for example, 
by film studios. Importantly, however, the vast majority would stand. 
Andrew Marr, a former editor of The Independent and now a BBC 
journalist, stated: ‘Most news values have not changed’, noting The Times’s 
coverage of the Battle of Trafalgar was comparable to that of the war in Iraq 
in 2003.175 He added: ‘Over the centuries, newspapers change shape, order 
the news differently and target different groups of people. Some slant even 
hard news for political effect. But the hard news agenda itself seems an 
unalterable part of modern urban life.’176  
Other media historians concur, stating that journalism evolved from 
the seventeenth and eighteenth century purveyors of opinion so that 
newspapers, by the late nineteenth century, had become more the 
distributors of information in the guise of facts. Williams wrote:  
The duty of journalism in the first half of the nineteenth century…was 
not to discover the truth. The emphasis was on the polemical power of 
the writer’s pen. Opinion and commentary were the essence of good 
journalism – except in the recording of parliamentary activity where 
accuracy was considered vital… By the end of the century technology 
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and commercial need had elevated accuracy and reliability, as well as the 
ability to meet the daily news deadlines, to the profession of 
journalism.177 
 
The Times predated Williams’s opinion in 1852 when it defined the role of 
journalism after coming under attack from the Prime Minister, Lord Derby: 
‘The first duty of the press is to obtain the earliest and most correct 
intelligence of the events of the time and instantly, by disclosing them, to 
make them the common property of the nation.’178 The Times continued by 
comparing the journalist to a historian in that the former should seek out 
‘the truth as near as he can attain it’.179  
Roger Fowler provided a more up-to-date definition of the role of 
the reporter when he stated: ‘He or she collects facts, reports them 
objectively and then the newspaper presents them fairly and without bias, in 
language which is designed to be unambiguous, un-distorting and agreeable 
to readers.’180 He also agreed that this was an ideal that was compromised 
by the production of news, and an inclination to select, limit and promote 
certain agenda and ideas, which will be examined below.  
 
3.2 Objectivity 
Tosh has written that newspapers are produced mostly with a view 
to their impact on contemporary opinion and consequently historians attach 
greater weight to them than memoirs written with posterity in mind: 
But the fact of publication sets a limit on the value of these sources. They 
consider only what was considered to be fit for public consumption – 
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what governments are prepared to reveal, what journalists could elicit 
from tight-lipped informants, what editors thought would gratify their 
readers, or MPs their constituents.181 
 
Tosh’s reservations automatically set limits on every report that appears in 
newspapers, yet some scholars of the media have argued that by the start of 
the Second World War, in the context of the rise of Fascism and Nazism, it 
was common currency in Fleet Street that reports should be as objective as 
possible.182 A different tradition of objectivity evolved in the United States, 
but Michael Schudson wrote that by the 1920s journalists had come to 
accept that, while ‘facts’ were in reality individually constructed 
interpretations, these interpretations could and should be ‘constructed in a 
methodologically objective manner, i.e. using professionally agreed rules 
which could minimise the impact of subjectivity on reporting’.183 Gaye 
Tuchman, also writing about American newspapers, stated objectivity 
should be a guiding principle, noting that: ‘Newspapermen must be able to 
invoke some concept of objectivity in order to process facts about social 
reality’.184  
There were qualifications, however. Brian McNair stated that 
criticism of objectivity was often based on content analysis that showed 
journalism can never be neutral and value free, but ‘is fundamentally 
interpretative, embodying the dominant values and explanatory frameworks 
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of the society within which it is produced’.185 Howard Tumber and Marina 
Prentoulis, on a similar theme, described objectivity as a concept 
underpinning journalism as ‘inherently ambiguous’.186 They argued that 
objectivity is an impossible goal yet also stated that, despite that 
qualification, it is important to acknowledge that objective reporting is 
associated with gathering news and reporting it in a detached and 
impersonal way free of value judgements. Chris Frost, while acknowledging 
that objectivity had taken on an ‘an almost mythical status for journalists 
over the past century’, outlined the inherent complexity of that ambition:  
Which stories are covered and how they are covered are more likely to be 
affected by practical and logistical pressures than by careful 
consideration of the philosophical niceties of objectivity. The ability to 
access a story, for instance, can have a direct effect on how objective or 
even truthful a reporter can be. There was much concern, quite rightly, 
during the Iraq war about reporters being embedded with troops. This 
limited the ability of reporters to access news from sources other than a 
particular group of soldiers.187 
  
Mark Hampton, maintained a stronger line, arguing that, with the exceptions 
of the BBC and the news agency Reuters, objectivity has never been 
‘accepted as a generalised ideal among British journalists’.188 Even within 
these parameters, however, Hampton did concede that British reporters in 
the twentieth century were influenced by such concepts as ‘accuracy, truth, 
fair play and independence’, and, the consensus was that those absolutes, or 
something as close as possible, was an aim of reporters by 1940.189 The 
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Royal Commission on the Press gave its definition of the role of the press 
as: 
Democratic society… needs a clear and truthful account of events, of 
their background and their causes; a forum for discussion and informed 
criticism; and a means whereby individuals and groups can express a 
point of view or advocate a cause. The responsibility for fulfilling these 
needs unavoidably rests in large measure upon the Press.190  
 
The Commission’s report was published in 1949, even if it was 
reflecting on newspapers during and before the war, but there were many 
signposts towards these ideals in Manchester in 1940. Scott’s definitions 
pointed a reporter in the appropriate direction while setting a benchmark to 
which Manchester’s journalists, both inside and outside the Guardian’s 
Cross Street offices, should have aspired.191 His influence was profound on 
the journalism of the Manchester Guardian and the Manchester Evening 
News and would have been reflected in the reporting of news that was 
printed to produce a ‘balanced newspaper in which liveliness might break 
through’.192  There was no equivalent to Scott’s pronouncement at the 
Evening Chronicle although Lord Kemsley’s view on journalism was 
articulated to the Royal Commission. He said: ‘If a newspaper desires to 
attain importance and stability it must tell its readers what has happened 
within the compass over which their interests are spread.’193   
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3.3 Impartiality and Propaganda 
If objectivity was an elusive ideal, what about impartiality? News 
values are affected by the demands of war and while the above set the 
parameters by which the press hoped to operate, the conflict distorted those 
values. War, generally, is good news for newspapers. What is being 
reported has an increased significance, readers have a greater stake in what 
appears in print and, correspondingly, circulations rise:  
Classic warfare is the epitome of a ‘good story’, high in tension and 
drama, with complex main plots and sub-plots played out within 
traditional binary oppositions of aggressor and victim, winner and loser. 
While expensive to cover, warfare is commercially rewarding for the 
media, since its threat and unfolding ignite insatiable audience appetite 
for news.194  
 
The effect of war on journalism, rather than the economics of journalism, is 
more complex and was articulated by Knightley. Journalists, he stated, face 
a dilemma if they wish to observe the military in action and record the first 
draft of history.195 He added in a revised edition: 
If doing that as objectively and as truthfully as possible means writing 
and broadcasting stories damaging to their nation’s war effort, what are 
correspondents to do? Does the journalist within the correspondent 
prevail? Or the patriot? And what if reporting patriotically involves 
telling lies? Is that journalism or propaganda?196 
 
This is a question that is fundamental to this thesis: was the imperative for 
journalists between 1939 and 1945 to support the war effort in a ‘deliberate 
and systematic attempt to shape opinions’ or to hold the authorities to 
account?197 And if they did the latter would they be helping or hindering the 
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fight against Hitler? With reference to the traditional theories of Walter 
Lippmann, Harold Lasswell and Edward Bernays, more recent studies have 
engaged with these questions. Leo Bogart, quoting a report from the former 
United States Information Agency, wrote: ‘It is more important to reach one 
journalist than 10 housewives or five doctors.’198 Frank Webster stated that 
the media are needed for more than reporting acceptable news from the 
battlefield: ‘They are also central players in justifying war itself… 
especially so in democratic regimes.’199 Susan Carruthers concurred: 
‘Consequently, to marshal and maintain morale on one’s own side, and 
attack the opponent’s, ‘munitions of the mind’ were an integral part of total 
war. Mass media received their call-up along with other vital wartime 
industries.’200 Ruling elites, she wrote, echoing Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony, had to generate support for the conflict and enlisted the media to 
help bolster the case. Patriotism was the trigger to assure compliance.  
This was an important element in the reporting of the Second World 
War. Nationalism, Michael Howard wrote, is ‘indissolubly linked, both in 
theory and practice, with the idea of war’ and Fleet Street interprets this as 
an inclination to be patriotic.201 In peacetime, this manifests itself most 
obviously in sports tournaments like the football World Cup and the 
Olympic Games, or even in such trivial entertainment events as the 
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Eurovision Song Contest. ‘The patriotic imperative lies at the heart of 
British journalists’ culture,’ Richard Keeble wrote. ‘Not surprisingly this 
patriotic loyalty appears strongest during times of war.’202 Simon Cottle 
argued: ‘National feelings of communal identity, pride, and patriotism, as 
well as historical parallels and past myths, are all summoned through the 
genre of war reporting and these generally seek to position “Us” in 
opposition to “Them”.’203 With the nation, Benedict Anderson’s imagined 
community, under attack journalists were inclined to ignore municipal and 
central government deficiencies under these circumstances and, even if they 
were not, most of the information they received was slanted because it came 
from official sources.204 Piers Robinson noted that research has ‘consistently 
demonstrated that the media have tended to remain deferential to 
government positions during times of crisis and war’ and Oliver Boyd-
Barrett added that the media typically cover wars from the point of view of 
the country in which they and their major owners are based.205 This applied 
to photographs as well as print, as Barbie Zelizer noted: ‘War is presented 
as often heroic and reflective of broader aims associated with nationhood, 
clean and at times antiseptic, and involving sacrifice for the greater good.’206 
Consequently, photographs of dead British soldiers are never published 
except in the context of their being honoured, and the concurring images are 
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of happy, smiling troops either going off to battle or caught in a moment of 
triumph.  
If the patriotic imperative was not enough to distort normal news 
values during wars, there were other dominant values. Newspapers have a 
discourse with their audience, and Stuart Hall’s communication model of 
encoding and decoding is affected when the decoders (the audience) are 
people who were either giving or risking their lives for the war, or had 
relatives who were.207 Even in a modern context this places restrictions on 
reporting. Certain sections of the press had reservations about the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 but not even the most war wary ever manifested their doubts 
with criticism of the troops. ‘Our boys’ are close to sacrosanct, and Keeble 
acknowledged this: ‘Journalists tend to be more courageous in criticising the 
government when British forces are not engaged; when “our boys” (and a 
few of “our girls”) are in action, most of the media tend to back it.’208 Given 
that the Second World War had the civilian population on the front line in 
large numbers for the first time in modern warfare, ‘our boys and girls’ 
extended beyond the armed forces and into the roads and avenues of Britain. 
The exemption from press criticism, the inclination to make references to 
the heroic whole, followed naturally. This was particularly relevant for the 
newspapers in the study whose audience was almost entirely locally based. 
As Jeremy Iggers noted: ‘Reporters must cultivate sources and are keenly 
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aware that their future access to information depends on how they handle 
today’s story.’209 
His observation underlined a second dominant force: access to 
information. Newspaper discourse has tended to be shaped by ‘the elements 
of society that are powerful enough and organized enough to generate press 
materials, hold press conferences and otherwise garner media attention’.210  
Herman and Chomsky, McNair, Cottle and others have stated that this elite-
dominated, top-down model of communication means that reporters are 
usually reliant on the powerful for their information, particularly in war 
conditions. Cottle wrote:  
The media’s dependency on military access, military transport systems, 
military minders, military briefings, military communication systems and 
military protection in the military-controlled theatre of war all powerfully 
contribute to the military’s ability to manage and contain the flow and 
content of journalism reporting.211  
 
In reality, Daya Thussu and Des Freedman argued, this meant that although 
the journalists cherish the idea that they are impartial observers of the armed 
forces, they are frequently unable to ‘shrug off ideological and 
organisational restrictions to keep a watchful eye on activities of military 
combatants’.212 
This complies with Herman and Chomsky’s argument that 
journalism reproduces the views and values of the elite due to a propaganda 
model by which money and power are able to filter the news to marginalise 
dissent and ‘allow the government and dominant private interests to get 
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their messages to the public’.213 One of these filters that leads to this 
manufactured consent stems from practical necessity. Newspapers cannot 
afford to have reporters everywhere and therefore concentrate on places 
where they know news stories often happen, the lobby in Parliament being 
an obvious example, press conferences organised by large organisations 
another. This leads to the elites – the government, business and ‘experts’ 
provided by the agents of power – having ready access to the media and 
excludes marginalised voices. McNair, building on Herman and Chomsky, 
stated that these filters help construct a propaganda model in which the 
media’s perceived ability to ‘manage and manipulate public opinion will be 
used by elites in the pursuit of what they define as the “national interest”.’214 
Given that it was the elites who had most to lose if Germany won the war, 
the national interest, in their terms, was to continue the fight.  
Cottle argued that the propaganda model is more complex than that 
implies, because codes of conduct and professional norms can lead to 
interactions between journalists and the sources of power that are not 
always beneficial to the latter.215 One part of this elite was largely exempt 
from this, however, namely the newspaper proprietors, and the influence 
they wielded on the pages of their newspapers was best summed up by 
Beaverbrook who told the Royal Commission on the Press in 1948: 
I ran the paper [the Daily Express] for propaganda, and with no other 
purpose… The policy is that there shall be no propaganda in the news. 
There is a strong, stern rule, and the most tremendous attempt…to carry 
the rule into effect. But we do stumble. It is terrible how we stumble; it is 
heart-breaking at times. 216 
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Beaverbrook ‘stumbled’ regularly, most frequently over the issue of the 
British Empire. When asked by the Commission what would happen if 
editors had ever taken an alternative stance, he replied: ‘I talked them out of 
it.’217 Beaverbrook’s maxim was simple: what was the point of owning a 
newspaper if you could not influence what appeared in it?218 Greenslade 
summed up his attitude as: ‘I am the boss; I have the power; I know best; 
you editors are the transient holders of office.’219 A Beaverbrook employee 
was quoted by Curran and Seaton as saying: ‘Fleet Street… was strewn with 
the corpses of Express editors.’220 As Harcup argued, journalists are torn 
between a ‘professional commitment to ethics and truth telling’, yet at the 
same time are ‘expendable employees expected to produce stories to sell in 
the marketplace’.221   
 
3.4 Balance 
McNair stated that journalism presents a narrative about the world 
beyond the experience of the reader: ‘This narrative is asserted to be “true”. 
The stories told to us by journalists are factual, rather than fictional.’222 He 
also argued that that one of the journalist’s tasks is to keep voters informed 
‘about the things they need to know’ and to do that balance is required.223 
Yet, in the circumstances listed in the previous section, that key component 
of Scott’s definition of news values, was impossible. Journalists based in 
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Germany would have had their reports heavily censored, and their loyalties 
or motives questioned, as indeed Sir Nevile Henderson’s were when he 
served as British ambassador to Berlin between 1937 and 1939 and the press 
referred to him as ‘our Nazi Ambassador in Berlin’.224 Another deterrent 
was perception. If reporters for British newspapers had not been arrested for 
being the enemy by the Gestapo, they would have risked being seen as 
mouthpieces for Hitler and the Nazis and there would have been the threat 
of being regarded as traitors. William Joyce, Lord Haw-Haw, whose crime 
was to broadcast radio propaganda to Britain from Berlin from 1939 to 
1945, was hanged for treason in 1946, ironically, as Martin Doherty pointed 
out, in an act of political propaganda.225 Keeble suggested that: ‘Journalists 
reporting from Berlin would have been unthinkable during World War Two. 
Yet during the undeclared Falklands, Gulf and Kosovo wars, British 
journalists sent dispatches from “enemy” territory, though not without 
sparking some major controversies.’226  
Consequently any form of balance was impossible between 1939 
and 1945 but reporters, whose lives were put as much at risk by the German 
bombers as those of their readers, had little personal incentive to seek it and 
would have incurred the wrath of their editors if they tried. As Steinbeck 
noted: ‘The foolish reporter who broke the rules would not be printed’.227  
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4. Newspapers and their Audience 
A final question to debate about the discourse between 
newspapers and their audience is: did the British public believe what they 
read in their newspapers in 1940 and 1941? The answer is, almost certainly 
not. Mass Observation reported that, in the early weeks of the war, people 
said it was ‘useless to buy newspapers since all the front pages were 
identical and could not be trusted,’ a sentiment underlined by Home 
Intelligence in May 1940 when it reported: ‘The general curve of distrust of 
the news has been rising during the last year.’228 Hylton wrote that the 
Ministry of Information tried to stem the flow of rumours but were not 
wholly successful and one explanation for their proliferation (and for the 
initial high audience figures for Lord Haw-Haw) was that ‘the public did not 
believe what they were being told by the official media’.229 
An erosion of trust in newspapers began in the First World War 
when the troops in the trenches could read what was being written in the 
press and could compare it to their own experience. Knightley observed: 
The effect of this distortion was immense. The average Englishman had 
been accepting all his life that if something was printed in the 
newspapers, then it was true. Now, in the biggest event of his life, he was 
able to check what the press said against what he knew to be the truth. He 
felt he had found the press out, and as a result he lost confidence in his 
newspapers, a confidence to this day never entirely recovered.230  
 
Yet newspaper circulations rose dramatically between the wars (and during 
the Second World War) and, as noted earlier, Gannon argued that foreign 
correspondents assumed a glamorous image akin to secret agents in the 
1920s and 1930s, a role that suggested they were believed by some if not all 
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their readers. Perhaps the most compelling evidence that newspapers had an 
influence on their audience is that the government spent so much effort to 
control what appeared in print.  
Bingham wrote that the rise in circulation showed that newspapers 
were satisfying a need, but with a qualification: ‘The journalist did not 
necessarily believe what he or she wrote, just as the reader did not 
necessarily believe what he or she read.’231 This echoed a contemporary 
report on the press by Home Intelligence that stated: ‘In war-time when 
there is open censorship, everybody accepts that the government can choose 
what news about the war shall be published.’232 This thesis will show that 
many of the reports that appeared in newspapers in the Second World War 
were written with morale in mind and often amounted to little more than 
propaganda. Yet the rising circulations would suggest that this, and the 
entertainment newspapers brought, was what the readers wanted at times 
other than in the immediate aftermath of serious bombing raids. When they 
were victims of a Blitz, readers wanted the truth so that others could bear 
witness to their suffering; at other times reports of resilience and quiet 
courage were exactly what they required. Ascension Andina-Diaz, citing 
Lazarsfeld et al, argued: ‘Most individuals expose themselves most of the 
time to the kind of material with which they agree to begin with.’ 233  
 
 
                                            
231 Adrian Bingham, Gender, Modernity and the Popular Press in Inter-War Britain 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), p. 11. 
232 Mass Observation, FR 126.  
233 Lazarsfeld, P.F. and others, ‘The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political 
Behavior’ in Handbook of Social Psychology, II, ed, by G. Lindzey (Cambridge: Addison-
Wesley, 1954), cited by Ascension Andina-Dıaz, ‘Reinforcement vs. Change: The Political 
Influence of the Media’ in Public Choice ,131, 1-2  (2007), 65-81, (p. 67). 
  
82 
5. Conclusion 
The concept of hegemony is normally understood to describe the 
way in which dominant social groups achieve leadership and control by way 
of social cohesion and consensus. Jonathan Joseph wrote: ‘It argues that the 
position of the ruling group is not automatically given, but rather that it 
requires the ruling group to attain consent for its leadership through the 
construction of political projects and social alliances.’234 Gramsci, as was 
seen earlier, asserted that the media play a central role in creating an 
‘acceptable’ consensus, an important concept for this thesis in which 
newspapers were seen to promote the government’s position during the 
Second World War.235  
The above, however, appears to complicate this theory that news is 
not merely an instrument of control but a constant negotiation between 
internalised and normative experience and the hegemonic imperatives of 
political elites. This negotiation can break down, but in war, as this chapter 
has examined, the need to over-ride these tensions becomes imperative. 
Bingham summed up the general mood in the Second World War thus: ‘The 
idealistic nationalism of 1914 had been rewritten as a cheerfully cynical 
spirit of defiance against Hitler’s attempted domination of Europe’ and, as a 
consequence, Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain and the Blitz became 
mythologised stories that were embellished by the press with the seeming 
consent of the readers.236 Newspapers had not told the truth in the First 
World War, and they carefully manipulated the facts between 1939 and 
1945. In short, for whatever the good reasons for doing so, they gave only 
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one side of the story. With little or no attempt to properly inform the public 
of an alternative, the myth of resilience was created.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
84
Part II: Methodology 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
1. Introduction 
The role of the press in the Second World War is frequently overlooked by 
historians, which is a surprising omission given that, from the outset, newspapers 
were the main form of communication between the government and its people – a 
position that would be gradually matched, and even overtaken, by radio during the 
conflict.1 Furthermore, Anderson has stated that the printing press was one of the key 
factors in the creation of nationhood as an ‘imagined community’, an essential 
prerequisite in the conducting of war on an industrial and national scale.2 He added: 
Regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the 
nation is always conceived as a horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this 
fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions 
of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.3 
 
In more recent times, Marie Gillespie wrote that the earliest newspapers connected 
dispersed people to national discourses and the ‘mass ritual and ceremony of 
newspaper reading’ contributed to the construction of ideas of national community.4  
The mythology of 1939-45 was either invented by Fleet Street or considerably 
advanced by it: the ‘triumph’ of Dunkirk was born in newspaper offices; the ‘few’ of 
the Battle of Britain and the Blitz spirit were pieces of Churchillian rhetoric that were 
embellished and given impetus by news pages. Yet, as Bingham observed: ‘Historians 
have, in fact, generally been reluctant to examine the press for insights into the past.’5  
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This research seeks to redress the balance in analysis of media coverage by 
developing a new understanding of how the provincial press reported the Second 
World War during one of its most crucial periods, analysing the contribution of 
Manchester’s newspapers to the engrained perception of the public reaction to the 
Luftwaffe’s sustained bombing of Britain in 1940 and 1941 that has been 
encompassed by the phrase ‘Blitz Spirit’. The findings have been assessed in the 
context of the wartime emergency, including government censorship, and the tension 
between this and some of the traditional imperatives of journalism – for example, 
notions of the journalist as interpreter of significant events and issues, the journalist as 
witness, the journalist as watchdog of governments, and the journalist as a provider of 
the information the public has a right to know.  
This is predominantly a qualitative study, which has taken an interpretative 
and contextual approach to the newspaper headlines and copy, involving analysis of 
all sections, including news and non-news pages, editorials and readers’ letters. 
Quantitative methods have not been entirely neglected, however, and they are used to 
measure the proportion of war against non-war reports, the amount of coverage given 
to lighter items such as entertainment and sport, and to monitor the movement of the 
news agenda of local and national newspapers away from Manchester and its Blitz of 
December 1940.  
The above combination of qualitative and quantitative methodology conforms 
to good research practice as stated by Martyn Denscombe, who wrote: ‘The use of 
more than one method can enhance the findings of research by providing a fuller and 
more complete picture of the thing that is being studied.’6 On combining qualitative 
and quantitative approaches, he added: ‘At the heart of the approach is that 
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researchers can bring together within a single research project certain elements that 
have conventionally been treated as an either/or option.’7 
 
2. Sources 
Three types of primary source have been used to carry out this analysis of 
Manchester’s newspapers, representing, in terms of Hall’s communication model, the 
production (encoding), the texts (reports and headlines), and their reception by the 
audience (decoding).8 Editorial archives are patchy but in the case of the Manchester 
Guardian and Manchester Evening News do exist, albeit in a limited form, in The 
Guardian Archive at Manchester University’s John Rylands Library. There are no 
similar primary documents available for the Evening Chronicle. These archives are 
complemented by the diaries of W. P. Crozier and William Haley, the editors of the 
Manchester Guardian and Manchester Evening News respectively, although neither is 
extensive. Crozier’s diary, type-written and kept in a loose-leaf folder, runs from 
October 1940 to February 1941 but is not intimate and is neither a business record nor 
intended for publication. Ayerst wrote: 
The formless jumble of entries, including a few snatches in Latin and Greek, 
chronicle the progress of his roses, the hunt for cigarettes for his wife and 
daughter, office rows, university business, the planning of a novel, illness, anxiety 
over the war, and the time spent in the shelters.9 
 
Ayerst concluded that the artlessness of the entries ‘reveals the writer’ and the no-
nonsense brevity of Haley’s diary also is an insight into the man. His summary of the 
war position in July 1940 was: ‘Worlds have happened in the last two months. 
Holland, Belgium and France have all gone. Now Great Britain feverishly prepares 
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for invasion.’10 But that was extensive compared to 1943, the entry for which 
amounted to half an A4 page. The second primary source is the newspapers 
themselves, the sampling of which appears below. The final type of source material 
comes from contemporary responses to the Manchester Blitz and to its press coverage 
(listed below).  
 
2.1 Sampling 
For the empirical part of the research the focus of the attention is on three 
newspapers: the Manchester Guardian, the Manchester Evening News and the 
Evening Chronicle. They were chosen because they dominated the market of the daily 
regional press in Manchester during the Second World War, in terms of influence, 
circulation and style, and all three were parts of national newspaper groups, the 
Manchester Guardian and Manchester Evening News being owned by the Scott Trust, 
and the Evening Chronicle being printed by Kemsley Newspapers, who also owned 
the Sunday Times the Daily Disptach and other national and regional newspapers. The 
three sampled newspapers represent different deadlines, and different publication 
pressures, with a national morning newspaper (Manchester Guardian) and two 
evening publications. Other local newspapers were considered but none had the 
centre-of-Manchester base and geographical reach of the chosen titles and some, such 
as the Stockport Express, came under the umbrella of Kemsley Newspapers and did 
not differ, in terms of editorial policy, from the Evening Chronicle. The Salford City 
Reporter was a small circulation weekly – The Times reported it had sales of around 
20,000 in 1962 – and the Royal Commission on the Press 1947-1949, ‘the first 
official, across the board inquiry into the modern press’, did not make reference to the 
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city in its list of daily, Sunday and weekly newspapers, although the smaller towns of 
Barrow-in-Furness, Nuneaton and Kettering were included.11  
 The Manchester Guardian’s circulation was modest (51,000 in 1939, rising 
to 140,000 in 1951), but its influence was far greater and in 1947 Lord Camrose 
described it as ‘one of the famous papers of the world’ and ‘the widest distribution of 
any provincial daily’.12 Its editor, Crozier, met Churchill on a regular basis (Ayerst 
stated there are records of 16 meetings between October 1939, when they met for the 
first time, and October 1943), Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary from February 
1938 until December 1940, said he read the Manchester Guardian every day and the 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, an abridged version of the newspaper, gained the 
Guardian an enhanced reputation in the United States.13 The German edition of the 
same publication, printed in Berlin, had such an influence that Alexander Werth, the 
newspaper’s foreign correspondent, wrote that the ‘Guardian here counts for more 
than any other English paper’, but it became such an irritant to the Nazi hierarchy that 
it was suppressed, along with many other newspapers, in 1933.14 The profits of the 
Manchester Evening News sustained the loss-making Manchester Guardian and 
perhaps that is a reason why the former did not submit circulation numbers before the 
Second World War.15 Even its audited figure for 1945, 250,000, is suspiciously 
rounded but the newspaper rightly described itself as ‘the oldest established and 
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leading evening journal in Manchester’.16 The Evening Chronicle sold more than 
200,000 copies a day in the build-up to the war and in 1945 was licensed as selling 
224,000.17 Its title page boasted ‘the largest evening sale in the provinces’. The 
Chronicle sold more than the Evening News in the outlying Lancashire towns but it 
never managed to capture the Manchester classified adverts market and in 1963 it was 
bought by the Manchester Evening News and merged into one newspaper.18  
The research comprises a study of the newspapers from 16 December 1940 to 
10 February 1941, a total of 144 editions. In the six-page Evening Chronicle of 17 
December 1940, which was a typical edition, there were 33 war-based reports and 34 
non-war items although only one story related to local incidents. Even six days later, 
the first edition after the Blitz, there were only two reports on the Manchester 
bombing and an editorial in the Evening Chronicle, again a typical number. These 
were lengthy, but the relatively low number allowed for extensive scrutiny of every 
article and for other related items such as official notices, readers’ letters, cancellation 
of sports and leisure events. The study period allows critical reflection on press 
reports in the week before the Manchester Blitz and for seven weeks afterwards, 
monitoring whether there was a change in the reporting before and after the bombings 
of 22/23 and 23/24 December. The newspapers after the Blitz also provide evidence 
of the local press’s willingness to investigate any national and local authority 
shortcomings exposed by the extreme circumstances brought about by severe 
bombing. Manchester also suffered another night’s bombing during this seven weeks. 
The study period also coincides with the suppression of the Daily Worker, an 
important moment in the evolving relationship between the government and the press.   
Particular attention is paid to the editions of 23 to 27 December 1940, the first 
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three after the first Manchester Blitz, when the Luftwaffe was still targeting the city, 
strains on reporting would have been at their greatest, but when news could be 
gathered from just outside the newspapers’ front doors (production of the Manchester 
Guardian was disrupted when the office was hit by incendiary bombs).19 Journalists 
were not just using news agencies, subject to the gate-keeping of the censor, but also 
would have had direct access to eye-witness accounts. Their reporting is compared to 
articles that were subject to greater restraints. The length of the study period and the 
number of editions conforms to Matthew Miles and Michael Huberman’s framework 
for qualitative analysis in that the sample ‘should be likely to generate rich 
information on the type of phenomena which need to be studied’.20  
The quantitative analysis of the proportions of hard news to entertainment, is 
applied to the eight Tuesday editions of the three newspapers beginning 17 December 
1940. Tuesday was chosen because Monday and Saturday editions are inclined to 
look backwards at, or forward to, the weekend, and consequently are frequently more 
entertainment focused, and Wednesday and Thursday papers would have had gaps in 
the analysis due to Christmas and New Year holidays. Friday was an alternative but 
was rejected because it would not have provided a proper perspective of a subsequent 
raid that finished in the early hours of Friday 10 January 1941. This study is 
conducted in the knowledge that entertainment would normally be given a greater 
priority by news desks during a holiday period but, while the edition of 17 December 
1940 might have been affected by this seasonal aberration, this would have been more 
than compensated for by the gravity and importance of the local news in the aftermath 
of the Blitz. Entertainment news had strong competition for space in already ration-
restricted newspapers so its inclusion was a strong indicator of the journalist’s 
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perception of the audience’s desire to escape the war. Or even a propagandist’s wish 
to cheer up people. As Bingham stated, readers tend to select the paper that most 
closely fits their own preconceptions:  
Neither the editors nor the audience, nor indeed the advertisers, were likely to get 
exactly what they wanted, but there was a set of ‘feedback loops’ between each of 
them, in the form of sales figures and market research, which ensured that each 
party had some input into the newspaper.21  
Those loops did not wholly take into account the negative feelings of the people of 
Manchester in the immediate aftermath of Christmas 1940, and in any case they move 
at a slow pace rather than immediately, but as no newspaper was willing to confront 
these issues, there were no circulation or financial implications attached to this 
exclusion. This is examined later in the thesis.  
 
2.2. Approaching the Newspapers 
At the heart of the research are the newspapers themselves. Using John 
Richardson as a guide, critical discourse analysis is applied to study the 
‘interpretations of the meanings of texts rather than just quantifying textual features 
and deriving meaning from this’.22 What is printed in newspapers needs to be judged 
against what else was in the news that day; where and how reports appear in the 
newspaper; and what other lines of inquiry were ignored or under-exploited. 
Journalism, according to Richardson, is inescapably connected to the social, political 
and cultural context in which it is written and consumed and he produced a list of 
questions that should be asked when examining newspapers.23 These are: 
 Where has the information in this article come from? 
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 Is there a reason why this information was provided to journalists on the 
day, or the instant that it was? Does releasing this story cover up a more 
significant story? 
 What are the relations between this text and systems such as markets, 
ownership, advertising, government, the law and religious beliefs? 
 How much power and social influence does the focus, or subjects of the 
story have? 
 Is there a customary or habitually used constellation of representations 
associated with stories on this subject? Are these negative or positive? 
 Who, if anyone, is ‘othered’ by the reporting? That is, whom does the 
report construct as ‘Us’ and who are ‘They’? Are any of ‘Them’ 
represented as part of ‘Us’ in other reporting contexts? What are the 
possible reasons for this? 
 What are the possible social consequences of reporting? 
 Specifically, who benefits and who loses – or may be harmed – from 
coverage of this sort?24  
 
Using this as a framework, all reports on the Manchester Blitz are analysed both 
individually and in the context of the copy elsewhere in the editions in which they 
appear. 
A typical application of the above could be used on the front page of the Late 
Night edition in August 1944 of The Star, a London evening newspaper in 
competition with the Evening Standard and Evening News in the 1940s. There were 
only five reports and each concentrated on foreign news, including the second lead 
headlined ‘Nazis race for Seine “Dunkirk”.’25 There are a number of discourses in 
operation here, some of them contradictory. As British newspapers had used Dunkirk 
as a metaphor for snatching victory from defeat in 1940 was the reader to conclude 
that the Germans were staging an unexpected rally? Or, was The Star making 
assumptions that its target audience had grown to question, or never properly 
subscribed to, the ‘Bloody Marvellous’ narrative being pedalled in the Daily Mirror 
and elsewhere Fleet Street four years previously and ‘Dunkirk’ had become a 
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convenient label to signify a serious military reverse?26 The quotation marks around 
Dunkirk, albeit derived from a non-attributed phrase in the copy, signalled a potential 
deviation from the previously accepted meaning of the word and the sub-headline – 
‘Their retreat is now a rout’ – removed all doubt. Given that Dunkirk has assumed a 
mythical status in British press folklore, there were social implications from this 
change of narrative. Below the headlines the copy read: 
The Seventh German Army has completely collapsed as a fighting force, and we 
are all out in pursuit of what remains of this once formidable army as the Germans 
race for the Seine, where hurried preparations have been made for an ‘inland 
Dunkirk’.  
 
The ‘their’ in the headline and the ‘we’ in the copy underline the abandonment of 
objectivity and the ‘othering’ in the report, but there is another, more subtle, sign of 
bias. The reporter (the above ‘we’ suggested the journalist was with the pursuing 
forces) wrote that German army was not just retreating, it had ‘completely collapsed’ 
to the point the reporter could write dismissively of ‘what remains’ and ‘hurried 
preparations’ for a retreat. An alternative report could have used the word 
‘regrouping’ and, as the Seventh Army would play a role in the major German 
offensive, the Battle of the Bulge, four months later, it would possibly have been the 
more accurate description.27 
All reports in the Manchester newspapers during the study period were 
examined in this manner to see if they abandoned reporting norms explored in the 
previous chapter. The standard format for news reports is the inverted pyramid ‘which 
places the most important information at the head of the story and uses the lead 
paragraph to answer the five ‘W questions’: Who? What? Why? Where? And 
                                            
26 ‘Bloody Marvellous’, Daily Mirror, 1 June 1940, p. 7. 
27 Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: The Official History of the Battle of the Bulge (St Petersburg, FL: Red 
and Black, 2011).  
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When?’28 Lasswell is credited with developing the five Ws model of communication 
in 1948 but, even though his work was published after the period of study, war and 
non-war reports in the Manchester newspapers generally followed the journalistic 
convention that White described as the ‘order of meaning’?29 A typical example was 
printed in the Manchester Evening News on 17 December 1940: 
Another German spy [WHO] was executed [WHAT] in London [WHERE] today 
[WHEN]. He was associated with Waldberg and Meier, the two spies who were 
hanged in Pentonville a week ago. Like them he was equipped with a wireless set 
[WHY].30 
 
There are other forms of news construction, such as the delayed drop, where the five 
‘W questions’ appear below paragraphs setting the scene, or more literary forms of 
newspaper journalism in which the report ‘invariably starts with a pronoun such as 
”it”, “he”, “she” or “they”’.31 Neither was common in news reports in the 1940s, and 
any deviation from the normal ‘order of meaning’ is an indicator of unusual pressures 
on, or priorities of, the reporter or sub-editor. Emphasis on the bravery of the fire 
fighters placed high in a story about Blitz deaths would be a typical example.  
Wodak and Michael Meyer, citing Teun Van Dijk, described one dimension of 
critical discourse analysis as ‘the extension of linguistics beyond sentence grammar 
towards a study of action and interaction’ and what failed to appear in reports, 
casualty figures for example, is also significant.32 Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang argued 
that academics should be interested not only in what the ‘media convey’, but also in 
‘what they leave out’. They added: ‘The topics, events, facts, issues, arguments, 
personalities, and political figures that never made it to this public forum have 
                                            
28 B. Franklin and others, Key Concepts in Journalism Studies (London: Sage, 2005), p. 122.  
29 Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: Norton, 1948), pp. 33-51; H. White, ‘The 
Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality’, in On Narrative, ed. by W. J. T. Mitchell 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981), 5-27 (p. 9). 
30 ‘Third Nazi Spy Executed’, Manchester Evening News, 17 December 1940, p. 1. 
31 A. Blundy, The Bad News Bible (London: Review, 2004), p. 181; Richardson, Analysing 
Newspapers, p. 72. 
32 T. A. Van Dijk, Discourse Studies, 5 vols, (London: Sage, 2007), cited in Methods of Critical 
Discourse Analysis, ed. by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2009), p. 2.  
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consequences, short-term and long-range.’33 This is particularly important in the 
context of wartime rationing of newsprint that reduced newspapers to between four 
and 10 pages in length.  
Critical discourse analysis was chosen as the principal methodology because it 
revealed what was written or said, and asked why? Richardson argued that this theory 
and method of newspaper analysis allowed academics to apply a interpretative, 
contextual and constructivist approach:  
What this means is that critical discourse analysts: offer interpretations of the 
meanings of texts rather than just quantifying textual features and deriving 
meaning from this; situate what is written or said in the context in which it occurs, 
rather than just summarising patterns or regularities in texts; and argue that textual 
meaning is constructed through an interaction between producer, text and 
consumer rather than simply being ‘read off’ the page by all readers in exactly the 
same way.34  
 
An example was a report in the Manchester Guardian in December 1940 that stated 
‘several incendiaries fell in a square near to a war memorial’.35 A grid of words would 
have noted ‘incendiaries’, ‘memorial’ and ‘war’ but would not have logged the mock 
outrage of the reporter or sub-editor. Anderson noted that ‘no more arresting emblems 
of modern nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers’ but no 
bomber several thousand feet in the air in the dark would have aimed at such a 
militarily meaningless target and, in any case, the memorial was not hit.36 This is a 
conventional propagandist technique as described by Stig-Arne Nohrstedt et al in 
which conflict is described in polarized terms: good and bad. They added: ‘So a 
discourse dominated by propaganda will consequently only allow two positions: for 
                                            
33 Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, ‘Personal Influence and the New Paradigm: Some Inadvertent 
Consequences’ in ‘The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science’, 608, 1 
(2006), 157-178 (p. 171). 
34 Richardson, Analysing Newspapers, p. 15. 
35 ‘Night Raid on North-West’, Manchester Guardian, 23 December 1940, p. 3. 
36 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 9. 
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and against. Attempts or claims to take a third position – a distanced, neutral or 
critical standpoint – will be effectively suppressed.’37  
Donald Matheson has argued that war requires a vocabulary to sustain it, 
however, so study of the semiotics of the language is important:  
Organised violence depends on language to organise it at every level, from 
conceiving of state-sanctioned violence to planning and giving orders, and it 
depends on language to justify it through philosophy, heroic stories and the 
construction of notions such as national honour and the dishonourable enemy.38  
 
The analysis will focus on the words used in headlines and in copy using linguistic 
concepts and tools. Words can contain value judgements as well as the dictionary 
meanings and Billig argued that ‘nationalism is not confined to the florid language of 
blood-myths’, but also operates in ordinary and commonly used expressions. He 
wrote: ‘Small words, rather than the grand memorable phrases, offer constant, but 
barely conscious reminders of the homeland.’ 39 This was demonstrated when the 
Guardian Weekly conducted an analysis of the words used by journalists during the 
Gulf War in 1991:  
They have     We have 
A war machine    Army, navy and air force 
Censorship     Reporting restrictions 
Propaganda     Press briefings 
 
They     We 
Destroy     Suppress 
Kill      Eliminate 
Kill      Neutralise 
 
They launch    We launch 
Sneak attacks    First strikes 
Without provocation   Pre-emptively 
 
Their men are…    Ours are… 
Brainwashed    Professional 
                                            
37 S. A.Nohrstedt and others, ‘From the Persian Gulf to Kosovo – War Journalism and Propaganda’, 
European Journal of Communication,15, 3 (2000), 383-404 (p. 384). 
38 Donald Matheson, Media Discourses. Analysing Media Texts (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 
2005), p. 3. 
39 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 93. 
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Cowardly     Cautious 
Desperate     Confident40 
       
The alternative word in the pairings could have been used for the other in each case, 
depending on the personal views of the writer, and is a clear indicator of the multi-
functional nature of linguistic semiotics that was apparent in 1940 as it was half a 
century later. This subjectivity is most evident in the headlines, which are designed to 
attract a reader to a report and, in trying to reveal the most newsworthy and eye-
catching element in the story they accompany, do not have time to address the issue 
of balance even on the rare occasions the reporter or sub-editor would attempt to 
include it in his/her copy during a war. Headlines perform a double function, ‘a 
semantic function regarding the referential text, and a pragmatic function regarding 
the reader (the receiver) to whom the text is addressed. The two functions are 
simultaneous’.41 This focus will be on the representations the words in the headlines 
convey: ‘The various types of verb process (mental, verbal, relational, transitive and 
intransitive action) aren’t just syntactically different, they also carry differences of 
meaning – that is semantic differences – between processes and hence between 
differing clauses.’42 The text below the headlines is also analysed. 
Van Dijk’s ideological square is characterised by positive self-representation 
and negative representation of others and if this applied to newspaper reports:  
We may expect that Our good actions and Their bad ones will in general tend to be 
described at a lower, more specific level, with many (detailed) propositions. The 
opposite will be true for Our bad actions and Their good ones, which, if described 
at all, will both be described in rather general, abstract and hence 'distanced' terms, 
without giving much detail.43  
 
In war, as the previous chapters have shown, there are imperatives which make Van 
                                            
40 Guardian, 23 January 1991. Cited in Cottle, Mediatized Conflict, p. 81.  
41 E. Iarovici and R. Amel, ‘The Strategy of Headlines’, Semiotica, 77-4 (1989), p. 441. 
42 Richardson, Analysing Newspapers, p. 197. 
43 T. A. Van Dijk, ‘Opinions and Ideologies in the Press’ in Approaches to Media Discourse, ed. by 
Allan Bell and Peter Garrett (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 21-63 (p. 35).  
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Dijk’s theory the default position in newspapers, in Jowett and O’Donnell words, 
using language that ‘tends to deify a cause and satanize opponents’.44 The copy is also 
examined for references that represent the values and characteristics of the British and 
the Germans. Martin Reisigl and Wodak describe these as predicational strategies, 
‘the very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons, 
animals, objects, events and social phenomena’.45 A typical example appeared in the 
Manchester Evening News in December 1940. Under the headline ‘A. F. S. men 
machine-gunned’, a story alleging that, after dropping their bombs, ‘Nazi planes 
swooped low and tried to machine-gun some of the firemen’.46 Nobody is quoted to 
substantiate this story and German gunners, faced with a long flight home, would 
have been more likely to have wanted to conserve ammunition for possible 
encounters with British fighters. Nevertheless, the reporter has assigned bad actions 
perpetrated against the good of the fire fighters. 
Language is an indicator of subjectivity but where reports appear and what 
projection they receive is also a potentially important indicator of a lack of objectivity 
or symptoms of censorship. ‘The design of a newspaper page, especially a news page, 
is its own menu,’ Allen Hutt and Bob James wrote, while F. W. Hodgson put it 
simply: ‘The order which headlines appear on a page, and their size, signify the 
relative importance of the text in relation to the other items.’47 The lead story on the 
main news page of relatively few words is more likely to receive attention and be read 
than a long report buried low down on the Foreign News page deep inside a 
newspaper. When the Manchester Blitz was not the lead story in a Manchester 
                                            
44 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda, p. 303. 
45 M. Reisigl and R. Wodak, Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Anti-Semitism 
(London: Routledge, 2001), p. 54.  
46 ‘A. F. S. Men Machine-Gunned’, Manchester Evening News, 24 December 1940, p. 1. 
47 Allen Hutt and Bob James, Newspaper Design Today (London: Lund Humphries, 1989), p. 12; F. W. 
Hodgson, New Subediting (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1998), p. 35. 
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newspaper, this can be an indicator of censorship. Why this would happen is explored 
later in the thesis. 
The column centimetres usually reflect the importance that the newspaper 
attaches to the article, although not always (as above), and there is a quantitative 
study of the amount of coverage of the war compared to other news stories, features 
and entertainment. This is done by analysing the number of stories, and the 
percentage of the newspaper they represent, allocating to seven categories: war news; 
non-war news; comment; entertainment and sport; business; cartoons and 
photographs; and advertisements. The findings are considered alongside the survey 
undertaken by the Royal Commission on the Press published in 1949 that analysed 
newspaper coverage in The Times, the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror in 1927, 1937 
and 1947.48  
It is important to take into account the expectations placed on the Manchester 
Guardian, which had a national audience and the consequent journalistic obligations 
that implied, but Manchester’s local newspapers also devoted considerable space in 
ration-reduced editions to the capital. Haley, editor of the Manchester Evening News 
during the war and a future editor of The Times and Director General of the BBC, 
stated: ‘Only London mattered.’ So, rather than self-restriction, was this kind of 
attitude simply the adoption of ‘metropolitan values’ by the Northern 
editorial/proprietorial elite? 49 Haley’s comment, while not conclusive, suggests this 
was the case but a quantitative analysis is undertaken to chart the Manchester Blitz’s 
fall down the news agenda. This is done by enumerating the references in the three 
newspapers to the bombing and Manchester from 24 December to the end of the study 
period. While local newspapers have a different audience and would be expected to 
                                            
48 Royal Commission, p. 249.  
49 Woods Papers, 5 September 1963, cited in Koss, Rise and Fall, p. 388. 
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linger longer on Manchester stories, their coverage is compared to that of The Times, 
the Daily Mirror and, to give a hyper-local perspective, the Salford City Reporter.    
 
2.3. Contemporary Accounts 
A fuller picture of how Manchester print journalism functioned in the face of 
the Blitz is drawn by comparing what appeared in newsprint to other, sometimes 
private, contemporary accounts. Interviews with senior journalists of the time were 
impossible because the nature of the call-up meant that only those who were older 
than fighting age or unfit for service remained in the UK to make the key decisions 
concerning newspaper content.50 Paper shortages imposed by war rationing may have 
contributed to the relatively few memos that were available, but the distinctive 
editorial structure, in UK national newspaper terms, of the Manchester Guardian 
where decisions had to be relayed between Cross Street, Manchester, and the London 
office meant there was important correspondence.51  
As Crozier was the editor in chief of the Manchester Guardian and set 
editorial policy, memos to and from him and his responses to readers’ letters are 
examined in detail. The Guardian Archive has his correspondence from 1932 to his 
death in 1944 but as the focus of this study is the period from December 1940 to 
February 1941 and the censorship framework was erected from the moment war was 
declared, greatest attention is paid to the period from the beginning of 1939 to the end 
of 1941. This allowed scrutiny of every one of his memos, many of them routine or 
mundane, but also containing responses to key moments, including Hitler’s 
occupation of Czechoslovakia, the countdown to conflict and the frequent 
interventions of the censor in the opening months of the war. The period in the 12 
                                            
50 Calder, People’s War, p. 505. 
51 Guardian Archive. 
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months after the Manchester Blitz also allowed time for Crozier and his staff to reflect 
on the Manchester Guardian’s coverage in what was a vital moment in the city’s 
history. Importantly for this thesis, the two-year examination period provides prime 
examples of self-censorship by Crozier.  
The editor’s memos were complemented by the study of the correspondence 
of the London editor James Bone and the newspaper’s war correspondent Evelyn 
Montague, representing the most important actors in the Manchester Guardian’s 
coverage of the war in 1940 and 1941. This correspondence is sparse – there is only 
one surviving memo from Bone to Crozier written during the war – and there were 
similar limitations regarding Haley’s correspondence. Although he was editor of the 
Manchester Evening News, his appointment as general manager for the newspaper 
group meant his memos largely related to logistics rather than editorial policy. A 
typical memo to him from Crozier was: 
Our three drivers who will be taking the papers to the stations ought to have some 
head protection if possible. I know the great difficulty of getting steel helmets, but 
is it possible that there may be three ARP officials in the office who could do 
without helmets better than drivers? I should say that these drivers merit head 
protection almost more than anyone else.52 
 
Other memos involving Haley referred to paper shortages, distribution difficulties and 
such like. Nevertheless, elsewhere in the archive, there are later memos beyond 1941 
where Crozier referred to interventions from the censor and to verbal conversations in 
the offices of the Manchester Guardian. These, in conjunction with the more 
pertinent material from Crozier et al, not only gave contemporary views but also 
revealed occasions when reports were spiked (rejected) or altered because of 
government or self-censorship. Biographies and autobiographies of journalists, editors 
and proprietors were also studied, although the latter could not be considered 
                                            
52 Guardian Archive, Crozier to Haley, 20 September 1940. 
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impartial and were always written with the benefit of hindsight. ‘This is not history; 
this is my case,’ Winston Churchill said when he described his account of 1939-45, 
The Second World War.53 
Other contemporary accounts from non-journalists were studied. 
Consideration was given to conducting a series of semi-structured interviews with 
people who had been alive during Manchester’s Blitz. Historians of the Holocaust 
have used oral history to radically shift perceptions, but, while the dreadful events in 
concentration camps would be burned on memories, the sharpness of recollections of 
more mundane day-to-day existence might be questionable in people who would be 
aged at least 85 now. There is also a doubt about the value of the views of people who 
would have been children or in their teens at the time and who may well have been 
sheltered from the grimmest news and darkest feelings by their parents. They would 
also have lacked an adult perception of the reporting in their newspapers. Instead, a 
variety of documentary sources, including contemporary written material, were 
examined, testing the accuracy of newspapers’ representation of popular morale and 
the extent to which editors and journalists correctly judged the popular mood in the 
way they reported the Manchester Blitz. This process was completed partly through 
the study of archive material at the Mass Observation Project, based at the University 
of Sussex, which has contemporary reports from diarists in Manchester. These were 
relatively short engagements and virtually everything the diarists wrote pertinent to 
their collection of material and the city’s reaction to the Blitz is included in this 
thesis.54 There is also a small archive of Mancunian recollections at Stockport 
Library, Greater Manchester, which have been published on-line by the BBC as part 
of its WW2 People’s War compilation. These recollections were compiled more than 
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60 years after the event, with all the potential for memory to be airbrushed by 
nostalgia that time span can imply, and while many revealed the usual narrative of 
fortitude, they also contained a significant number of accounts that suggested there 
were more complex responses that spoke of fear, anger and the questioning of 
whether continuing to wage war against Hitler was worth the suffering.55  
Finally, there was a series of weekly reports compiled, via the resources of 
Home Intelligence, by the Ministry of Information and distributed to the War Cabinet. 
These are also to be found at the University of Sussex and, importantly for this thesis, 
included a report on the morale of the Manchester public conducted in January 1941, 
just days after the Christmas Blitz.56 This is used extensively as it is an official 
document that would have been read by the Cabinet or officials close to it and the 
team of government reporters would have had no obvious reason to be biased. This 
report also included an appendix in which a Mancunian gave a detailed account of her 
reaction to the destruction. Again, virtually all her report is included in the thesis. The 
archive also includes a Home Intelligence report on the press written in May 1940 
that monitored the public’s trust in their newspapers, why they read them and the 
demographics of the reading public. This report is also used extensively. 
The research findings from this study, showing that popular perceptions of the 
time frequently countered the accepted version of British attitudes to the Blitz, 
particularly the Home Intelligence report on Manchester’s morale referred to above, 
are compared to analysis of the selected contemporary newspapers in order to produce 
overall answers to the key questions at the heart of the thesis. Particular attention is 
given to newspaper reports with headlines that appeared to provide negative case 
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analysis but, even though they hinted at criticism of the authorities in the aftermath of 
the Manchester Blitz, the copy below did not back up these headlines.  
 
3. The Limits of the Research 
This thesis provides new analysis of the reporting of the war in an important 
provincial British city that would have become the national print centre if Fleet Street 
had been rendered inoperable. It focuses on the three newspapers that dominated the 
local market in Manchester. In 1940 and 1941 between them they sold more than 
500,000 copies every day to a population of between double and treble that figure.57 
Even allowing for the geographical spread of the circulation that reached into outlying 
towns such as Bolton and Rochdale, this meant that the Manchester Guardian, 
Manchester Evening News and Evening Chronicle’s penetration into the local market 
was extensive. The research could have extended to other evening newspapers in the 
Greater Manchester area, for example the Bolton Evening News or Oldham Chronicle, 
but they did not have the influence and circulation (65,000 and 25,000 respectively in 
1945) of the chosen sample.58 Also neither the Bolton nor the Oldham newspapers 
had a central Manchester base at Christmas 1940 and, with the city’s infrastructure 
severely damaged by the bombing, would have had logistical difficulties getting ready 
access to the victims of the Blitz. The experience, too, would not have been 
comparable as Bolton had only one air raid when Punch Street and Ardwick Street 
were attacked in 1941 and Oldham had only two of serious note, in 1941 and 1945, 
when 27 people were killed on each occasion.59  
                                            
57 Census of Great Britain 1841-1931, cited in Steven J. Fielding, ‘The Irish Catholics of Manchester 
and Salford: Aspects of Their Religious and Political History, 1890-1939’, (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, University of Warwick, 1988), p. 347.  
58 Audit Bureau of Circulations <http://www.abc.org.uk> [accessed 16 November 2012]. 
59 Bolton’s War, Bolton Remembers the War <http://www.boltonswar.org.uk/t-blackout.htm#berry> 
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Thought was also given to making a direct comparison between 
Manchester and Liverpool’s newspapers. Liverpool suffered more raids than any 
British city other than London and had a comparable population (856,000) and 
demography to Manchester.60 It also had three daily newspapers, the morning 
Liverpool Post, and two evenings, the Liverpool Echo and Liverpool Evening 
Express, although it was not a national newspaper print centre like Manchester and 
had a far more local focus. But Liverpool, other British cities and local newspapers in 
the Second World War are worthy of a separate study.  
The three chosen newspapers represent a narrow spectrum of political 
opinion. The Manchester Guardian had supported the Liberal Party but, unlike the 
News Chronicle, had distanced itself when the party disintegrated after the First 
World War.61 By 1939 it had no political allegiance, although A. P. Wadsworth, a 
future editor, articulated an editorial policy that pledged the paper to Churchill, who 
had ‘the boldness, the imagination, the sense of social justice, the capacity to rouse 
the enthusiasm and devoted service that we need’.62 The Manchester Evening News 
and Evening Chronicle, in common with most provincial and weekly newspapers, 
showed no obvious support to any political party, preferring ‘journalism of 
consensus’, although the former’s link with the Guardian would make it liberal-
leaning, while the latter’s regular political commentator was the Conservative Party 
MP Beverley Baxter, who had an unofficial post with the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production where he was responsible for keeping up production of aero-engines.63 
                                                                                                                             
2009) <http://www.oldham-chronicle.co.uk/news-features/8/news/29219/the-day-war-broke-out> 
[accessed 28 November 2012]. 
60 Beaven and Thoms, Civilian Morale, p. 196; Demographia <http://www.demographia.com> 
[accessed 19 November 2012]. 
61 Gannon, British Press, p. 75. 
62 ‘Ayerst, Manchester Guardian, p. 535. 
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The fact that his views were printed despite his lack of local connections – he was a 
Canadian and represented the constituency of Wood Green in north London – 
suggests his opinions did not differ significantly from the editorial policy. None of the 
papers in this study was among the most strident in terms of support for the main 
political parties and, although this is addressed in part by holding up the findings 
against The Times and the Daily Mirror, newspapers which tended to be Conservative 
and Labour by nature if not by proclamation, a more rigorous study of left-wing 
publications, for example, would include the Daily Herald, which supported the 
Labour Party, and the Daily Worker, which was set up in 1930 to support the 
Communist Party.64  
Finally, the length of the study period could have been extended. 
Manchester and Salford suffered sporadic bombing throughout the Second World 
War, most notably in June 1941 when 14 nurses were killed after bombs landed on 
Salford Royal Hospital. The death rate and the damage were not comparable, 
however, and the strain on the local infrastructure was not as heavy. Nevertheless, 
there is scope for further study tracking the change of tone in Manchester’s 
newspapers as the fear of invasion receded and the mood changed from if the war 
could be won to when?65  
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Part III: Results and Analysis 
Chapter 4 
Manchester: Its Blitz and its Newspapers 
 
1. Introduction 
Manchester and Salford entered the Second World War with a combined 
population of around a million. The census of the cities in 1931 counted 766,378 and 
223,438 people respectively and, although the 1941 census was not undertaken 
because of the hostilities, those numbers grew by the time war was declared.1 In 1949 
the Royal Commission on the Press estimated the population of greater Manchester as 
1.5 million, rising to 2.25 million if the outlying Bolton, Oldham, Stockport, Bury and 
Rochdale were included.2 There was a significant Catholic presence, amounting to 
130,000 or 13 per cent in 1931, including around 800 Italians in Ancoats, an area just 
north of the city centre, while Bill Williams stated there was a 40,000-strong Jewish 
community in Manchester in 1933, although this also grew before the war because 
8,000 refugees came to the city to escape Nazism from Germany, Austria and 
Czechoslovakia, most of them Jews.3 
The city attracted immigrants, according to Louis Hayes in 1840, because of 
its tolerance towards foreigners: 
Our foreign trade brings us into contact with most nationalities, and makes us 
probably more cosmopolitan in our views… Manchester makes no distinction as to 
creed or race. She opens her portals and offers an equal chance to all those who 
wish to settle here to trade and get gain.4 
                                            
1 Fielding, ‘Irish Catholics’, p. 347 
2 Royal Commission, p. 10. 
3 Fielding, ‘Irish Catholics’, p. 52; Paul de Felice, ‘Reconstructing Manchester’s Little Italy’, in 
Manchester Region History Review, 12, 1998, 54-65 (p. 56); Bill Williams, Jews and Other 
Foreigners: Manchester and the Rescue of the Victims of European Fascism, 1933-40 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2011), pp. 11, 435. 
4 Louis M. Hayes, Reminiscences of Manchester and Some of its Surroundings from the Year 1840 
(Manchester: 1905), cited in Williams, Jews, p. 2. 
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This may have been the case in the mid nineteenth century, yet in the 1930s the 
membership of the British Union of Fascists was sufficiently large in Manchester that 
Sir Oswald Mosley considered moving his headquarters from London to the city.5 The 
support for the BUF dissipated rapidly on the outbreak of war and a swing in the 
city’s sentiments by June 1940 might be detected in that riots broke out in Little Italy 
in Ancoats when Mussolini allied with Germany and invaded France.6 Most of the 
city’s Italian males in a community described by Williams as ‘subsisting largely as 
itinerant ice-cream sellers, barrel organists and manual workers’ in Ancoats and 
academics, lawyers and entrepreneurs dotted elsewhere in the city, were interned in 
Bury and many died when the Arandora Star was sunk the following month.7 The 
thesis will return to this subject in Chapter 7. 
Home Intelligence’s verdict on 1940s Manchester was less than flattering.8 
When its observers visited the city in the January after the Christmas Blitz it found 
morale to be low, but their criticism extended beyond the immediate difficulties to 
pre-war attitudes. Describing Manchester as an ‘uncoordinated, topographically 
incoherent, overlapping, jumbled up nondescript place’, their report continued: ‘Even 
at the best of times Manchester feeling and a positive Manchester outlook are liable to 
be lacking.’9 The inspectors added: 
Long before the war competent observers were saying that there was a noticeable 
strain of selfishness and strict utilitarianism in Manchester. And in the last few 
months several people have pointed out the tendency for Manchester people to stop 
work at the slightest siren, sleep all night in shelters long before the Blitz, etc. 10 
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6 Ibid, p. 396. 
7 Ibid. 
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As Iggers noted earlier, Manchester newspapers might have wished to gloss over or 
ignore ‘local jealousies’ because highlighting them would have been seen as an attack 
on their target audience, but this thesis will show later that they also failed to pursue 
incidents of local authority incompetence. There were reasons for this, as the previous 
chapters have discussed, but this contradicted a basic tenet endorsed in the training 
and practices of journalists, namely holding those in authority to account. 
 
2. The Bombing of Manchester 
The raid on Coventry in November 1940 not only allowed Nazi propaganda to 
add Coventration or Coventried to the war-time vocabulary, it highlighted a change in 
tactics by the Luftwaffe which extended its bombing of London to Britain’s provincial 
centres.11 Birmingham was attacked on 25 October, and Glasgow, Plymouth, 
Coventry, Bristol, Southampton, Merseyside, Manchester and Sheffield followed.12 
The Germans began the war directing bombers by a radio device named the 
Knickebein, but when the British jammed the beams, they revised their methods and 
pathfinder forces were sent out to light the way for the heavy bombers with 
incendiaries.13 Coventry was the first city to be attacked using the new method.     
The first raid of the Manchester Blitz occurred on 22-23 December 1940, a 
Sunday night and Monday morning, when 149 aircraft of Luftflotte 3 and 121 of 
Luftflotte 2 dropped 272 tons of high-explosive bombs and 37,152 incendiaries.14 The 
attacks, concentrating on the western side of the city, the docks and industrial areas of 
Trafford Park and Salford, lasted from 7.45 pm to 1.20 am and again from 2 am to 
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6.55 am.15 Guided to the target area by fires still burning in Liverpool and Birkenhead 
from raids the previous night, more than 400 fires were started, 100 of which were 
serious, and within two hours the glare of the fires was visible to crews flying over 
London.16 The very large number of incendiary bombs dropped on the city, 
particularly before 3 am, and a shortage of civilian defence staff, who had been 
transferred to help in Liverpool the previous day, presented a multitude of problems 
and although there was no shortage of water it was not possible to extinguish them all 
before nightfall the following evening.17 Trafford Park was particularly badly affected 
and the main bus station and both the city’s main railways stations, Central and 
London Road (now Manchester Piccadilly), were hit.  
At times another Coventry seemed to be threatened and people living near Withy 
Grove [where the Evening Chronicle was based] risked death by deserting their 
own surface and Anderson shelters to seek greater protection afforded them 
beneath the largest of all provincial newspaper offices. Difficult as conditions 
were, none could be refused shelter that night and the refugees crowded on to the 
benches while the cramped sub-editors went about their job preparing for the 
morning’s newspapers.18 
 
The following night, 23-24 December, 171 aircraft of Luftflotte 3 dropped 195 tons of 
high explosive and 7,020 incendiary bombs between 7.15 pm and midnight bringing 
the Mancunian casualty list to an estimated 684 people dead and 2,364 wounded.19 Of 
the famous buildings in the centre of Manchester, the following were severely 
damaged: Free Trade Hall; Victoria Buildings; Rates Office; Cross Street Chapel; 
Manchester Cathedral; Chetham's Hospital; Masonic Temple; Corn Exchange; St. 
Anne's Church; City Hall; Smithfield Market and the Gaiety Theatre. Within a mile of 
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16 Ibid. 
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Albert Square, 31.3 acres were in ruins and 165 warehouses, 150 offices, five banks 
and 200 other business premises were either destroyed or severely damaged.20 
Salford, a city bordering Manchester, was also very seriously damaged by the pre-
Christmas bombing, with 215 killed and 910 wounded, while Stretford, the domestic 
area closest to the factories and warehouses of Old Trafford and Trafford Park, 
suffered an estimated 73 deaths. 21 The human cost at Christmas 1940 was also 
reflected in the homeless: 6,000 people in Manchester; 5,000 in Salford; and 4,000 in 
Stretford.22 These figures, confused by the destruction of burial and crematorium 
records in Barlow Moor Road, south of the city, during the same two nights of 
bombing, were depressing enough given that they represent nearly one in 60 of every 
UK civilian killed in the Second World War, but many believed they were an 
underestimate. Freethy, for example, summed up the confusion over the number of 
casualties when he stated: 
Records show that between the 22 and 25 of December 1,005 people were killed 
and many more injured. This compares to the 4,100 people who were killed in 
Liverpool between 1940 and 1941 and the 1,236 poor folk who were killed in 
Coventry.23 
 
None of these figures correlates with statistics supplied by the Imperial War Museum, 
but there was widespread suspicion in 1940 and 1941 that the published figures did 
not match the reality. Joyce Kilshaw, of Sale, four miles south west of Manchester, 
recalled: 
One of my vivid memories of the war was looking at the lists, which were pinned 
up informing the neighbourhood who had been killed in the various air raids. 
However, I am now sure that these lists didn’t give quite a full picture of those 
who lost their lives and most certainly the numbers had been well and truly 
censored. 24 
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She articulated the common fear of people emerging from their shelters not knowing 
whether their house had survived the air raid intact: 
Sometimes news of homes that had been bombed filtered through to the shelter but 
the ARP wardens were told not to give any information to stop people going out of 
the shelters whilst the raids were still going on to rescue their belongings. The 
ARP wardens had to write detailed reports and they were also censored.25 
 
The fact that people were concerned about their possessions is indicative of the 
prevalence, or fear, of looters.26 
Manchester would endure only one further major raid during the war, in June 
1941, leaving it relatively lightly touched compared, for example, to nearby Liverpool 
which, according to official figures, suffered 2,716 casualties between 1939 and 1945 
(and a further 1,173 in neighbouring areas).27 Liverpool endured 16 heavy raids in 
1940 and 1941, and 50 of varying degrees of severity between August and Christmas 
1940, including two bombardments that killed 365 people on 20/21 and 21/22 
December, the two nights immediately before the Manchester Blitz, yet Home 
Intelligence inspectors, as this thesis will examine later, observed that morale suffered 
far more in the latter than it did in Merseyside.28 There were reasons for this, partly 
economic. Liverpool boomed during the Second World War, largely because of 
imports from the United States and Canada which reversed the trend of growth in 
trade to ports in the south of England, particularly London, during the previous two 
decades.29 As in the First World War, trade concentrated on the North Atlantic and by 
1947 35 per cent of the city’s labour force was employed in shipping and other 
                                            
25 Ibid, pp. 14-16. 
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dependent industries.30 Manchester did not have an equivalent commercial boom to 
balance the effects of the bombing, but, irrespective of economic factors, Calder 
stated that often it was those cities and towns that were less used to bombing that 
suffered most psychologically. ‘The effect on popular attitudes of even a singe sharp 
raid should not be underestimated.’31  
London, too, had an advantage because of its size. If a grocer’s shop was 
bombed, another would be within walking distance, so the capital could absorb the 
strain of continuous bombing. In smaller cities the quality of life could be severely 
reduced by the loss of utilities and amenities. Also, when the centre of a smaller city 
was razed, the symbols and buildings of local pride and the centres of local pleasure 
were destroyed with it. Beaven and Thoms noted that Manchester suffered 
disproportionately in this respect, stating that Manchester’s Blitz-scale attacks were 
concentrated on the heart of the city, seriously affecting key institutions such as 
‘public houses, cinemas, and public utilities, along with transport systems which 
linked Manchester’s centre with its suburban areas’.32 
  Calder argued: ‘Small raids were interspersed unpredictably with periods of 
lull and fierce Blitzes, and no “even tenor’’ could be established.’33 After Leicester 
was bombed relatively lightly for eight hours on 19 November 1940 at a cost of 108 
deaths, a special constable wrote: ‘Many fantastic tales swept through the city about 
the damage, the hundreds, some said, even thousands that had been killed.’34 That raid 
brought a residue of fear that lasted for several months. ‘There was nothing but the 
incessant drone of enemy planes and the constant vigil,’ the same man wrote, 
                                            
30 Ibid. 
31 Calder, People’s War, p, 220. 
32 Beaven and Thoms, Civilian Morale, p. 199. 
33 Calder, People’s War, p. 205. 
34 George Harold Ingles, When the War Came to Leicester: The Account of the Air Raids on this Great 
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describing the 20-minute spells of severe anxiety as people braced themselves for the 
noise of bombs exploding. Only when they did not arrive did relief come with: ‘Well, 
they’re not coming for us, this time.’35 Calder stated that it was the lack of regular 
bombings, the uncertainty, which frayed the nerves: 
The worst feature of morale, as the Mass Observers saw it, was the feeling of 
helplessness which emerged as the weight of remembered and anticipated fear, and 
of present inconvenience, sank down on the shoulders of populations which did 
not, like London’s, have the stimulus to adaption [sic] provided by nightly raids.36 
         
The Manchester Blitz appears to have had an effect out of proportion to its 
destruction, but perhaps that was because the bombing came as such a shock, both in 
its occurrence and its timing as the city prepared to enjoy its Christmas break. Freethy 
stated that while it was relatively easy at the start of the war to censor the armed 
forces, and even newspapers, it was more of a problem to convince civilians in the 
north of England that careless talk could cost lives: ‘The people of Lancashire needed 
even more persuading than most because, initially, they felt themselves remote from 
danger, unlike those in the southern counties.’37 To many Mancunians the most 
obvious signs that Britain was at war were minor inconveniences. All Ordnance 
Survey maps were removed from sale, for fear of being acquired by enemy agents, 
milestones and sign posts were removed – even the Cross Street building of the 
Manchester Guardian and Manchester Evening News had all traces of the word 
‘Manchester’ removed from its exterior (below) – and the names of railway stations 
were painted over so that passengers had to rely on a comprehensive transport 
knowledge or station staff with loud voices to ensure they left trains at the right 
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place.38 Even train timetables were pulped to avoid revealing lists of stations in the 
correct order.39 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Donald Read, born in 1930, was a schoolboy in Burnage, a suburb of 
Manchester three miles from the centre, when the war began and his initial experience 
was typical of many. He was among 72,000 children from the Manchester area who 
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were evacuated to safer areas, going to Kirkham, in Lancashire, when the war started 
and then to Bollington, Cheshire, 18 miles south of the city. He was back home by the 
end of September 1939, however, when the expected bombing did not materialise 
immediately. Read’s recollection of the Manchester Blitz was of a city caught 
unawares. ‘Many voluntary workers in Manchester social services had taken 
Christmas week off, leaving the city’s rest centres and other emergency systems short 
of staff just when help was most needed.’41 That, as the thesis will show, added to the 
confusion and lack of preparedness that afflicted the city in the aftermath of its Blitz.  
 
3 The ‘Other Fleet Street’ 
The roots of Manchester’s position as Britain’s second newspaper print centre 
began growing from 1821 when the Manchester Guardian was published for the first 
time, to be followed by the Manchester Courier four years later.42 The Manchester 
Evening News and the Evening Chronicle were established in 1868 and 1897 
respectively and the city started printing a national newspaper on 3 February 1900 
when Alfred Harmsworth launched a northern edition of the Daily Mail in Gorton, 
east Manchester.43 It was a landmark moment because, of the national dailies, only 
The Times and the Financial Times declined to follow suit by establishing print 
centres in the city. Manchester’s distribution area embraced England north of 
Birmingham, Scotland for those newspapers not published in Glasgow or Edinburgh, 
north Wales and all of Ireland. This provided a market for regional and provincial 
publications as well as national newspapers and by the start of the Second World War 
the Sunday Empire News, Daily Dispatch, the Chronicle Mid-Day and the Sporting 
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Chronicle were printed exclusively in the city.44 During the war Manchester was the 
natural choice as an emergency centre of publication should Fleet Street be put out of 
action by the Luftwaffe and, although this scenario never materialised, transport 
problems meant many southern editions had to be printed in the city.45 
  
3.1 Manchester Guardian 
Despite the Manchester Guardian being largely supportive of Germany in the 
1920s and a consistent critic of the reparations imposed at Versailles, the Nazis 
banned it in 1933.46 It opposed Hitler almost from his emergence in Germany, 
becoming exceptional in Britain in that it tried to print what it knew about what was 
happening in the Third Reich. Gannon wrote: ‘From the very first there was no doubt 
but that the Manchester Guardian abhorred the Nazi regime, its racial theory and 
barbarous practices,’ which meant the newspaper occasionally found itself in a moral 
quandary.47  Following the Nuremberg Nazi Party Conference of 1936, a leading 
article stated:  
After a week of Nuremberg it is difficult for us to remember that we too may be 
responsible for the present state of Europe. In the violence of Hitler and Goebbels 
we… do not stop to ask whether any great nation would behave like Germany that 
had not some cause to do so.48  
 
Crozier, the editor of the Manchester Guardian from 1932 to 1944, insisted it 
was important to keep the Jewish and other persecutions in the eye of a public, many 
of whom had anti-Semitic sympathies and who too easily became bored when news 
was not sensational, and he was particularly scathing about The Times, which he felt 
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ignored or did not pay sufficient attention to these issues.49 It is interesting that much 
of Crozier’s determination in this regard sprang from the conviction that the 
Manchester Guardian had been negligent in the years before the First World War in 
exposing the militarist ambitions of influential people in pre-1914 Germany. He wrote 
to one reporter: ‘C. P. S. [C. P. Scott] had such a profound belief in the goodness of 
human nature… that he would just not believe that there was any important section of 
opinion in Germany who were a real danger to peace.’50  
In the countdown to war the Manchester Guardian was less culpable than 
most other national newspapers in playing down the prospect of hostilities. 
Paradoxically in view of its regional roots, the newspaper provided comprehensive 
coverage of news directly related to British foreign policy, Germany and Danzig in 
July and August 1939, averaging 305 centimetres of copy a day compared to The 
Times’s 208 centimetres, the Daily Express’s 157 and the Daily Mail’s 132.51 This 
was partly due to the newspaper’s letters pages that, in contrast to the other 
publications, dealt extensively with Germany and, in particular, the Munich 
agreement. The tone of the newspaper’s coverage was critical of the Nazi regime and 
there was a negligible amount of the false optimism of the Daily Express. A leader 
printed on 24 July 1939 calling for the inclusion of Churchill and Anthony Eden in 
the Cabinet was indicative of the sense of foreboding, while a report from Germany 
read: ‘It is possible Herr Hitler will decide in favour of war this year’, but said the 
feeling in Berlin was that he preferred the following spring.52 It was not a matter of if 
the war would start, but when. 
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Even so, the Manchester Guardian’s own voice, via its leader articles, was more 
hopeful, although it described Goebbels as an ‘arch illusionist’ and his propaganda as 
‘shriller, wilder and, to put it bluntly, more panic-stricken’.53 Contrarily, Hitler was 
described as ‘the great man’ in another leader on 16 August and even when the 
Soviet-German pact was announced the newspaper almost mirrored Beaverbrook’s 
optimism when it claimed the crisis was ‘extremely threatening, but not beyond 
remedy’.54 Reality dawned the following day when the Guardian bemoaned the lack 
of a Franco-British agreement with Stalin: ‘The front which was not merely to win a 
war, but to prevent a war will be much weaker than it might have been, both in a 
military and moral sense’.55 The Manchester Guardian, like other newspapers, had its 
reason swayed by the evacuation from Dunkirk. Its reporter ‘watched with 
incredulous joy the happening of a miracle’, as he saw a destroyer dock with rescued 
soldiers: ‘They at any rate did not regard themselves as the central figures of tragic 
drama… Their eyes were red with weariness above bags of tired skin, but they were 
still soldiers and still in good heart.’56 
 
  
3.2 Evening Chronicle 
While the Manchester Guardian was undoubtedly earnest in the 1930s, the 
Evening Chronicle, the Sunday Times’s theatre critic James Agate argued, had a 
lighter touch: 
The effect of the Guardian was to make one feel that the previous day had been 
one of grave moral questioning and serious responsibility at home and abroad. The 
Chronicle gave one the impression that the day one had just lived through had been 
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full of exciting and, on the whole, jolly happenings. One would be serious again in 
the morning.57 
 
Agate, an employee of Kemsley Newspapers, had a vested interest in preferring the 
Evening Chronicle, but its tone was generally lighter and less reverent. Like the 
Manchester Evening News, the Evening Chronicle sold at three halfpence (just over 
0.5 of a modern penny) a copy and both newspapers printed first editions at 11 am. 
These were followed by the ‘home’, ‘last’, ‘last edition extra’ and the ‘late night final’ 
editions that reached vendors just before 5 pm. The edition was denoted at the top of 
the title page. Local news came from the paper’s reporters and freelance journalists, 
while Manchester’s satellite towns were covered by the Press Association and Extel, 
the national news agencies, and other national and international news was provided by 
the British United Press and Reuters. Not that there was much space for these reports 
because newsprint restrictions meant that by the summer of 1940 the Evening 
Chronicle was down to six pages. 
The Chronicle’s response to the talks at Munich in 1938 was to describe 
Chamberlain as ‘a spectacular figure’ whose virtues shone through a crisis and the 
paper’s regular political commentator, Baxter, praised the Prime Minister for treating 
Hitler like a ‘gentleman’.58 On 30 September, the day the agreement was announced, 
the newspaper stated:  ‘All the world today is hailing Mr Chamberlain as a 
peacemaker.’59 The following day it reported: ‘The thoughts of British people have 
turned inevitably to rejoicing and thanksgiving.’60 
Six months later, after the Germans occupied the whole of Czechoslovakia, 
Baxter’s tone had changed. ‘The present occupation of Prague is the greatest offence 
Herr Hitler has committed against international decency,’ his column read, before 
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condemning the invasion of a country ‘which has no more relation to Germany than 
the moon’.61 As war loomed, the Chronicle assumed a perceptiveness that its previous 
work could not justify. ‘In the end the world always has a day of reckoning with men 
like Hitler,’ its leading article read on 1 September 1939. ‘Our hands are clean. We 
have pursued conciliation to the utmost, but in the last resort we stand ready and 
united.’62 On 4 September, the first edition after war was officially declared, an 
indicator of what was to come in terms of demonizing-the-enemy propaganda 
appeared. The lead headline read: ‘Liner was torpedoed without warning: 311 
Americans aboard’, while the subhead was: ‘Treaty has been callously broken’.63 
There was also an attempt to lift morale with an article on making the most of the 
blackout. ‘Even though the windows might be darkened at night so that not even a 
pencil of light shows through on the outside, there is no reason why the inside of a 
room should be dark and depressing.’64  
Given the censorship of news of the evacuation of Dunkirk, the Evening 
Chronicle probably did not appreciate the irony in its sub-headline on 27 May 1940 
that read ‘Our offensive not yet started’.65 On 14 June, with the beaten British army 
back in England, ‘our Special Correspondent’ reported from the South Coast: ‘To a 
gay eightsome reel, which a man from Motherwell solemnly assured me is called 
“Hitler’s lament” at home, thousands of British troops left a Southern port for 
France.’66 Three days later, with the true position dawning, there was a rush to 
apportion blame: ‘France has given up the battle’.67 By the height of the Battle of 
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Britain, the Evening Chronicle had abandoned all pretence at objectivity. ‘The RAF is 
hitting Germany hard – infinitely harder than Goering’s Luftwaffe has been hitting,’ it 
reported, neglecting the obvious flaw in its argument that the battle was being fought 
over British territory. It added:  
The only thing Hitler can do in the air is to continue on a larger scale the type of 
bombing we have been getting in recent weeks. The enemy’s air force has scarcely 
hit a military target in Britain but it has managed to do a certain amount of damage 
to civilian life and property and has also wantonly machine-gunned the streets of 
open towns.68  
 
The alleged futility of the enemy’s attacks, along with the attribution of negative 
characteristics, was emphasised, the words ‘wantonly’ and ‘open’ stressing the 
unashamed attacks on undefended areas. Nine days later the Chronicle followed that 
up with a report of raids at ‘three places in North-West England’, adding ‘one person 
is said to be slightly injured and the damage was only trivial’.69     
 
3.3 Manchester Evening News  
The Manchester Evening News became increasingly concerned with politics 
and foreign affairs under the editorship of Haley, questioning Chamberlain’s policies 
in early 1938. On 16 February its editorial accused the Prime Minister of failing to 
recognise the singular threat posed by Germany.70 ‘The time has come for the 
ordinary man to stop avoiding the truth… he knows in reality… where the only 
danger to the peace in Europe lies.’ On 15 March 1938 it called for the inclusion of 
Churchill in the Cabinet.71 
While the Evening News had stood apart in early 1938, it joined the consensus 
in the build-up to Munich, praising Chamberlain for his ‘courage’, although it did 
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warn a fortnight later: ‘Today the world rejoices. It should not do so without care for 
the morrow.’72 The leader added prophetically: ‘Hitler’s troops will still march… The 
settlement terms the world is so gratefully applauding today are terrible proof how far 
aggression has managed to travel along its “peaceful” road.’ When the Germans 
moved on Prague in March 1939 the paper adopted an ‘I told you so’ stance, stating 
that the time to act had been six months earlier. It asked if the rest of the world 
regarded Britain as a nation of clever lawyers who could wriggle out of any 
agreement and would not stand up to Hitler as long as ‘they didn’t touch Britain’?73 A 
day later it stated: ‘The free people of the world await a lead.’74  
A study of the Evening News in the four weeks leading up to the war marks a 
journey towards unhappy resignation that the conflict was inevitable. On 21 August 
1939 the paper commented: ‘During the next fortnight the fate of European 
civilisation may be decided,’ while the signing of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact 
on 23 August led to the question: ‘Can any life be worth living in which force and not 
justice governs the affairs of nations and men?’75 The same editorial asked: ‘Is a man 
to be conceived as a free, if still imperfect individual… or a mere robot… having no 
freedom… or rights within himself?’ The 1 September edition, two days before war 
was declared, carried the grim headline ‘Warsaw bombed’ under which was a report 
of Germany’s invasion of Poland.76         
The Evening News, unlike its rival the Evening Chronicle, had a realistic 
vision of what was going on in France in May 1940, notwithstanding its sub-
headlined claim that ‘Germans had five casualties to every British’. Its leader noted: 
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‘The BEF are getting out. Despite fearful odds, relentlessly beset and harried by a 
determined and ruthless aggressor, our men are slowly being extricated from a 
position made desperate by no fault of their own.’77 During the Battle of Britain the 
Evening News printed tables giving ‘scores’ referring to the number of German planes 
shot down that week. When Churchill made his ‘finest hour’ speech the newspaper 
reacted with an editorial: ‘Compare that speech with Hitler’s last effort. In that 
comparison you will find the inner reasons why this is a war Britain will win.’78  
 
4. The Internal Management of Manchester’s Newspapers 
Crozier, appointed editor of the Manchester Guardian in 1932, was 
indisputably the man in charge of editorial policy. John Scott, the son of C. P., was 
the managing director, but believed that a newspaper manager’s duty was to ‘make 
his paper as profitable as possible, and to refrain from taking part in editorial 
decisions’.79 It was not that John Scott lacked interest in what appeared in the 
newspaper – The Guardian Archive has several examples of his non-judgmental 
comments – but he believed the editor ‘must be as free editorially as if he were the 
proprietor’.80 Crozier acted accordingly and memos showed his powers were matched 
by his attention to detail. He had a penchant for precise English, pronouncing: ‘The 
best and most effective English for newspaper purposes… simple, direct, lucid, 
concise, short.’81  To the reporting staff he wrote in 1940:  
The verb ‘to rock’ or ‘to be rocked’ in such phrases as ‘London Rocks’ or 
‘Manchester Rocks’ where there is a big explosion is forbidden. The verb ‘to 
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shock’ or ‘to be shocked’ in phrases like ‘Two wardens were shocked when this 
bomb fell’ is also forbidden’.82 
  
The production staff were not spared either. A memo to the chief sub editor, F. S. 
Attenborough, read:  
I reckon that in the last four years I have sent to you personally not less than a 
hundred notes on ‘both… and’ and ‘either… or’ alone (say one per fortnight) and 
not less than fifty (I think far more) on the misuse of ‘otherwise’. And, roughly 
speaking all wasted. Some people say these things are unimportant… But, 
unfortunately I can’t.83  
 
With such scrutiny came conflict and Malcolm Muggeridge, a freelance reporter in 
the Soviet Union for the Manchester Guardian and later an author and broadcaster, 
wrote to Crozier in 1932 when his copy was toned down: ‘From the way you cut my 
messages… I realise that you don’t want to know what is going on in Russia or to let 
your readers know.’84 
Crozier was capable of a stinging retort too – in March 1936 he wrote to 
another reporter: ‘Neither I nor my predecessors have been accustomed to be 
corrected by a member of the staff’ – and Muggeridge’s short-tempered exchange was 
not the only one.85 The outstanding reporter on the Manchester Guardian in the build-
up to war was Frederick Augustus Voigt, who Gannon described as ‘undoubtedly the 
greatest British political journalist of the 1930s’.86 It was his exposing of Germany’s 
rearmament that was partly responsible for the Guardian being banned in Berlin, but 
such was his consistent castigation of the Nazis, his writing was frequently toned 
down, causing rows with his editor. On one occasion in 1933 Voigt wrote to Crozier 
that his report about ‘abductions, torture and secret executions’ had been downgraded 
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to rumours that ‘may be “quite untrue”.’ He asked: ‘What is the good of having a man 
in Berlin if he cannot establish the truth?’87  
Crozier was a hard taskmaster but a human one, too, and there are several 
instances of personal feelings being expressed by the editor and his staff. When 
Alexander Werth’s reports from Berlin put him in physical danger, Crozier withdrew 
him to Paris writing: ‘I have been uneasy about your safety all the time.’88 During the 
war, when he had to intervene on the letters page because of the inexperience of a 
young journalist, Crozier insisted on calling on a trusted sub-editor, R. G. Garner, 
who would become night news editor later in 1941. In his diary he commented: 
‘Think for the future… send all letters to R. G. – poor R. G.!’89 Evelyn Montague, 
who was C. P. Scott’s eldest grandson and the war correspondent for the Guardian, 
wrote on his posting to cover the BEF’s deployment in France: ‘I have never been as 
nervous since my wedding day as I am at this moment…. But I’ll do my best. It’s a 
grand chance and I’m deeply grateful.’90 The following year, Montague reported 
about the morale in the Manchester Guardian’s London office at the height of The 
Blitz: 
Shand and, to a much lesser extent, Ray are rattled. Scott and Miss Isitt are 
magnificently unmoved. Lambert is not so good; he is defeatist by nature, and was 
severely affected by the French collapse. I am not quite happy about Werth. 
Boardman shows no signs of nerves in his conversation, but is notably careful in 
looking after himself.91 
 
He added: ‘Our staff here are exhausted and rattled, and any effort which can be made 
to spare them will assist the production of a good paper.’ Montague, himself, declared 
he was: ‘not scared but exhilarated by the bombing’ but fell ill not long afterwards.92 
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An indication of the relationship between Crozier and his war correspondent, and the 
former’s authority over editorial matters even when up against relatives of the 
newspaper’s former editor, was also revealed in Crozier’s diary: ‘E. A. M. 
[Montague] now writes a letter to me protesting against me spiking his pars. He finds 
it “mortifying and humiliating” that I should accept agency reports instead of his 
word.’93 The following day, Crozier added: ‘Letter of apology from E. A. M. for his 
outburst.’94 
The strain on the staff was exacerbated by their lack of numbers. Once war 
was declared, calls to the services and government deprived the Manchester Guardian 
of reporters and editors, including Voigt, who was needed for what Ayerst described 
as ‘political warfare’, so former employees returned to bring out the newspaper.95 
Ayerst wrote that the war ‘gave old men their chance… or a least their second 
wind’.96 Among them was Attenborough, the former chief sub-editor who had turned 
70 and returned to work under his previous deputy, while the three principal leader 
writers in 1939 had a combined age of 175 years, including Crozier who would die, 
still editor of the paper, on 16 April 1944, aged 64.97 Haley wrote in tribute: ‘Through 
12 of the most difficult and troubled years in history, from the rise of Nazism in 1933 
to 1944, the eve of its destruction, Crozier put the Guardian in the van of the fight.’98  
What happened at the Guardian in terms of staff shortages was replicated 
across the industry. By the end of 1943, substantially more than a third of the nation’s 
9,000 journalists had been called up by the armed forces, more were employed by the 
government and only around 25 per cent of staff photographers remained in Fleet 
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Street.99 Reductions extended beyond staffing. Newsprint was rationed and 
restrictions were put on circulation, so that newspapers could increase sales only by 
reducing the number of their pages. ‘Finance, shortages of raw material, and indeed 
every factor of production must have been a nightmare,’ Lord Burnham, who worked 
for the Daily Telegraph from 1955 to 1986, observed.100 The Royal Commission on 
the Press 1947-1949 quantified the lack of newsprint, comparing the 1.25 million tons 
used before the war to the 350,000 tons in 1948 and, at the rock bottom of February 
1943, only 4,320 tons were consumed weekly.101 Newspapers were reduced by as 
much as 80 per cent and the Royal Commission noted:  
The reduction to four or five pages of newspapers, which before the war averaged 
over 20, means that much important material cannot be published and that what is 
published must be highly compressed. Much news must be ‘suppressed’ for this 
reason alone and severe compression makes inaccuracy and distortion difficult to 
avoid. The likelihood that the Press will be subject of complaints is increased.102 
 
Space was at a premium, so what was selected for publication became even more 
significant, not only because trivial reports were rejected but also because stories that 
were printed had greater impact in a regime of restricted news.   
The Guardian’s pagination came down to 40 per week compared to 120 for 
March 1938, allowing an increase in production to 58,000 in July 1941 and 60,000 by 
September of that year.103 Ayerst wrote: ‘There was even a waiting list of about 3,000 
would-be purchasers. As many Guardians could be sold as could be printed. This was 
a common experience of all papers.’104 The Manchester Guardian was still a 
relatively financially poor paper, however, as display advertising migrated to 
‘popular’ papers, and in 1937 it could charge only £1 per column inch compared to 
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The Times’s £3 and the Daily Express’s £6 10s.105 Consequently most of its war 
coverage had to be done through others – the paper paid for the rights to use reports 
from The Times’s correspondents – and only when Montague landed in North Africa 
with the British First Army and then accompanied the Eighth Army in Sicily and Italy 
could the service be reciprocated.106 This arrangement also testified to the lack of 
competition between the newspapers. The Guardian sold only around 3,000 copies in 
the London area while The Times barely penetrated Manchester and the North West. 
It was there where the Guardian mattered: 
What the M.G. had to say at this stage about the fighting forces was interesting and 
important at the time to its readers, but it could not by the nature of things be 
influential. What it had to say about the home front was both interesting and 
influential.107  
 
The Manchester Evening News went into the Second World War under the 
editorship of Haley, who had joined the newspaper in 1922, became chief sub-editor 
three years later and was appointed a director of the Manchester Guardian and 
Manchester Evening News in 1930. A journalist who eschewed reporting because of 
shyness – ‘that made him an embarrassing casual acquaintance’ – but nevertheless a 
newspaperman of considerable repute, he would later become Director General of the 
BBC (1944) and the editor of The Times (1952).108 Haley was a workaholic and an 
imposing man with a ‘quiet but rasping voice, iron-grey wiry hair, a hard mouth and 
unsmiling eyes’, while one person meeting him for the first time commented: ‘I’ve 
met a chap with one glass eye before – but never a chap with two.’109 Hamilton wrote 
that Haley came across as cold on first acquaintance: ‘On the surface there was no 
warmth at all, but underneath, as I came to know, there was tremendous warmth, even 
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passion.’110 Appointed editor at the age 29, Haley transformed the newspaper, made it 
more national in outlook and prepared the ground for the Evening News’s supremacy 
over the Chronicle.111 
 Haley became responsible for the day-to-day management of both the 
Guardian and the Evening News when war was declared but his grip on the editorial 
stance of his own newspaper remained. In his interview to be the editor he stated: 
‘One man must control news, distribution, advertising, the whole running of the 
paper.’112 His appointment coincided with steady circulation growth from around 
150,000 in 1930 to more than 200,000 when he left 13 years later and it was thanks to 
the Evening News that the Manchester Guardian survived.113 John Scott recognised 
this, paying Haley more than he did himself: ‘After all, you make the money we 
spend.’114 
Haley, whose judgement in being wary of Hitler’s intentions had been 
vindicated in the build-up to the war, was less prescient when hostilities began. 
Writing in his diary on 3 September 1939, the day war was declared, he noted: 
For once it was inevitable. This is said untruly of most wars. It is true this time. So 
long as Hitler ruled Germany we could not escape ultimate conflict with him 
because he sought it. The only thing we could do was to see it was at our time 
rather than at his.  
 
The announcement of the Soviet-German pact spelt the beginning of the end. It 
may seem foolish to think it will be a short war; I feel it may be. Germany in 1914 
was rich and strong after 40 years of peace. We were not one quarter so prepared 
as we are today.115 
 
His short war never materialised and the Evening News was soon publishing with 
fewer reporters and less newsprint, a challenge Haley seemed to relish. When the 
                                            
110 Hamilton, Editor-in-Chief, p. 133. 
111 Ayerst, Manchester Guardian, p. 491 
112 Ibid, p. 490. 
113 Ibid, p. 491. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Churchill Archives, Haley, 3 September 1939. 
  
131
number of his Manchester Evening News staff was reduced by three, he wrote in his 
diary in March 1940:  
This is a complete clear-out. And I feel exhilarated rather than depressed. We’ve 
done so well lately that we have got into a groove. This will give us all a chance to 
jump out of it and shake things up. 116 
 
The pagination was reduced from 16 broadsheet pages to 10, then to eight, and, by 
July 1940, it had fallen to six. After the print allowance was cut by a further 17 per 
cent in March 1941, Haley took the decision to make the paper a five-column tabloid, 
circulating an office memo, ‘we are putting on our battle dress’, to pacify 
traditionalists on the paper.117  
The tone and news judgments at both the Manchester Guardian and the 
Manchester Evening News reflected the men in the editor’s office, and reporters based 
in the city were tightly controlled, but much of the copy that appeared in the 
newspapers came from news agencies. Reuters and the Press Association, the 
principal providers, were based in one Fleet Street building, so the Ministry of 
Information could easily control the information flow and ensure that ‘the journalism 
produced could communicate a sense of social unity in the war effort’.118 Much of this 
copy came from official communiqués and within a fortnight of war being declared, 
Crozier was complaining: ‘What makes me rather despair is the stuff that they are 
actually themselves putting out – wordy, woolly and thoroughly commonplace.’119 
The following chapters will include more examples of Crozier’s dissatisfaction and he 
and Haley did not have far to go to complain. John Scott was made a government 
regional information officer (with the potential consequences for press freedom that 
suggested), while the chief regional information officer was George Mould, a former 
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news editor of the Manchester Evening News who was given an office in the 
newspapers’ Cross Street offices.120  This was a convenient accommodation for 
Evening News journalists who could submit their items and have them returned very 
quickly. ‘He had a real sense of a newspaper’s urgent requirements,’ Bill Pepper, a 
journalist working on the paper, recalled.121 The comment sums up the cosy nature of 
the relationship between Manchester’s newspapers and the authorities during the war, 
a subject that will be looked at in subsequent chapters.     
If the editors shaped the editorial stances of the Manchester Guardian and 
Manchester Evening News, the line of control at the Evening Chronicle was more 
ambiguous. Lord Kemsley was the proprietor, and each of his newspapers carried the 
slogan ‘a Kemsley newspaper’ below the masthead, which prompted Herbert 
Morrison, the Home Secretary for much of the war, to describe his publishing empire 
as ‘the gramophone press’.122 Yet he was ‘largely preoccupied with the flagship of the 
group, the Sunday Times’, and ‘he relied on old-fashioned, able journalists to bring 
out the papers’.123 In the case of the Evening Chronicle that was James Woodbridge, 
who had joined the paper in 1912 as a leader writer and who was editor from 1925 to 
1943. The Guardian described him an editor who ‘was able to inspire his staff, whose 
own views he always treated with courtesy’.124     
Woodbridge needed his diplomatic skills because Kemsley, like Beaverbrook, 
generated strong opinions. One contemporary described him as a dim social climber 
with ‘a genius for circulation and advertising’, but Kemsley has been credited with 
creating the platform for the Sunday Times’s success in the 1960s, even if it was his 
brother Lord Camrose who, according to Greenslade, was ‘the better journalist and 
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the better man’.125 Hamilton, who would edit the Sunday Times for Kemsley, was 
more scathing, describing him as ’a deeply conservative Conservative who had 
succeeded in life by clinging to his brother’s coat-tails and was then saved from real 
competition… by the war.’126 Nevertheless, reporters on the Evening Chronicle would 
have been answerable to Kemsley who ‘reserved to himself final authority in all 
matters of policy’.127         
This manifested itself in many ways but the National Union of Journalists, in 
its submission to the Royal Commission on the Press in 1949, claimed he kept a 
blacklist. The union described this as: ‘lists of persons – and sometimes firms and 
organisations – mention of whom is completely banned in all circumstances in the 
columns of the papers concerned’, and stated that the Kemsley organisation sent 
directives on the treatment of weekend speeches sent from London to the provinces 
during the war: ‘Do not use Mr xxxx’.128 Michael Foot, an MP, future leader of the 
Labour Party and a former journalist, reported to the Commission:  
I think for a period Lord Beaverbrook was on Lord Kemsley’s black list; at any 
rate, it was an extraordinary fact that when Lord Beaverbrook was Minister for 
Aircraft Production there were no stories about the Ministry of Aircraft Production 
on Lord Kemsley’s front page.129 
  
The Royal Commission also heard from the Manchester editor of the Daily Sketch, 
who gave a further example of editorial interference from Kemsley after Hitler had 
delivered a speech before the Munich agreement. The editor received a call from 
Kemsley’s headquarters in London saying the contents bill should include an 
‘agreeable’ photograph of Hitler with one word: ‘Peace’. He added: 
The comment of the chief sub-editor was: 'Well that's not my reading of Hitler’s 
speech' and that was the general opinion. But we had to put out the bill just the 
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same. It was another instance of journalistic knowledge, experience and sense of 
responsibility to the public being overridden by the fiat of a Press Lord.130 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has underlined the importance of Manchester in terms of the 
British newspaper industry. Other British cities produced regional newspapers but 
none had the national reach of Manchester’s print centres.131 Robert Waterhouse 
wrote:  
For the best part of the twentieth century Manchester was the other Fleet Street, 
publishing between a quarter and a third of all newspapers consumed in the British 
Isles… Manchester was the means by which national newspapers became truly 
national.132 
 
This ensured that the city had the journalists based there, even with reduced resources 
caused by the war, to report the Manchester Blitz and its aftermath to a national 
audience. What was printed will be examined in this thesis, but this chapter has 
shown that an editorial elite, conforming to Herman and Chomsky’s top-down news 
model, influenced the reports in the Manchester Guardian, Manchester Evening News 
and Evening Chronicle heavily. In the case of the Guardian and the Evening News it 
was their editors, Crozier and Haley, albeit with the sanction of the owners, the Scott 
Trust, while the Chronicle had a less defined management structure. Woodbridge was 
editor, and his work led to his promotion to become editor of a national Sunday, the 
Empire News, in 1943, but it was the proprietor, Kemsley, who had the ultimate say 
on editorial policy.133 The government set the parameters in terms of censorship, but it 
was Crozier, Haley and Kemsley who decided how far to test these limits.    
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Chapter 5 
Censorship 
 
1. Introduction 
In terms of censorship, newspapers were made aware of potential government 
coercion well before the Second World War began. The Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act passed on 28 August 1938, Knightley observed, authorised the 
government to do virtually what it liked to prosecute war without reference to 
Parliament: 
Every press, commercial or private message leaving Britain, whether by mail, 
cable, wireless or telephone was censored. Everyone, including newspaper editors, 
was prohibited from ‘obtaining, recording communicating to any other person or 
publishing information, which might be useful to the enemy’.1  
 
The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact on 23 August 1939 increased the government’s 
readiness to control the press and the following day Crozier, the editor in chief of the 
Manchester Guardian, wrote to the London editor Bone about a meeting on 
censorship with officials who were preparing to establish the Ministry of Information. 
It will be voluntary, he reported, ‘in the sense that all editors were expected to do as 
much of the censorship as they could themselves’.2  
The MOI was formed the day after the outbreak of war and expanded from a 
staff of 12 to a reputed and numerically resonant 999 within a matter of weeks (in 
reality it grew steadily to be 1,385 by 31 July 1940 and 3,000 by 1945).3 Taylor 
wrote:  
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Britain went to war with a wealth of peacetime experience in censorship and with 
the basis of a censorship machinery that, once its wheels began to turn when the 
correct lubrication was added by 1941, was to run remarkably smoothly.4 
 
Since Britain was fighting for democracy, it was decided that censorship should be 
conducted on what outwardly appeared to be a liberal basis with editors invited to 
submit copy they thought might infringe regulations.5 The censors would then have 
the right to cut or withhold this material, thus absolving newspapers of any legal 
responsibility should it later transpire publication aided the enemy. Even if the press 
ignored the censors’ cuts the government still needed to prove that the offending 
publication had actually aided the enemy before prosecution could take place. It 
seemed a benign regime; in reality, the censors exercised comprehensive control over 
what appeared in newspapers. Editors, the chief censor George Thomson noted, were 
issued with such a barrage of D-notices that the restrictions ‘covered nearly every 
conceivable human activity’.6  
This was acknowledged even in Parliament where one MP, Sydney Silverman, 
speaking against the restrictions, said they would put the government ‘in a position by 
no means inferior, as regards the scope of its powers over newspapers, to that 
occupied by the distinguished Dr Goebbels in Germany’.7 This system was 
constructed by Chamberlain and reinforced from May 1940 by Churchill, who 
forsook his previous occupation as a journalist to bear down on his former Fleet Street 
employers. Margach noted: 
Fleet Street was the foundation of his fortunes and, during his long years in the 
political wilderness, it sustained him as a national figure. Yet when he became 
Prime Minister he became authoritarian and repressive, incapable of tolerating any 
form of criticism in the press. Criticism he viewed as treasonable. He had to be 
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restrained by Cabinet colleagues not only from censoring comment but also from 
suppressing all together newspapers he considered hostile.8  
 
According to Margach, Churchill used the ‘majesty of his office to steamroller Fleet 
Street’ so that coverage of the war became a series of good news stories or columns 
listing examples of Nazi inhumanity.9 Its success was down to the expedient of 
censoring at source – the principal national and international news agencies – so as to 
avoid the French system whereby information that might be useful to the enemy was 
blanked out in the newspapers. That French method allowed the public to see the 
extent of the censorship, whereas British readers could not quantify the work of the 
MOI.10 That work ensured that attempts at objectivity became replaced by the 
reporting of more subjective and ‘biased’ comments via official press releases, 
government communiqués and, when journalists went out in to bombed-out areas, 
simple propaganda. As Temple noted: ‘What is remarkable is not that there were 
clashes – which was inevitable – but that there were so few. Newspapers accepted the 
need for a propaganda role and there was no real need for over-officious 
censorship.’11 As Chapter 1 showed, Fleet Street had not held the government to 
account in the two years before the war when they had the freedom to do so; once the 
hostilities began the restrictions on the press were quickly imposed and newspapers 
had lost the opportunity. Academics, including Curran, Seaton and Kevin Williams, 
noted that newspapers consciously sought to boost morale at the expense of objective 
reporting: ‘Most of the British press responded to government overtures, abandoning 
                                            
8 Margach, Abuse of Power, p. 64 
9 Ibid. 
10 Jacquie L’Etang, Public Relations in Britain: A History of Professional Practice in the Twentieth 
Century (Mahwah, NJ: Earlbawm, 2004), p. 39. 
11 Temple, British Press, p. 48 
  
138
their role of acting as a watchdog on behalf of the public and adopting a partisan role 
in favour of government policy.’12 
This chapter examines the relationship between the government and the 
national and local press in the Second World War, noting it was more complex than 
mere acquiescence. There were misunderstandings and errors, the government 
suppressed one newspaper and issued threats to others, and there was a persistent 
dialogue between the censor and editors. The memos in The Guardian Archive are 
examined to indicate the strictures within which newspaper offices were working and 
examples of censorship are examined in the three Manchester newspapers during the 
study period. Finally this chapter looks at self-censorship at the Manchester 
Guardian.  
 
2. ‘They could not help the enemy, but are they any use to us?’ 
Taylor wrote that propaganda and censorship are ‘really different sides of the 
same medal: the manipulation of opinion’, but despite Britain’s alleged expertise in 
the former, which will be explored in the next chapter, the war began in terms of 
censorship with a series of misunderstandings and mishaps that reduced the credibility 
and threatened the existence of the MOI.13 Partly this was down to a decision, 
unknown to editors, by the Allied chiefs of staff to make the war ‘newsless’.14 
Initially British military action was limited mainly to the Royal Navy, who refused to 
relay information to the press even though the First Lord of the Admiralty was a 
former journalist, Churchill, and when American newspapers began to be filled with 
information coming from Berlin, there was an outcry in Britain.15 This mood was not 
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improved when a Commons statement revealed that only 43 of the nearly 1,000 MOI 
staff had been journalists.16 Knightley wrote:  
The Daily Express said that soon Britain would need leaflet raids on itself to tell its 
own people how the war was going. The Manchester Guardian said that the 
official communiqués could not help the enemy but ‘are they any use to us’?17  
 
The situation reached farcical proportions in September 1939 when a total embargo of 
news of the British Expeditionary Force being sent to France was lifted and re-
imposed in a matter of hours so that the police guarded printing presses and 
newspapers were confiscated from commuters.18 The blackout was lifted again shortly 
afterwards. When the British army’s attempt at a second front in Norway in 1940 
ended ignominiously but with barely a report in British newspapers, Ed Murrow, of 
the Columbia Broadcasting System, was scathing.19 He told his American listeners 
from London on 22 April 1940: ‘The handling by the press and radio in this country 
of the news from Norway in the past 10 days has undermined the confidence of a 
considerable section of the British public in the integrity and accuracy of its news 
sources.’20  
What Murrow did not acknowledge, and, as an American broadcast journalist, 
may not have fully appreciated, was the threat hanging over Fleet Street of a British 
Gazette-style newspaper that could be produced by the government as competition. 
The British Gazette was a short-lived newspaper that had been published by the 
government during the General Strike 14 years earlier and the fact that Churchill had 
been the editor of a paper that rose from 200,000 sales to 2 million in eight editions 
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emphasised the threat.21 In June 1940 Alfred Duff Cooper, the Minister for 
Information, met the Editorial Committee, a combination of senior journalists 
representing the whole of Fleet Street, and was asked if there was foundation in the 
rumour that a government newspaper would take the place of existing newspapers? 
‘Mr Duff Cooper did not give an emphatic denial to the rumour,’ a report of the 
meeting to the Guardian’s editor Crozier read. ‘He said he had heard the matter 
discussed, but it had not been considered by the Cabinet. He smiled at the suggestion 
that there might be another “British Gazette”.’22 Six weeks later, with newspapers 
generally compliant, the government withdrew from its aggressive position when 
Duff Cooper organised a dinner meeting with journalists (including Michael Foot and 
future Daily Mirror editor Hugh Cudlipp), arranged ‘so that they could talk to him in 
an atmosphere less formal and less bitter than usually exists’.23 Montague reported to 
Crozier that ‘Cooper had mentioned the British Gazette, so he says, as a joke, quoting 
it as an example of which nobody wanted.’24 Nevertheless, a warning had been 
delivered.   
Relations between Fleet Street and the government improved with the 
appointment of Thomson, first as deputy and then, from 1940, chief censor for the 
duration of the war.25 The Rear Admiral felt the press had genuine grievances and 
adopted the policy to ‘prevent the enemy from gaining military information of value, 
but also to ensure that the Press and the BBC should have complete freedom to inform 
the British people and the world at large of every thing that was happening’.26 The 
freedom was never as encompassing as Thomson suggested, but the press, after initial 
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scepticism, eventually came to a working relationship with Thomson and his team at 
the MOI.  
Importantly for this thesis, Thomson acknowledged that air raids presented a 
problem for those responsible for information and security on both sides. There was 
the basic question of whether the effects of bombing should be played up or down. If 
one opted for the former, the chief advantage would be that it would provoke anger 
and stiffen resistance, but that had to be balanced against the risk of encouraging the 
enemy and spreading alarm and despondency. Playing down raids, however, would 
risk belittling the credibility of official communiqués, encourage the spread of 
rumours and antagonise victims in bombed areas. In May 1941, for example, raids on 
Glasgow and Liverpool were described as light when casualty figures published a few 
days later showed this to be false. Thomson reported that this provoked considerable 
anger:  
We had to try and satisfy the natural desire of the inhabitants of a town which had 
been raided so that their menfolk at the front and their relatives and friends in other 
parts of the country should know what they were having to endure. They had seen 
with their own eyes ancient, familiar and homely things turned into heaps of ash 
and rubble. They knew with what resolution and courage they and the ordinary 
folk around them had stood up to it and they wanted the whole world to know. 27 
 
Myths of their own sprang out of the ‘May Blitz’ of 1941 in which Liverpool, 
in particular, was badly hit, and there were rumours that Merseyside had been 
cordoned off from the rest of the country.28 This was untrue, but it highlighted the 
dilemmas facing the censors. One way out of the difficulty of how much information 
should be distributed was to allow local newspapers more extensive reports than 
national newspapers, thus satisfying the victims of raids while restricting the spread of 
knowledge that might aid the Germans.29  
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A frequent problem was whether to reveal places that had been hit. The Air 
Ministry allowed national newspapers to name bombed cities only after it was certain 
the Germans knew where they had raided, normally meaning a delay of two days, and 
it was forbidden to identify localities and damage to buildings for 28 days. But, as 
Thomson pointed out, Goebbels did not wait until aircrew reports had been checked 
before he put out news of a bombing raid, German radio often proclaiming that 
London, Liverpool or Manchester had been devastated even before the bombers had 
returned home:  
On the other hand it was most important that the British Press and radio should not 
give the enemy information of which he was in need. The first essential was to 
conceal the name of the town raided until the Air Ministry were quite satisfied that 
the enemy knew it.30  
 
The Germans did not always know which cities they were hitting because large 
conurbations in England were often close together, leading to potential confusion, and 
the wireless beams used to guide the bombers were jammed by the British. As a 
consequence national newspapers frequently were forced to be vague. Thomson 
added: 
To enable the press to report some sort of locality, pending release of the name of 
the town, we divided England into several large areas: North, North East, North 
West, East, South East etc… Thus the newspapers appearing on the morning 
following a raid were allowed to publish that a South Western town or a town in 
South West England had been attacked, but not the name of the town.31 
 
Casualties also presented a problem. If the casualty was a doctor, solicitor or 
shopkeeper, whose name and address appeared in a telephone directory, both the 
name and the occupation were not permitted in order to prevent the Germans knowing 
precisely where a bomb had landed.32 It was a sign of the relative rarity of telephones, 
and Thomson’s preconceptions, that he wrote: ‘In the case of a miner, steelworker or 
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manual worker this difficulty did not of course arise.’33 Thomson highlighted an 
example of the minutiae that required the judgement of the chief censor when he had 
to intervene personally over the Daily Mail. The newspaper wished to carry a report 
of a raid in which it stated: ‘Mrs A., her daughter Annie, aged 14, and her sister, the 
wife of Lt-Col. A., commanding the seventh Battalion of the X-shires, who had just 
given birth to a baby, were injured.’ A censor, wishing to remove all reference to the 
officer, changed it to: ‘Mrs A., her daughter Annie, aged 14, who had just given birth 
to a baby, were injured.’ The Daily Mail challenged the ruling, were told to alter the 
girl’s age to 19, and a correct version reporting injuries to a woman, her daughter and 
her sister, who had just given birth to a baby, appeared in print only after Thomson 
had intervened himself.34   
Even though there were improved relations brought about by the appointment 
of Thomson, there were serious clashes between Fleet Street and Downing Street, 
particularly after Parliament passed new defence regulations in the wake of Dunkirk 
in which section 2D allowed for the suppression of newspapers and 18B provided for 
imprisonment without trial. In July 1940 the Daily Worker was warned that its pacifist 
line contravened these regulations and in January the following year the Home 
Secretary, Herbert Morrison, ordered Scotland Yard to stop the presses of the 
newspaper and they were allowed to resume only in August 1942 after Germany 
invaded Russia.35  
More significant in terms of size was the relationship between the government 
and the Daily Mirror. Its circulation nearly trebled from 1.36 million in 1939 to 3.7 
million in 1947, but it frequently tested the government’s patience.36 Churchill, who 
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had used the paper as his platform as a backbencher in 1939, made representations to 
the Mirror to moderate its ‘guilty men’ attack on Chamberlain in early 1940 and, after 
he had become Prime Minister, was so angered by the paper in January 1941 that he 
accused it of: 
Creating a spirit of hatred and malice against the government which, after all is not 
a party government but a national government almost unanimously chosen, which 
surpasses anything I have ever seen in English journalism. One might have thought 
that in these hard times some hatred might be kept for the enemy.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘The price of petrol has been increased by one penny’ - Official38 
Relations soured further in March 1942 when the Mirror published a cartoon 
by Philip Zec that depicted a half-drowned merchant seaman clinging to some 
wreckage (above). The intention had been to attack any needless waste of petrol, and 
Home Intelligence stated that was how it was understood by most people, but the 
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government, or rather Churchill, saw it as an attack and part of a campaign that had 
begun with an editorial in the Mirror the month before.39 That had read: 
The assumption that whatever blunders are committed and whatever faults are 
plainly visible in organisation, we must still go on applauding men who muddle 
our lives away, is a travesty of history and a rhetorical defiance of all the bitter 
lessons of past wars.40 
 
The implication of Zec’s cartoon, in the minds of Churchill and his Cabinet 
colleagues, was that sailors in the merchant navy were risking their lives for the 
benefit of higher profits for private enterprise at the government’s connivance and 
caused unprecedented fury in Downing Street. Churchill, ‘famous for his eloquent 
speeches in defence of liberty’, wanted to close the Mirror, was reined back by 
Beaverbook and Morrison, but nevertheless a full-scale Parliamentary debate 
followed on 19 March during which a public warning was given that the government 
would suppress the paper unless it changed its tone.41 Morrison’s public attack on the 
paper could hardly have been more damning. He said: 
The cartoon in question is only one example, but a particularly evil example, of the 
policy and methods of a newspaper which, intent on exploiting an appetite for 
sensation and with a reckless indifference to the national interest and to the 
prejudicial effect on the war effort, has repeatedly published scurrilous 
misrepresentations, distorted and exaggerated statements and irresponsible 
generalisations.42 
 
In private, Churchill was equally scathing. Crozier, the editor of the Manchester 
Guardian, revealed a conversation with the Prime Minister on 20 March:  
He turned to the Daily Mirror question and was very hot and strong about it. He 
said it was dangerous to have a constant stream of stuff calculated to undermine 
the morale of the soldier; very serious issues were involved. He resented the 
‘carping, niggling criticisms’ that he and the government received day by day from 
certain quarters and certain newspapers.43  
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And in another conversation recorded by Crozier, Churchill commented: ‘The paper I 
can’t stand, the worst of all, is the Daily Mirror. Yes, the Daily Mirror. It makes me 
spit.’44  
 Despite Churchill’s anger, newspaper proprietors and editors were not as 
compliant as they had been over the silencing of the Daily Worker 14 months earlier 
and the majority of national daily papers sided with the Mirror.45 Curran and Seaton 
wrote: ‘It thus became clear that closing down the Daily Mirror would lead to a major 
confrontation with a powerful section of the press.’46 This flexing of Fleet Street’s 
muscles was underlined when another campaign led to the lifting of the ban on the 
Daily Worker in August 1942, but also poses a question: if the press had resisted the 
pressure of the government, would the censor’s grip have been so tight? This is an 
important indicator that the relationship between Downing Street and the press was 
more complex than the straightforward pushing of propaganda with proprietors intent 
on ingratiating themselves with the government. Fleet Street rallied behind the Mirror 
on the grounds of freedom of speech, but later it was apparent that the warning had 
been grave enough to place all newspapers on their guard for the rest of the war. 
According to Harrison the threat of 2D hovered over all editors and ‘unofficial 
proposals were mooted for the closing down of all newspapers except The Times, the 
Daily Herald and the Daily Express’. 47 The Daily Mirror, which ‘minded its ways 
without quite mending them’, continued to attack examples of inefficiency but not on 
the scale of March 1942, although it did play a significant role in the defeat of 
Churchill and the Conservative Party in the General Election of 1945.48 The effect has 
divided observers. Williams noted that the government never again attempted to use 
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Regulation 2D to suppress publication and Taylor wrote: ‘Opinion had not actually 
been censored or punished, only threatened with it.’49 Margach was less sanguine: 
The crises between the Churchill government and Fleet Street continued over most 
of the war years, covering many papers… It was a miracle, particularly since 
newsprint rationing kept papers down to four or six pages, that journalism survived 
the experience.50 
  
 
3. Guidance to Editors: Manchester Guardian and the Censor  
 
Price noted that Churchill ‘read more newspapers with greater attention than 
almost any other Prime Minister’ so, although the threat of the British Gazette was 
averted, the scrutiny of Fleet Street was constant.51 The archive of Manchester 
Guardian memos and correspondence has several examples of the generic pressure 
being applied by the government and, at a more specific level, the censor. In June 
1940 a telegram from the Ministry of Information was received in the offices of the 
Manchester Guardian. Under the title ‘Guidance to Editors (Not for Publication)’, it 
laid out the government’s policy concerning the reporting of war news with a 
particular reference to air raids:  
Germany exercises rigid censorship over news of air raids. Very little information 
is released for publication and the meagre particulars which appear in the German 
press are always misleading when compared to authentic reports. 
 
In this country, whilst no one would suggest that the enemy should be given useful 
information as to the result of his air attacks, it would be contrary to the traditions 
and spirit of our country that we should adopt such extreme methods as those 
employed by Germany in keeping facts from its people. We pride ourselves on the 
fact that ‘we can take it’.52  
 
The memo went on to say that the Luftwaffe was bound to get through, particularly at 
night and that ‘many casualties and severe damage are inevitable’.53 Then, 
contradicting the spirit it had initially espoused, the memo issued orders to the press, 
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stating there should be: delays to the full description of air raids; delays to lists and 
numbers of casualties; and restrictions on the mention of bombed areas ‘even of large 
towns’.54 
In the same month, at the meeting with the Editorial Committee that Duff 
Cooper ‘joked’ about a British Gazette, the Minister for Information was also quoted 
as saying that the voluntary system of censorship had not been satisfactory, and ‘it 
must now give place to a compulsory system’.55 Duff Cooper asked the committee to 
consider three ‘possible solutions’. Namely: 
1 Complete compulsory censorship using French system (delay of two to three 
days in publishing news). 
2 Compulsory source of news so that newspapers could publish from official 
sources only. 
3 Board of Censors, consisting of two members from the MOI, Admiralty, War 
Office, Air Ministry, Ministry of Home Security and the Press. Would meet twice 
a day and would decide what should be said on certain matters.56 
  
These reforms were successfully resisted by the combined force of Fleet Street, but 
individual editors continued to feel the overt presence of the censor. In June 1940 
Crozier warned Bone that complaints had been made ‘from certain quarters (the P. 
M.) about attacks in the Manchester Guardian’ – the brackets were Crozier’s – and 
five months later Cyril Ray, a war correspondent, reported that three newspapers, the 
Melbourne Argus, Toronto Star and Winnipeg Free Press, had withdrawn their 
London correspondents because of the heavy-handed censorship.57 ‘Representations 
to the Ministry of Information,’ he wrote, ‘have generally been answered in an 
offhand way and have resulted in no improvement.’58 
 In December 1940, at a lunch hosted by the Minister for Information, Duff 
Cooper, and the Home Secretary, Morrison, journalists were told: ‘The censorship as 
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it affects air raids is to be tightened up… We are telling Germany too much about air 
raids.’59 Morrison listed the new restrictions: 
1. No mention of water shortages (for fear enemy would return to finish the job 
in the knowledge there would be little water to put our fires). 
2. No criticism of the railway, post office or telephone breakdowns. 
3. No mention of people moving out of towns and cities. 
4. No mention of fires not being extinguished. 
5. Unwise to mention the efficiency in putting out fires.  
6. No mention of emergency services moving to help other towns. 
7. Don’t mention land mines (had a fault and would not explode unless it hit the 
ground in a certain way).60 
 
Morrison finished this lecture by saying: ‘If the press is willing to go slow on all this, 
it is better to do it wholeheartedly. Tell your readers what you are going to do to cheat 
the enemy and make a patriotic virtue out of necessity.’61 Within a matter of days 
Manchester’s newspapers were given ample opportunity to practise their ‘patriotic 
virtue’ in the aftermath of the Christmas Blitz.  
At a more mundane level there was the constant irritant of having to adhere to, 
and be under the scrutiny of, the censor. Even in 1943, with the war going the Allies’ 
way, Crozier was still being upbraided by a ‘very courteous gentleman from the MOI 
who reads leaders from all over the world each night’. The reprimand read: 
The nightly extract from Manchester tends to criticise the government or to tell 
people not to be too optimistic, or, in short, all is not supremely well in the best of 
all possible worlds. They have difficulty, they say, in sending extracts abroad and 
ask for something not so critical.62  
 
By then, the dialogue between the MOI and the Guardian’s offices was well 
established. In November 1941 Crozier had written to the MOI complaining of its 
‘technical ignorance’ of the cotton industry: 
All references –and there have been many – to labour shortages in the cotton mills 
have spoken of the shortage in the cardroom, because that is the only department in 
a mule spinning mill in which women happen to be employed. The deletion of the 
                                            
59 Guardian Archive, Wartime Arrangements, December 1940. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid, 2 February 1943. 
  
150
word ‘cardroom’ safeguards nothing from the enemy but merely destroys the point 
of the sentence.63 
  
Three months later he had to defend himself against the censor after the Guardian 
reported there was a shortage of ARP wardens in Salford. Emergency committees, he 
argued, had to use the press to draw attention to their needs. If the publicity was 
denied ‘the need will not be met and the deficiencies will not be remedied’.64 In June 
1942 Crozier was forced to apologise after the Manchester Guardian carried a small 
story under the headline ‘The Two Uncles’. It read: ‘In a recent letter received here 
from a prisoners’ camp in Germany this passage had been uncensored: “I hear that 
Uncle Sam and Uncle Joe are doing well”.’65 The response from the censor was: ‘It is 
thought that any suggestion in our press of laxity on the part of German censorship 
may result in steps being taken to make it stricter.’66 The fact that it took the MOI 
nearly three weeks to respond to the above was indicative of the delays brought by 
censorial involvement. On 8 December 1942 Crozier complained: ‘Montague’s 
message tonight, dated December 5, is useless, being covered by this morning’s news, 
so it goes on the spike... Our service is being almost completely ruined.’67  
The system for wartime photographs was also complex and slow. To get a 
permit from the MOI, a photographer had to have accreditation, usually from a 
newspaper or news agency.68 Their work had to be given to the censor before it could 
be distributed, often to a pool for general use, although, to save time, the 
photographers would self-censor beforehand. Even that was complicated because the 
                                            
63 Guardian Archive, Crozier to the MOI, 18 November 1941. 
64 Guardian Archive, Crozier to the MOI, 18 February 1942. 
65 ‘The Two Uncles’, Manchester Guardian, 21 May 1942, p. 4. 
66 Guardian Archive, MOI to the Manchester Guardian, 10 June 1942. 
67 Guardian Archive, Crozier to Bone, 8 December 1942.  
68 Amy Helen Bell, London was Ours: Diaries and Memoirs of the London Blitz, (London: Tauris, 
2011), p. 29. 
  
151
public reaction to their presence was not universally welcomed.69 Inevitably, given 
the pressures of deadlines, there was friction. On 26 December 1940, two days after 
the Manchester Blitz, Crozier complained of the problems of getting photographs into 
the approved pool for publication: ‘I want to get them there as soon as possible lest by 
chance the Censor should release other people’s before he releases ours. In which 
case we shall be undone.’70 A month later Crozier, normally succinct to the point of 
brusqueness in his diary, was so irritated about the dithering of the censor about 
photographs of the Duke of Kent’s post-Blitz visit to Manchester that he noted: 
Censor stopped Duke of Kent in Manchester at 8 pm. Pictures now in page. Said 
he did not know what the MOI in Manchester had promised. (2 of them had said 
the stuff was all right for Thursday’s paper). D Herald protested because its stuff 
had gone in early editions. Censor rescinded his prohibition and the stuff went in – 
we took emergency pictures off machine and restored normal page. 71 
 
For Crozier’s diary this number of words amounted to an essay and was perhaps 
indicative of his frustration at having to deal with such overt control.  
Crozier rarely let this exasperation spill out into his newspaper, but the fall of 
Tobruk, Libya, in June 1942 was a rare example of the Manchester Guardian openly 
criticising the running of the war.72 Even then, the criticism was buried below an 
introduction to the editorial that read: ‘The edge has gone off the political threat to the 
Government in the Commons. The “no confidence” men have shown themselves to be 
a small muster’, but below was forthright condemnation: 
We have had our share of disillusionment and disappointment. But the people have 
been ready to accept and forget. Norway could be forgiven as a scratch affair; 
Dunkirk followed the defection of our allies… Hong Kong, Singapore and Java 
were an almost inevitable sequence after our gamble of Eastern unpreparedness 
had failed. But Libya, as the ordinary man sees it, is another matter. Here at least 
we were prepared to be strong…The government will have to put itself in the place 
of the workers who find that after they have worked so hard and so long their 
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production is thrown away in the field, battered by superior weight, or left as booty 
to the enemy.73 
 
This was exceptional, and perhaps the Manchester Guardian was emboldened 
because Churchill was being criticised in Parliament, but six days and five editions 
later it had reverted to type. Its editorial on 3 July read: ‘The government has beaten 
off the vote of “no confidence” by 475 to 25 votes. We must be all un-feignedly glad 
at the result.’74     
 
4. Fit to Print: Censorship and the Manchester Blitz 
Crozier’s reactions to the censor in January 1941 revealed the frustrations felt 
by editors, who saw their job, after all, as bringing news to the public as quickly as 
possible. The MOI monitored every report about air raids and the only items of news 
newspapers could report without submission to the censor were: anti-aircraft guns and 
British fighters had been in action; bombs had been dropped; enemy aircraft had been 
brought down; and eye-witness accounts of fights in the air.75 As has been referred to 
earlier, the chief censor allowed some leeway for local newspapers and, in the most 
practical terms, this was demonstrated by the difference between the Manchester 
Guardian that, despite its name, was a national newspaper, and its sister paper, the 
Manchester Evening News, which had only a local audience. The former deliberately 
kept details of Manchester’s raids to the minimum, while the Evening News was 
allowed more extensive reports than its national partner, thus, in theory, satisfying the 
victims of raids while restricting the spread of knowledge that might aid the Germans. 
This section will examine the three newspapers over the related eight-week period to 
show that news coverage was regularly affected by the need to satisfy the censor.  
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A typical headline appeared on the Evening Chronicle’s front page in 
December 1940: ‘Nazis try “sneak raids” on N-West’.76 The choice of words here is 
significant and conforms to the propaganda model described by Reisigl and Wodak 
earlier.77 The Germans ‘try’ rather than succeed in their bombing mission, and they 
were described pejoratively as ‘sneak raids’ when a similar mission by the RAF 
would have provoked adjectives such as ‘daring’ or ‘secret’. Propaganda will be 
examined more thoroughly in the next chapter, but the work of the censor is apparent 
too. The N-West was used when the place under fire was Manchester, the standard 
practice for all initial reports of raids, and the placing and prominence of the report 
was also indicative. Typically, it would require a very strong news story to supplant a 
bombing as the lead story, but the first raid on the city was a single column under the 
shoulder of the second lead in columns six and seven of an eight-column page. The 
apparent downplaying of this story by a Manchester paper was deliberate in that to 
have led the front page with it would have been an indication that the main 
destruction was in the city. The report, too, contained typical phrases that diminished 
the effect of the raid and disguised the geography, beginning: ‘A short but 
concentrated attack was made on a district of an inland town… Damage was not 
heavy, although there were a number of casualties, some fatal.’78 Normal news-
writing conventions would dictate that the deaths would have been in the first 
sentence.  
This was typical of the censorship throughout the study period and showed 
that newspapers’ willingness to suppress reports of casualties and bomb damage was 
as keen in the immediate build-up to Manchester’s Blitz as it was in the seven weeks 
afterwards. If there was an exception it was in the immediate aftermath of 22 and 23 
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December 1940 when Manchester’s local newspapers were allowed to refer to the city 
as the Luftwaffe’s target. As Mancunians could see the bombed-out buildings in the 
city centre, Salford and Old Trafford with their own eyes, and German radio was 
announcing that Manchester had been Blitzed, the need for secrecy became 
redundant. Only the timing of the details were influenced and it was 3 January 1941, 
10 days after the first heavy raid, that the Manchester Guardian announced that the 
Free Trade Hall, the Royal Exchange, Chetham’s Hospital and Manchester Cathedral 
had suffered substantial damage.79 These details had appeared a day earlier in the 
Manchester Evening News and Evening Chronicle, which may have been a nod to the 
freer licence given to local newspapers, and the Evening News acknowledged the 
censor’s role with the headline: ‘First proper report on damage to Manchester’, which 
neither explained why it had taken 10 days, nor how the previous reports had been 
less than proper.80 Under a sub-headline ‘Free Trade Hall in ruins: Royal ‘change 
[sic] roofless’, the report read: 
Manchester today revealed to the world how the Germans attack ‘military 
objectives’. Historic buildings dating back more than 500 years and known the 
world over now bear the scar of the Hun, wantonly damaged in recent pitiless 
raids. They have been named for the first time.81 
 
The expression ‘the scar of the Hun’ was deeply subjective, and conformed to Reisigl 
and Wodak’s theory of attributing negative characteristics on the enemy, but just in 
case the reader was left in doubt about the crimes against the city’s heritage, the 
Evening News emphasised the cultural loss to the city. The Royal Exchange was 
described as ‘one of the largest of its kind in the world’; the Free Trade Hall as the 
‘home of many great Hallé concerts’; and Chetham’s Hospital and Manchester 
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Cathedral were listed as ‘two architectural gems’. The censor ensured not a single 
mention was made of the considerable damage to the city’s industrial infrastructure 
The government’s restrictions on casualty figures meant that no Manchester 
newspaper issued the true numbers of the dead, although they did acknowledge the 
numbers were high. Gardiner wrote: 
The War Cabinet had taken the decision that it would be ill-advised to make 
casualty figures public, but once the Blitz started it became clear that rumours 
often exaggerated the number of deaths and serious injuries, so stark notices were 
posted outside town halls giving the number of those killed and injured, but 
without identifying the location of the ‘incidents’ and insisting that the information 
‘must not be published in the press’, lest it prove helpful to the Germans by 
informing them how successful their raids had been. 82  
 
The Manchester Evening News printed a report a week after the Christmas Blitz in 
which it was stated:  
Although no official figure can be obtained of the total number of deaths caused 
during recent air raids in the Manchester area, it is estimated that nearly 500 men, 
women and children were killed. In addition, there were many injured.83 
 
The Manchester Guardian followed that up the next day, although the censor’s hand 
can clearly be detected:  
In view of the rumours which have circulated both within and outside the city, it is 
important to point out a ‘Manchester Guardian’ representative was informed by a 
member of the City Council yesterday, that the position on December 27 was that 
the fatality list was substantially less than 500.84 
 
The newspaper was careful to attribute the figure to the council official but its 
dissembling was to no avail because, as the previous and following chapters show, the 
public, distrusting what they read in their newspapers, believed that the figures were 
being kept deliberately low. They believed this with some grounds given that the 
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figures for the dead and wounded were later estimated at 972 and nearly 4,000 
respectively.85  
The Births, Marriages and Deaths section did not bring clarity. Eight of the 
death notices in the Manchester Guardian on 27 December did not give a date, but 
stated typically: ‘In December, by enemy action’, thus still apparently trying to keep 
German intelligence wondering whether the Luftwaffe’s radio beams led its bombers 
to the right destination. The work of the censor is apparent because the lack of detail 
in terms of dates is in contrast to other material that was printed: the home addresses 
were Whalley Range, Heaton Norris, Stretford, Knutsford and Hulme; the Hulme 
victim was a Catholic priest; two victims were a married couple.86 
The mass funerals for the dead at the city’s Southern Cemetery were covered, 
although the number of victims was kept deliberately vague. Surprisingly, the report 
was not the lead story in the Evening Chronicle on 28 December 1940 – that was 
reserved for an attack by RAF torpedo planes – which was an idiosyncratic choice for 
a Manchester local newspaper, and, instead of specifics, the Chronicle concentrated 
on the mood.87 The introduction read: ‘They died together; they are buried together. 
Rich man, poor man, the aged and the children, the victims of the Manchester Blitz 
were buried today. And over them the Last Post was sounded.’88 The language, 
harking back to the trenches, emphasised the egalitarianism of the dead, but, like the 
casualties of the First World War, there was a lack of detail in terms of numbers. The 
report, too, did not linger over the deceased and, instead, there was a urgency to 
emphasise a community on the road to recovery. A sub-head lower down the report 
announced: ‘City returning to normal’, while the sentence that followed was: 
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‘Throughout the raided areas of Manchester there were sure signs today of the great 
works that have been accomplished in bringing a return to smooth running.’89 The 
later chapter on other, contemporary reports on Manchester will show this was not the 
case even a week later.90 The Manchester Guardian, of 30 December, was more 
forthcoming in stating that ‘seventy-two people were buried in the civic service’ but 
by then, with funeral services occurring on a daily basis, the numbers had become so 
confused as to be meaningless.91 The details were more illuminating when it came to 
the fire service and on 1 January 1941 the Guardian reported that 17 fire fighters had 
died ‘in the raid’.92  
Manchester was bombed again on the night of 9/10 January 1941 and there 
was a sense of growing confidence in the evening papers’ dealings with the censor, 
conforming to the guidelines but using German reports to identify the city. The 
Manchester Evening News did not reveal the target was Manchester in its second lead 
on page one, reporting: ‘Scattered attacks with high-explosive and incendiary bombs 
were made on a North-West inland town last night, but although many incendiaries 
were dropped, only a few fires were started.’93 Immediately below it, however, was 
the headline ‘Would you believe it?’ that prefaced the report: ‘Manchester bore the 
weight of last night’s German air attack, and was heavily hit, the Berlin radio said 
today.’94 On the same day the Evening Chronicle was even bolder, proclaiming: ‘The 
fire bomb fighters – men and women organized among themselves to protect their 
homes against fire in air attack – went into action during the night and thwarted an 
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attempted Blitz on a wide scale by the Nazi raiders.‘95 The report went on to list 
damage to houses, shops and a cinema, all civilian targets, but while there was not 
even a reference to a North-West town, the ‘you’ in the headline made it obvious 
where the incendiaries had fallen. A cut out in the report stated: ‘Strong formations of 
the German air force directed their attacks last night against important military 
objectives in Manchester,’ says the official German News Agency.96 
 The Home Intelligence report on the city, referred to earlier, highlighted 
several shortcomings in Manchester’s preparation for its Blitz and its reaction 
afterwards, yet, in accordance with Lang and Lang’s assertion about the importance 
of what is omitted in news reports, obvious stories for a local newspaper were 
virtually ignored. On Saturday 4 January an Evening Chronicle headline read 
‘Criticisms answered by city transport chief’, but, while this was the first hint of 
public dismay at the city’s response, the report was unquestioning. 97 Instead it merely 
reported the official’s response to a letter to a newspaper that claimed there were 
insufficient buses, traffic chaos, and inflexibility over routes so that buses stuck to old 
routes even though they were bombed out and impassable. An uncensored report 
would have led on the alleged the deficiencies.   
Four days later two headlines on one report also suggested that the city had 
made mistakes. ‘Lessons of the Manchester Blitz’ the main headline announced, with 
the sub-head reading: ‘Grim, heroic page in city history’.98 Instead of listing the 
lessons, however, the story quoted Manchester’s Lord Mayor saying: ‘Never in their 
history have the citizens shown greater courage or determination.’ The only whiff of 
criticism was a mention of the need for more firewatchers and more rest centres 
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within reasonable reach of the congested areas ‘where heavy casualties were likely to 
occur’. Both were couched in terms of praise for the people who had been on duty. 
The words ‘pride’, ‘thankfulness’ and ‘gratitude’ were used liberally.  
The Manchester Guardian was equally circumspect in its criticism, its reports 
often failing to deliver what was promised in the headline. So a report with the 
subsidiary headline ‘Neglect of Precautions in Manchester’ ignored several obvious 
news stories. Its second paragraph listed recommendations in a report, reading: 
These included firewatchers thoroughly trained in fire fighting on duty during 
raids… It was also suggested that employees should be given elementary 
instruction in the use of fire appliances, that water tanks should be installed to 
supplement mains supplies, that special risks should be notified to the local fire 
authorities, that hydrant points should be clearly shown, and the advisability of 
having a direct telephone line to the nearest fire station should be considered. 99 
 
There were several elements of news in that list that would have merited a better 
introduction than the one it got: ‘The Manchester Guardian understands that a full 
report on all fires caused in Manchester during last week’s raid is being prepared for 
the Emergency Committee.’100 This was bland stuff that hardly encouraged the reader 
to go on, and the criticism was instead lower in the report and attributed to another 
newspaper. The Observer was quoted by the Guardian: ‘It is admitted that much of 
the damage caused by fire in the raid on Manchester would have been averted by 
proper precautions.’  
Both the Manchester Guardian and The Observer listed one raid on 
Manchester when there were two, but while the censor’s blue pencil may have 
influenced what could be printed, the restrictions on information even affected what 
could be said. On 28 December it was reported that a Lieutenant Thomas Lonsdale 
Hilton, of the Royal Naval Voluntary Reserve, had been found guilty of expressing 
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defeatist views by a Naval Disciplinary Court. According to the prosecution, Hilton 
had asked where the Royal Navy had been when Germany had crossed 120 miles of 
water to invade Norway? ‘Our shipping losses were greater than our building 
strength,’ Hilton was reported as saying, ‘and if England was building more aircraft 
then Germany must be building thousands.’101 His punishment, the Guardian noted, 
was a severe reprimanded. 
One censorial restriction was the reporting of the weather. There were fears 
that trains and other vital transport would become easy targets for the bombers if they 
were halted in drifts so the weather was a banned topic, which posed many problems 
for editors, particularly as in the first winter of the war was the coldest for 45 years.102 
A front page headline in the Manchester Evening News on 29 January 1940 read: 
‘Road and Rail chaos in Britain’s severest hold-up’, above an article which reported 
that certain of Manchester’s satellite towns had been cut off without post or papers, 
and how people had been stranded and unable to report for work, without any mention 
of snow and ice.103 The only quoted reference in the report referred to concerns for 
children, who were suffering in the cold, although the newspaper did carry the 
headline ‘Cheshire is stagnant’ on the back page.104 The following day the Evening 
News found the means of overcoming the ban by printing a photograph of children 
playing in the snow in Piccadilly with the caption ‘taken during the cold spell, which 
began last month’.105 
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The strict censorship of newspapers ensured that the grimmer tales of 1940 
and 1941 did not reach the wider audience that they would in peacetime, although 
Freethy related an example of how that censorship had a twin edge. Butterfly bombs 
were attractive-looking weapons that descended almost like landing helicopters on to 
Lancashire and other parts of Britain. Some were caught in trees and many curious 
youngsters were killed or maimed as they tried to take a closer look, casualties whose 
fate was hidden among the statistics of those killed in conventional bombing. 106 As 
Freethy noted: ‘This successfully led the Germans to think that the weapons were an 
expensive failure and they stopped dropping their deadly butterflies.’107  
A strict blackout of secrecy was also imposed over the V1 attack on the North 
West of England, and the Manchester area in particular, on the morning of Christmas 
Eve 1944. According to German records, 40 to 50 missiles were launched from 
Heinkel He111 bombers over Hull and an area immediately west of the Pennines 
received the brunt of them. Casualties, the numbers all censored, were inflicted on 
Stockport, Oldham, Worsley and Tottington near Bury. At Tottington six people were 
killed, Chapel Street was demolished, and a memorial garden now occupies the 
site.108  Other V1s landed on Radcliffe, Hyde and Didsbury, the last of which released 
propaganda leaflets before exploding. These included quotations from letters said to 
be from British prisoners of war saying that life in Germany was better than that in 
Britain under Churchill.109 These events were not reported. 
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5. Self Censorship at the Manchester Guardian 
Fleet Street operated from 1939 to 1945 with the censor watching keenly, but 
editors and reporters, while aware of this disapproving eye, also seemed willing to go 
beyond even the strictures set by the Ministry of Information. The restrictions 
imposed on newspaper reporters, whether through official pressure or through 
editorial and personal conviction, were articulated by Montague in a memo to his 
editor Crozier on 13 September 1940, a year into the war and at the height of the 
London Blitz. The memo gave an insight into the self-censoring mind-set of the 
reporter in that it was entitled: ‘Picture of what is happening here in London and 
cannot be published’. He wrote: 
The fundamental fact here is that the East End is scared out of its wits, and is eager 
to accept any kind of settlement which would put a stop to the bombing. Doctors 
who have been working in rest centres say that the East Enders recover in an 
incredibly short space of time when once evacuated. I can confirm from my own 
experience. My wife lost her nerve a few days ago when a bomb burst 20 yards 
from our house; when I told her to clear out, she recovered her nerve entirely a 
quarter of an hour later, merely through the knowledge that she was going to be out 
of it before long. 110 
 
The suggestion that Londoners had been bombed to the point where they would have 
been keen to talk peace terms with Hitler fundamentally contradicts the myth of the 
Blitz. No-one reported it then, and it is at odds with today’s popular conception of 
fortitude under fire that was summed up by Marr who stated: ‘The Blitz was a 
devastating attack from the air that everyone had dreaded, yet it didn't break the spirit 
of the people or dim their humour.’111 Montague suggested that the real picture was 
that humour was difficult to locate in a large part of the capital ‘scared out of its wits’.  
Montague’s memo urged Crozier to use the Manchester Guardian to 
campaign for the evacuation of the East End ‘within the limits allowed by the 
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censorship’, describing the bombing as worse than anything he had endured with the 
British Expeditionary in France.112  He added:  
For the East End it is particularly hard to bear. Those living near the big fires are in 
the position of soldiers lying out in no man’s land with flares all around them; their 
position is known and they can only lie there and wait to be bombed. 113  
 
This First World War imagery emphasised Montague’s fear that the war effort ‘may 
be torpedoed’ unless the East End was quickly evacuated.114 Giving an insight into 
the prevailing inclination towards self-censorship in Fleet Street, he added: 
Pictorial descriptions of the raids and their results are more or less limited 
nowadays by the censorship to word-pictures of bombs falling and buildings in 
ruins, and I propose, again with your approval, to ease on these, which are 
monotonous and depressing.115 
 
This was a Guardian reporter exercising self-censorship although there is 
evidence in The Guardian Archive that Crozier, too, was wary of printing 
newsworthy items for fear of the reaction of the authorities. In a memo to Bone, the 
editor gave his reasons why he refused to print a report in June 1940 of plans to unite 
Britain and France into one country in an attempt to prevent the surrender of French 
forces.116 By any standard, that was a hugely significant news story, historically, 
socially and militarily, yet Crozier, along with every other Fleet Street editor, chose to 
ignore or downplay it.117 ‘I should not use the story… about Sunday’s proceedings. I 
think it would sound too irresponsible for so tremendous an act of State,’ he wrote.118  
Nearly a year later, when Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s deputy, inexplicably 
parachuted into Scotland in an attempt to meet the Duke of Hamilton and negotiate a 
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peace with Britain, Churchill insisted: ‘We must not make a hero of him’.119 Hess was 
placed in the Tower of London, Churchill insisted he should be ‘strictly isolated’ and 
editors were urged to:  
1. Emphasise his [Hess’s] importance and popularity in Germany. 
2. Write up his past. 
3. Speculate on correspondents’ own authority as to the reasons for the flight. 
4. Write up the achievements of the flight, which may in itself be regarded as 
evidence of his complete sanity.120 
 
The instructions were also explicit about what could not be reported, including any 
conversations or messages which Hess may have and any mention of the Duke of 
Hamilton.121 In response, Charles Lambert, the Guardian’s diplomatic correspondent 
who had been based in Berlin before the war, wrote to Crozier: ‘From what I hear 
about Hess I should think he is insane, or at least that his mind is unbalanced.’122 No 
indication of Lambert’s opinion, nor any questioning of Hess’s mission – something 
that had the potential to fracture the Soviet-German Pact – appeared in the 
Manchester Guardian. 
If these were glaring omissions, there was a greater one in June 1941 when 
Crozier took the decision to ignore reports of what was a pivotal moment of the 
Second World War, Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in Operation 
Barbarossa. In a ‘confidential report’ that was unattributed but probably stemmed 
from Montague, it was stated: 
Germany sees she has got to nullify the ultimate Russian menace now because the 
war is going to be a long one. No confirmation of any clash yet but present tension 
cannot go on… His object therefore is to kill the Russian bogey now and thus 
improve his war position against us.123 
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The report, which continued ‘Germany’s main bombing strength believed to be held 
in readiness for Russia’, was dated 19 June 1941 and, as Germany and the Soviet 
Union were allied at the time, there is no obvious reason why Crozier chose not to run 
a story that under any circumstances meets the criteria as newsworthy.124 Operation 
Barbarossa began on 22 June. 
This reluctance to tackle larger news events is extraordinary in terms of 
normal news values in a newspaper, and emphasises that the Manchester Guardian 
was subject to self-censorship, although this was not unique in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Indeed, it mirrored the British press’s attitude to another landmark event, the 
Abdication Crisis in 1936, when Fleet Street chose to ignore Edward VIII’s 
relationship with Wallis Simpson even though newspapers throughout the world were 
reporting it. As a consequence, it came as a greater shock when the British public 
were finally informed, it inflamed the constitutional crisis, and undermined public 
trust in the press (Mass Observation was formed partly because the newspaper 
coverage of the public’s reaction was considered inadequate).125 Crozier made 
reference to this in a letter in August 1940, to a reader, J. W. Dulanty, who had asked 
whether newspaper accounts that the UK was considering invading Éire to pre-empt 
similar plans by Germany had been ‘inspired’ and encouraged by the government. 
The question itself indicated a mood of scepticism and Crozier’s reply, while 
defending the reputation of Fleet Street, did nothing to dispel the notion that the 
British press lacked boldness:  
You will remember that for some time before the Abdication Crisis the newspapers 
maintained complete silence although they knew what was afoot. It was afterwards 
suggested by many people in this country, and it was widely believed in the United 
States, that the newspapers had agreed among themselves to keep silent and that 
they had been ‘inspired’ to do this by the government. This was, in fact, a complete 
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misconception, for we acted independently, each of us hoping it would be 
unnecessary to wash the dirty linen in public and each, I may add, wondering 
whether some rival contemporary might not one fine day, decide to ‘blow the 
gaff’. But there was no agreement and no ‘inspiration’. 126 
  
While the Abdication Crisis fell before the war, Crozier’s response, written in August 
1940, betrayed an attitude of self-imposed compliance that was relevant in respect of 
the reporting of the Blitz. It did not meet the self-proclaimed fiction of neutral news 
values, and nor did it follow the assertion of one of Crozier’s predecessors as editor of 
the Manchester Guardian, C. P. Scott, who had asserted that the journalist’s primary 
function was the gathering of news. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The context in which newspapers of 1939 to 1945 operated can be illustrated 
by an incident when a woman from Éire sent her daughter in England some eggs. The 
daughter responded with a letter of thanks and included the joke: ‘I wish you could 
send me a cow!’ The letter she received from one of the 10,000 civil servants 
monitoring letters and telegrams in Britain read: ‘Import of cattle into England from 
Éire by private individuals is not permitted. This letter, therefore, which asks for a 
prohibited article, is returned to sender.’127 With this kind of scrutiny, the 
circumspection of newspaper proprietors and editors is put in a different light and it 
should also be remembered that Prime Minister Churchill was more willing to use the 
stick than the carrot when it came to the press. Hylton noted: 
Despite his own background as a journalist, Churchill treated the press with a 
similar contempt to that shown by Neville Chamberlain. He was one of the leading 
protagonists for tighter control of the media and even objected to factual reports of 
speeches by MPs critical of the government – the Ministry would censor the 
offending passages.128 
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Yet this chapter has shown that Manchester’s newspapers were compliant when it 
came to censorship and even went beyond the government’s strictures. Crozier’s 
disinclination to publish stories in the Manchester Guardian that would be 
newsworthy in any circumstance, such as Germany’s plan to invade the Soviet Union, 
suggested that newspapers (and no other reported the story either) were so willing to 
subscribe to the master narrative that they went even beyond what was prescribed by 
the censor. The Manchester Evening News, the sister paper of the Guardian, and the 
Evening Chronicle showed similar enthusiasm to downplay or gloss over bad news 
and exaggerate the good, yet, as later chapters will show, this did not lead to 
reassurance and optimism in the Manchester public, but rather to scepticism and 
distrust of the press.  
Bingham wrote: ‘While texts usually contain a “preferred” meaning, this 
meaning can always be negotiated, resisted, or ignored by the reader’, and 
Manchester’s public had reason to be sceptical.129 If their newspapers were to be 
believed, the Luftwaffe damaged hospitals, schools, shops and houses while the city’s 
industrial infrastructure remained untouched. Yet the RAF’s bombsights were so 
honed that their precision bombing wiped out arms factories, transport links and 
power utilities at no loss to civilian life. The Manchester public could see that 
factories were in ruins, that they could not get public transport to work even if their 
workplace was undamaged, that hundreds of their fellow citizens were homeless and 
housed in under-resourced and overcrowded shelters and, as the next chapter will 
show, that they could not even drink water without boiling it first.130 The consequence 
was widespread cynicism. Hylton wrote:  
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Along with direct censorship, journalistic euphemisms for war-time reverses 
became commonplace. A rout became a ‘retrograde movement’, a ‘disengagement’ 
or simply ‘straightening the line’. Insanity caused by exposure to the fighting 
became ‘battle fatigue’ or ‘exhaustion’.131 
 
He noted that other examples included the initial blaming of damage caused by V2 
rockets on gas explosions, leading to their being christened them ‘flying gas 
mains’.132 Even the armed forces became euphemistic and bomber crews participating 
in raids that spectacularly failed to find their targets spoke of major assaults ‘on 
German agriculture’.133 The MOI, which could have made reporting any news a near-
impossible process for journalists, did not approach the extent of its potential 
draconian powers and became known, according to Koss, as ‘Minnie’, ‘a fusspot 
dreaded not so much for what she did as what she might do.’134 Price stated:   
The press, by promising to be on its best behaviour, had seen off the danger of 
direct government control… The mainstream media had fought an effective 
rearguard action to protect their liberties. It was a campaign based more on self-
interest than high principle and didn’t extend to protecting those people who 
wished to use the right to free expression to propound more extreme views.135 
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Chapter 6 
Propaganda and the Management of Opinion 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The Second World War, according to Taylor, witnessed the biggest 
propaganda battle in the history of warfare. For six years, he claimed, all the 
participants ‘employed propaganda on a scale that dwarfed all other conflicts’.1 In 
terms of propaganda, Britain’s preparations were advanced by 1939. Twelve years 
earlier Lasswell had written: ‘There is no question but that government management 
of opinion is an inescapable corollary of large-scale modern war’ and in 1936 the 
Committee of Imperial Defence formed a sub-committee to prepare plans for a 
Ministry of Information on the outbreak of war.2  
The British government drew on its experience derived from the First World 
War, which was, according to Carruthers, the first ‘in which propaganda was a vital, 
and thoroughly organised instrument’ and, to Ferguson, ‘the first media war’.3 The 
vital importance of propaganda was recognised on both sides of the Western Front 
from 1914 to 1918 and, confronted by casualties on an industrial scale, Britain 
embarked on an intensive campaign of information suppression and manipulation. 
The author John Buchan commented in 1917: ‘So far as Britain is concerned, the war 
could not have been fought for one month without its newspapers.’4 
The propaganda effort in Britain between 1914 and 1918 focussed on the 
demonization of the enemy, – the German soldier was depicted as a murderer who 
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committed ‘all sorts of atrocities’ – censorship and news management.5 Alice 
Goldfarb Marquis wrote that this model of censorship was achieved by the close 
control of news from the trenches by the military authorities combined with news 
management provided by a ‘tight-knit group of “press lords” who (over lunch or 
dinner with Lloyd George) decided what was “good for the country to know”.’6 As a 
consequence newspapers frequently failed to mention losses or battles, including the 
sinking of the battleship Audacious in 1914, and the Battle of Jutland occurred in a 
news vacuum because, as Lord Balfour told George Riddell, ‘it would have 
occasioned un-necessary anxiety’.7 Why were journalists so willing to suppress 
important news? Goldfarb Marquis wrote: 
The obvious answer is that they all belonged to the same club, whose membership 
also included the most powerful politicians. Publishing a casualty list… would 
have meant expulsion from the club; social ostracism apparently meant more to the 
newsmen than their professional duty to inform the public.8  
 
Knightley wrote that Britain had created a propaganda organisation by the end 
of the First World War that became the model on which Goebbels based that of the 
Germans 20 years later and certainly Hitler wrote admiringly in Mein Kampf of 
Northcliffe’s work as director of external propaganda, describing it as ‘an inspired 
work of genius’. He added: ‘I myself learned enormously from this enemy 
propaganda.’9 This became part of the myth propagated by the Nazis that the German 
army had not been defeated but had been betrayed by Jews and financiers in 1918. 
Eugen Hadamovsky, a Nazi propagandist, wrote in Propaganda and National Power 
in 1933: ‘The German people were not beaten on the battlefield, but were defeated in 
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the war of words.’10 Erich Ludendorff, commander of the German army in 1918, 
wrote: ‘Words today are battles. The right words, battles won; the wrong words, 
battles lost.’11  
Britain’s propaganda in the first two years of the Second World War had 
external and internal targets. The former was aimed at enemy countries and the 
United States, whom Churchill hoped to persuade into the conflict, but there were 
imperatives at home too.12 There was pessimism in government circles about Britain’s 
willingness to fight borne by a cynicism in working class circles caused by the 
slaughter in the First World War and the ‘false promises’ made to returning soldiers 
about ‘homes fit for heroes’.13 The 1930s had also seen the rise of the pacifism 
movement and the widening of social divisions brought on by unemployment. These 
discordant voices will be returned to in a later chapter, but Williams wrote: ‘On the 
outbreak of war in 1939, those in authority believed that the experience of the 1930s 
had made the British worker so militant that he wouldn’t fight and that class divisions 
would weaken morale.’14  
The MOI’s earliest attempts at propaganda were based on building resolve and 
were rooted in traditional themes, national feelings, of King, country and ‘our past’.15 
The ministry’s initial shortcomings were epitomised by one poster (below). This, in 
many minds, underlined the class divisions in Britain and even the newspaper most 
associated with the establishment, The Times, described the poster as ‘insipid and 
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patronising’.16 Williams noted: ‘Official propaganda at the start of the war was inept, 
lacking knowledge of public opinion and betrayed a complete distrust of the people. It 
was in Lord Reith’s words, “utterly ineffective”.’17 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Williams’s comments referred to the MOI but overlooked the ministry’s more 
persuasive work with the press because newspapers delivered government-derived 
propaganda to people’s homes from September 1939. Curran and Seaton wrote: ‘The 
press, including critical and independent-minded papers such as the Daily Mirror, 
consciously sought to bolster public morale at the expense of objective reporting. 
Coercive censorship was made, to some extent, unnecessary by self-censorship.’19 
Lord Reith, Minister for Information from January to May 1940, said famously ‘News 
is the shock troops of propaganda’ and this chapter will look at how the words used 
by the ‘other Fleet Street’ were mobilised before and after the Manchester Blitz of 
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1940.20 The first section will analyse the week preceding 23 December 1940 to set the 
coverage of the Blitz in context. The second will look at the editions of 23 and 24 
December in detail because they were printed while Manchester was under attack and 
news was readily available on the newspapers’ doorsteps. Finally, the third section 
will look at the post-Blitz newspapers for seven weeks during which Manchester’s 
press had time to reflect and to investigate any shortcomings exposed by the extremes 
of war. This approach will allow the thesis to reflect on whether there was a 
consistent approach to propaganda or whether the newspapers reacted differently 
when their readers became the news story. 
 
2. Before the Manchester Blitz 
2.1 Manchester Guardian 
Bernays described propaganda as an ‘unseen mechanism’, and part of the 
mastery of manipulation of opinions is to deny or minimise propaganda’s existence.21 
The Manchester Guardian provided an example on 16 December 1940 when it 
carried a report on a radio broadcast to the United States by the novelist and 
playwright J. B. Priestley, in which he stated that Britain’s government did not take 
propaganda seriously. ‘Instead of doing too much propaganda we did not do half 
enough,’ he was paraphrased as saying.22 This was the Guardian’s interpretation of 
Priestley’s broadcast because, when he was quoted directly lower in the report, the 
tone was different:  
He complained that the people of Britain were left too much in the dark, ‘not so 
much because somebody wants to deceive it [sic] and hide the truth as that there 
are too many censors who are afraid of making a mistake and at the same time 
have no particular enthusiasm for keeping the public informed’.23    
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21 Bernays, Propaganda, p. 37. 
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 A study of the Manchester Guardian in the week before the city was attacked 
suggests that the newspaper’s enthusiasm for keeping its readers informed was 
tempered by other considerations. The night after reports of Priestley’s broadcast 
appeared, Manchester suffered a bombing raid and the Guardian’s news story 
complied with the polarized propaganda technique framed by Nohrstedt et al 
discussed earlier in the thesis. It was not the lead story on its main news page, which 
was an unusual display of news judgement even allowing for the obligations placed 
on a newspaper that purported to be national. Instead, the bombing of the city was 
confined to a single-column story in column three and its introduction read: ‘High-
explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped in a North-West inland area last night 
during a raid which lasted for about an hour. Heavy bursts of AA fire were directed 
against the bombers.’24 Although Manchester was not named, the level of detail in the 
ensuing paragraphs, in the circumstances of a raid taking place as page deadlines were 
coming and going, suggested the Manchester-based paper had its own reporters very 
close to the scene. This would have told any serious analyst that the city had been hit. 
In keeping with accepted news values outlined by Richardson, the second sentence of 
the above ought to have focused on the extent of the damage so the prominence given 
to the work of the ack-ack gunners seemed an intentional attempt to boost morale. 
The damage and loss of life (vaguely worded) came immediately after the tribute to 
the ack-ack. ‘One district of a North-West inland town suffered considerable damage 
and there were a number of casualties, some of which were fatal.’25  
The report, in line with Reisigl and Wodak’s theory of linguistic assignation, 
was keen to underline German bad points and Allied good. To emphasise the German 
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‘crimes’, the list of damage mentioned civilian targets – houses, business premises, a 
chemist’s shop, buses, a public house, two churches, the rectory of one of them, some 
lock-up shops, a cinema, two pubs, a girls’ hostel, a savings bank, and a children’s 
playing field.26 The only ‘military’ target mentioned was an A.R.P. post, but, from a 
propaganda point of view, the public at the time would have seen it in the same 
category as the others – it was the local centre to which one’s civilian husband or 
father went after putting on his dark navy uniform and steel helmet with the ‘W’ for 
warden.27 The minor nature of some of the damage to the more emotive targets did 
not deter the reporter from using it. ‘Slight damage was done to a stained-glass 
window of a church’ and splinters struck the outside of another church.28 By contrast, 
a double-column report next to the Manchester bombing story (columns four and five) 
quoted communiqués from the RAF and HQ Cairo. They were quoted verbatim, along 
with a report under the byline of the Air Ministry News Service and listed targets of 
RAF raids on Naples and various towns in Germany. These were warships, an 
aerodrome, railway stations, junctions and goods yards, factories, merchant vessels, 
munitions factories, power stations, grain elevators and oil plants.29 
 
2.2 Manchester Evening News 
Propaganda had a role to play in shaping the attitudes of the British and a 
report on shelter etiquette in the Manchester Evening News on 17 December 1940 
conformed to Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell’s model in that it attempted to 
‘direct behaviour’.30 Under the headline ‘Shelters not for lazy mothers’, the report 
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read: ‘The practice of leaving children unattended in shelters must stop.’31 Using 
Richardson’s list of questions, the articles probably stemmed from an official source 
(although that was not acknowledged) and, while it is debatable how much power and 
social influence the newspaper would have on the missing mothers, it could have 
strengthened the resolve of its readers to enforce good practice. That was on page 
three, while the bombing raid on Manchester the previous night was on the front page, 
although, like the Guardian and the Evening Chronicle, it was not the lead but the 
third most prominent story. Surprisingly given that it was its readers that came under 
attack, the newspaper attempted to shape behaviour again. Under the headline  
‘Foolish crowds risk bomb death’, the report read: ‘Hundreds of sightseers ignored all 
appeals to keep roads and pavements clear, risked death and impeded the work of 
wardens and ambulance men after a working class district of a North-Western town 
had been raided last night.’32 On the back page, there was a portentous piece of 
reporting given that five days later Manchester was about to be attacked. On 17 
December Mancunians could read:  
Rest centre accommodation for Manchester people, who might be bombed out of 
their homes, has been speeded up in the last few days so that there are now in the 
city 21 permanent fully-equipped centres to house 8,000 people. And, within the 
next few days the Manchester Evening News learned today, there will be many 
more.33 
 
The intention of the propaganda was to reassure, but, as Manchester would discover 
within a week, the city was not prepared. The reassurance was hollow. 
This was the only instance of the Evening News tempting providence. After 
Coventry was bombed in November 1940, the newspaper’s London editor Malcolm 
Gunn wrote a comment piece in his column ‘In Fleet Street today’, asking why some 
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towns like Coventry were named but others, like Manchester and Birmingham, were 
not. His conclusion was that it was down to the Air Ministry – a strange assertion 
when he knew full well it was down to the MOI – and civic pride: 
‘Brum’ has less of a grievance than that mysterious ‘North West town’ which up to 
now has suffered complete anonymity and can’t get any publicity at all. One’s 
heart bleeds for this brave little known and essentially modest people, who up to 
now, have not even been officially credited with a Molotov breadbasket.34 
        
It was a light-hearted, facile, comment that created an ‘us’ and ‘them’ confrontation 
even if the ‘them’ on this occasion were fellow-Britons in bombed cities. The 
intention, presumably, was to demand attention for Mancunians who had survived 
attacks by the Luftwaffe and it backfired three weeks later when the city received 
publicity by being bombed to an extent that morale plummeted.  
 
2.3 Evening Chronicle 
It was not difficult to locate the Evening Chronicle’s attempt to polarize 
opinion. On the top of every edition, just below the paper’s main title, was the 
message ‘Hitler’s War – xxth Day’, the number rising every 24 hours. The count 
began on 3 September 1939 when it was Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, 
who had declared war. The intention to place blame – linguistically to apportion 
characteristics in Reisigl and Wodak’s terms – was evident in the frequent use of the 
word ‘Nazi’ which appeared three times on the front page of the Evening Chronicle’s 
17 December 1940 edition. This had a value in typographical terms in that the word 
was short and would fit in headlines but it also branded all Germans as Nazis. The 
semiotics of the most prominent, headlined ‘Nazis try “sneak raids” on N-West’, were 
referred to earlier in the thesis but the report also provided a contrast to a story on the 
same page about the RAF’s attacks on the Italian port of Bari and the German city of 
                                            
34 ‘N-West Town’, Manchester Evening News, 29 November 1940, p. 2 
  
178
Mannheim.35 London sources were quoted as describing the raid on Mannheim as a 
‘heavy attack’.  The story told of how ‘many important targets were left in flames’, 
contrasting with the churches attacked by the Luftwaffe in the former report. The 
report of the raid on Manchester had two cross-heads – lay-out devices to break up 
type but used to emphasise aspects of a story that the sub-editor considers important –
to set an upbeat tone: ‘Fires soon out’ and ‘Warden hero’36 The report read: 
‘Incendiaries were dropped on a number of other North-West inland districts, but 
where fires were started they were quickly put out by the ARP services.’ The warden 
story began: ‘Hero of the attack on one North-West town was a 34-year-old warden, 
John Molloy, father of two children, who gave his life while sticking to his post.’ 
There was a description of how Molloy, who was in charge of a public shelter, 
remained in the doorway while bombs were ‘whistling down’, and tried to persuade 
people still outside to take cover.  One of the bombs injured him, and he died in 
hospital.37 The image of the hero is carefully drawn and conforms to a mythology that 
Jowett and O’Donnell describe as being embodied ‘in recurrent symbols and events’, 
and the futility of the enemy’s work was underlined by the report of the damage that 
focused on a block of property already scheduled for demolition.38 A more artful use 
of propaganda was the reference to the ‘heavy anti-aircraft barrage’ that was going on 
at the time.39  
The target audience would have had every right to question some of the 
reports and the comment in their newspapers that were anxiously looking for 
optimistic news to print. On 19 December 1940 a report from Istanbul quoted a Turk 
who was not named and who, allegedly, had returned from a visit to Britain. It read: 
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‘The morale has not been in any way affected… What the German bombs will never 
be able to destroy is such a nation’s underlying morale and resistance and 
determination to fight on.’40 In the same newspaper Baxter wrote of ‘Hitler’s 
setbacks’, adding: ‘He can truly say that his victories have outpaced those of 
Napoleon himself and no conqueror has ever accomplished so much in so short a 
time.’ Two sentences further on he added without irony: ‘Diplomatically Hitler has 
suffered a heavy defeat’.41 
 
3. The Blitz editions 
 
3.1 Manchester Guardian 
 
The raid of 16 December 1940 proved to be a trial run for both the Luftwaffe 
and Manchester’s newspapers because the propaganda techniques were repeated six 
days later on the first night of the Christmas Blitz. The final edition of the Manchester 
Guardian on Monday 23 December comprised four pages, 86 per cent of the editorial 
(non-advertising) space of which was devoted to war related items. The bombing of 
Manchester was not the lead, but a single-column running down the middle of page 
three, the main news page. This may have indicated the pressures on deadlines – the 
Blitz began at 7.45 the previous evening and printing was disrupted by 11 incendiary 
bombs falling on the Guardian roof in that night – but more probably there was a 
concern that leading with it would tell the Luftwaffe that its pilots had successfully 
targeted the city. 42 The four decks of the headline were: 
NIGHT RAID ON NORTH-WEST 
Heavy Attack on Inland Town 
MANY FIRE-BOMBS 
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People Trapped in Shelter Rescued 
while the introduction read:   
The German Air Force, continuing its campaign of heavy night bombing, 
concentrated its attack last night on an inland town in North-West England.  
Hundreds of incendiary bombs and many high-explosives were dropped and some 
fires were started in different parts of the town, but the entire staffs of the fire 
brigades were quickly called out and fought the outbreaks.  The firemen worked 
through the barrage and amid falling bombs.43 
 
Manchester was not mentioned by name, although the Guardian’s sister paper the 
Manchester Evening News, published later the same day, felt free to identify the city. 
In terms of propaganda, four points were made: the town concerned did not take the 
bombing passively; the highest possible number of firemen fought the outbreaks; 
there was no delay in calling them out; and they worked courageously under enemy 
attack. In reality, there was a shortage of civilian defence staff, who had been moved 
to Liverpool the night before, and the fire service, as later editions will show, were 
hindered by a shortage of fire watchers and had considerable problems putting out the 
fires.44 The effect of the bombing was also minimised with a good news element on 
the bottom deck of the headlines; civilians had been trapped but had been rescued.45  
Subsequent paragraphs continued to stress the plus points in line with the 
propaganda theory that if a message is ‘consistent and repetitious’ people are unlikely 
to challenge it.46 Thus, the enemy aircraft ‘were met by sharp bursts of fire from 
ground defences’; in a number of cases civilians used sandbags to extinguish the 
incendiary bomb fires; nurses helped to put out fires when a hospital was hit; and 
when people were trapped in the wreckage of a public house, rescue squads ‘worked 
strenuously to rescue them’. The Guardian staff themselves played their part, but, 
although reference was made to bombs landing on a newspaper office, censorship as 
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well as modesty forced them to withhold which was involved: ‘A newspaper office 
was hit by incendiaries, but the office fire-fighters put out the flames before any 
damage was done.’ Nowhere were there pictures or reports of the damage done or the 
casualties inflicted, an absence that could be explained by the extraordinary 
circumstances in which the newspaper was printed, but the publications that followed 
on 24 and 27 December proved there would have been no desire to print them even if 
the journalists and the production team had the time and information.     
That was propaganda by omission, conforming to Lang and Lang’s assertion 
that what is left out of a news report is often as important as what is included; a study 
of the language elsewhere on page three exposes propaganda by inclusion.47 A cross-
head proclaimed: ‘Three hospitals hit’, while the Luftwaffe’s targets were identified as 
houses, schools, shops, business premises, public buildings and hospitals, all non-
combatant constructions. Unity was stressed in a report about the homeless who found 
shelter with friends or at public rest centres staffed by the Women’s Voluntary 
Service. The desired effect on the target audience would have been to cause outrage, 
and attribute bad actions to ‘them’, that sick and innocent patients had been targeted, 
while comfort that care was being provided for those who had suffered in the 
bombing (‘us’).  
The Manchester Guardian of 24 December was also produced while the city 
was under attack but also had the benefit of a day in which to report what had 
happened on the night of 22/23 December. Yet the most revealing information did not 
come in the news reports, but in the advertisements, nearly all small, that filled the 
front page. Two prominent display adverts said more about the true state of the city, 
the first, signed by the Town Clerk, reading: ‘All water for drinking purposes should, 
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until further notice, be boiled before use.’48  There was also a display advertisement 
of the same size opposite consisting of a Christmas message from the Minister of 
Transport, urging people not to travel over Christmas.49 The message was of a city’s 
basic functions close to collapse, but no news reports tackled this. Page two was 
nearly all commercial and financial news, sports results and radio listings, but there 
was still an element of censorship. A brief statement that daily services at Manchester 
Cathedral had been suspended for the present failed to give the reason: the cathedral 
had been bombed.50 
The facing page was extraordinary in that, with a city still smouldering, its 
transport infrastructure creaking and Mancunians needing to boil water to drink, more 
than half was devoted to photographs stressing defiance: Whitley bombers under 
construction at a northern factory (probably at English Electric, in Preston); a Whitley 
in flight; anti-aircraft ammunition production for the Fleet; Australian troops in the 
Western Desert; and a Cecil Beaton photograph of Churchill looking ready for a fight. 
To emphasise German ‘crimes’, a bombed House of Commons completed the set. The 
lower half of the page was almost entirely on subjects other than the war, although 
there was an underlying theme of how to behave. ‘Lucio’, in the ‘Miscellany 
Column’, recalled being in the British Museum, close to a ‘100-per-cent-safe air-raid 
shelter’, when an attendant informed the researchers that aircraft were overhead. ‘Not 
one of ’em budged or indeed took the slightest notice,’ he reported with obvious 
approval. The use of the abbreviation for ‘them’ has a (perhaps ironical) Boy’s Own 
Paper ring.51 
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 The main news page focussed on the previous night’s (23/24 December) 
attacks. The lead headline read:  
NIGHT RAIDERS AGAIN IN THE NORTH-WEST 
Heavy Attack on an Inland Town 
HOSPITALS, PUBLIC BUILDING, AND A CINEMA HIT 52  
The city was disguised in the introduction as ‘a North-West town’, although the sub-
editor responsible for the headline had decided it was safe to go beyond the text and 
call it an ‘inland’ town’. This was perhaps done to make it clear that it was not 
another attack on Liverpool, which was still burning from the raid by 294 bombers on 
the Saturday night. The propaganda was most obvious in the third deck of the 
headline that emphasised the civilian status of the damage, while the report read: 
‘High explosive bombs caused damage to house property, public buildings, and 
hospitals and a cinema were hit in one district.’53 It added: ‘The raiders had to run the 
gauntlet of fire from the ground defences.’ 54 This ‘running the gauntlet’ metaphor 
exaggerated the effectiveness of the gun batteries as Erich Sommer, a German airman, 
stated: ‘We laughed off the enemy defences… The flak didn’t worry us as it was 
mostly badly directed.’55 Shrapnel from British anti-aircraft shells killed more people 
on the ground than it killed German aircrew, but the noise of the guns was, 
nevertheless, good for civilian morale.56 One enemy bomber shot down was therefore 
a good-news story, and the flak may have scored at least one hit: a sentence was 
included, attributed to the Press Association, stating that a raider was reported as shot 
down at Old Trafford, Manchester. 
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The raid on the first night of the Blitz was demonized as part of a ‘Nazi attack 
on the civilians of Britain’, as if this were its sole purpose. ‘Wave upon wave of 
bombers, drawn like iron filings to a magnet, swept over the burning buildings’ and 
dropped high explosives among the fire fighters. Many families were ‘made 
homeless’, and ‘innumerable decent homes’ were ‘broken and laid down by the 
enemy’.57 The language was designed to underline it was ‘us’ under attack – 
‘families’, ‘decent’, and ‘homes’, while ‘laid down’ was resonant of a deceased 
relative – and the indictments were emphasised by a cross-head: ‘Schools suffer’. As 
in previous pages, there was an attempt to minimise the Germans’ success. The report 
stated that many hours of intense bombing produced ‘a surprisingly small number of 
casualties’. The information was attributed to the town clerk, but a truer picture 
emerged in the first paper after Christmas, on 27 December, when it reported that ‘a 
mass funeral of the victims of the raid in Manchester will take place at Southern 
Cemetery tomorrow’.58  
The propaganda message of ‘we can take it’, reinforcing ‘the cultural myths 
and stereotypes’, ensured the mood of the 24 December paper was resolutely 
upbeat.59 The public transport vehicles were said to be undamaged, apart from a few 
broken windows; two schools had been taken over to supplement the rest centres; and 
‘One group of firemen could talk of nothing but the courage of three girls who stayed 
in town all night making cups of tea and carrying them round to the bomb teams.’60 
But a reporter stated plainly: ‘It was a bad night.’  He asserted, however, that although 
civilian damage was great, the people were ‘still, in Mr Churchill’s phrase, “grim and 
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gay”.’61 As a subsequent chapter will show, Home Intelligence reported to the 
government that some people in Manchester were close to despair. 
 
3.2 Manchester Evening News  
There was no attempt by the four-page, three-halfpence, Manchester Evening 
News of 23 December 1940 to disguise where the bombs had fallen the previous 
night. Page one, which was the main news page, led with a report on the raid, its 
introduction stating: ‘Manchester had its longest and most severe aerial bombardment 
last night’.62 The propaganda impact lay in the second deck of the lead headline that 
referred to ‘Two raiders believed down in North-West’. To put that into context, that 
represented a success rate of little more than 0.7 per cent given that 270 aircraft took 
part, but it was not an isolated piece of morale boosting. Under the left-hand 
‘shoulder’ of the main head there was a bold headline across three columns asserting: 
‘Chins up in the North-West’, while under the right-hand shoulder was the headline: 
‘Mannheim again left in flames’ – another ‘hitting back’ piece.63 Elsewhere on the 
page there were examples of attempts to shape values, attitudes and behaviour. Role 
models were provided in the shape of nurses who stayed at their posts despite a 
hospital being bombed, while the antithesis was provided by a report headlined 
‘Soldiers accused of looting’.64 
While the 23 December Manchester Evening News openly identified 
Manchester as the targeted city, there was more reticence in the last extra edition the 
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following day. Page one’s lead headline read: ‘Buildings dynamited in Lancashire 
town’.65  This did not refer to the second night of bombing but to the deliberate 
dynamiting of buildings in some of the Lancashire town’s main business streets, to 
stop the flames spreading and to bring down walls that were in danger of collapsing. 
This seems at odds with normal news values, which would have reported the raid of 
23/24 December, but it fits in with the determination seen in the Manchester 
Guardian to suggest there had been only one night of bombing. It also served to show 
that the authorities were doing something positive and thereby showing resilience. 
The story admitted that by morning ‘a number of buildings’ had been either destroyed 
or badly damaged, and that ‘some firemen’ were killed. The introduction to the story 
began by emphasising the non-military status of the targets: 
Hospitals, two shelters, and a number of shops, houses and commercial buildings 
in a Lancashire town were damaged or destroyed in another heavy raid on the 
North-West last night.66 
 
The report’s cross-heads included ‘Church burnt out’ and ‘Four halls hit’, civilian 
targets.   
The reporting generally was a case of minimising bad things happening in 
Britain, maximising the bad things happening to Germany, maximising the good 
things happening to ‘us’, minimising the good things happening to ‘them’, an 
example of the Van Dijk’s ideological square.67 This edition also contained the 
familiar theme of hitting back at the Germans. Another deck of the page-lead 
headlines claimed: ‘Bomber brought down at Old Trafford’.68 There was no source 
for this story, which was slightly less strong than the headline: the bomber was only 
‘reported to have been brought down’. A scrupulous sub-editor would want quotation 
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marks round ‘brought down at Old Trafford’, to indicate some uncertainty. ‘Transport 
keeps on’ was another cross-head, emphasising a claim that ‘transport is functioning 
almost normally’. There was no mention of the fact that railway stations and the main 
bus depot had been hit the previous night.  The picture of traffic functioning ‘almost 
normally’ was put into question by the back-page’ lead on the previous night’s paper 
(23 December) which had appealed to motorists to give lifts to stranded pedestrians.69  
The 24 December paper reinforced that message when it reported that drivers 
had entered into the spirit of ‘free lifts’ that morning:  
It was a common sight to see people being driven into town, smartly dressed 
typists crowded in with workers in their rough clothing. But all were smiling, and 
it is almost impossible to speak too highly of the way Lancashire folk have faced 
up to the intensive raiding with real courage.70 
   
The needs of propaganda included showing that the different classes worked 
cheerfully together for the common cause, a picture exposed as idealised when Home 
Intelligence and Mass Observation reporters described a different landscape. 
Manchester people put out of work by the previous night’s bombing were provided 
with a role-model in a story tied with the lead: ‘Work gone, they helped hungry tired 
A. R. P. men’.71 Citizens were assured that their forces were retaliating on land, at sea 
and in the air: There were headlines on ‘Navy planes sink two ships’ and ‘Our night 
fighters are scoring’.72 This last headline reflected wishful thinking: Britain had no 
specially-designed night fighters at that time.73 There were very few interceptions. 
Another reference to inflicting damage on the Germans appeared in a reference to the 
noise of the ground defences (the anti-aircraft guns, which had a distinctive sound). 
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In the same edition, another propaganda message came in the form of civic 
pride at the foot of the front page. A message to citizens, stated to be from ‘the Lord 
Mayor of Manchester, Alderman R. G. Edwards’, blew away the censorial 
smokescreen of ‘a Lancashire town’. The Mayor, having made an extensive tour of 
the city, was ‘profoundly impressed’ by the way citizens had faced the ordeals they 
had suffered.  He paid tribute to the ‘untiring’ work done and still being done by all 
branches of the civil defence.74 This showed the newspaper performing its wartime 
role as a line of communication between authorities and public.  It could also have 
shown any enemy agents, by the Mayor’s references to ‘an extensive tour’, and 
‘untiring’ work, that the Luftwaffe had identified and attacked its intended target, 
causing widespread damage. 
 
3.3 Evening Chronicle  
The Evening Chronicle of 23 December 1940 had to search hard for the 
positive, as the three decks of headlines testified:  
SAVAGE GERMAN AIR ATTACK MADE ON MANCHESTER 
MANY FIRES IN CITY 12-HOUR BLITZ 
TWO GERMANS DOWN, ONE IN SEA OFF BLACKPOOL75 
The introduction read:  ‘Manchester had its longest and most severe aerial 
bombardment last night, and after a 12 hours’ Blitz a pall of smoke hung over the city 
today. A church and other historic buildings were damaged.’ The description of the 
bombers’ approach to the city – how they ‘spread fanwise over a wide area, and 
adopted the familiar tactics of flare-dropping, followed by incendiaries and high 
explosives’ – had almost exactly the same wording as the report in the Manchester 
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Evening News, and must have come from the same source, probably an official one.76 
There was no attempt to play down the raid, which was described as ‘savage’ and 
lasting 12 hours, although there was a clear emphasis on attributing negative 
characteristics on the Germans. The placing of the damage to ‘a church and other 
historic buildings’ in the introduction showed the Luftwaffe in a bad light and lower 
down in the report there were references to hotels, commercial premises, business 
houses, shops, stores, cinemas and schools being ‘victims of indiscriminate bombing’. 
High-explosives and incendiaries ‘dealt death to people and destruction to property’.77   
The degradation of ‘them’ continued in the leader on page two which began: 
‘The Blitz has come again to the north, following the usual Nazi pattern of 
concentrating not on military objects but on ancient and historic buildings, business 
premises and residential areas.’78 Note that it was normative behaviour, and that the 
Germans were not damaging local landmarks by accident, thus offering an interesting 
contrast with the story alongside about an RAF attack on Mannheim. Here the 
bombed areas were ports, aerodromes, docks, barges, railway yards, goods yards, 
munitions works, oil stores and factories. Yet, Robert Kee, a British airman, 
articulated the contradictions between his experience and what was appearing in his 
newspaper in his diary in 1941: 
I’ve now been on many raids where owing to total cloud it’s been impossible to do 
anything but fling the bombs out somewhere near the flak and the searchlights, and 
yet I have invariably read the next morning of ‘attacks on rail communications or 
industrial premises’.79 
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The leader went on to claim that the aim of the Germans, ‘as Manchester is now able 
to judge’, was to terrorise and cause dislocation.80 This was propaganda, a reiteration 
of the crimes of the Nazis, but it could also be read as an admission that the bombing 
had this effect, or was threatening to have this effect, in Manchester.  
No Second World War British newspaper could continue in the vein for very 
long, however, and local pride was evoked almost immediately, another element of 
the discourse between the newspaper and its readers. Keeble wrote that local pride is 
used by newspapers as a marketing strategy and the Chronicle gave an example: 
thanks to the precautions taken in Manchester, the ‘full blast of the Nazis’ enmity’ 
had been foiled.81 The leader continued: ‘Manchester, a city proud of its record and of 
its preparations to meet attack, has maintained and more than maintained this standard 
of efficiency and heroism.’ This, as this thesis shows, was wishful thinking but it 
required scrupulous reading between the lines to detect deviations from the 
predominant message. ‘Those who have work should go to it,’ the leader continued, 
suggesting there had been some absenteeism, while the unemployed were urged stay 
at home and not go sight-seeing. It could be inferred that there had been some form of 
bomb-site tourism.  
The demonization of the enemy is a common propaganda technique and the 
lead headline, across three columns, in the Evening Chronicle of 24 December 
conformed: 
FIVE HOSPITALS HIT IN A NEW LANCASHIRE BLITZ 
Churches, houses and business places suffer82 
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The message was reinforced by the copy. ‘Five hospitals in two towns were among 
the places damaged by bombs’, the introduction read, and the second paragraph added 
to the list of civilian targets: churches, houses, shops, business houses and public 
houses. At one point, the report stated, civil defence workers, particularly firemen, –
local figures with no means to fight back – were machine-gunned by individual 
raiders, although no casualties were reported. The report also mentioned an ‘oil 
bomb’ falling into ‘one of the town’s thoroughfares’, which contained business 
premises and shops.83 The choice of ‘thoroughfare’, rather than ‘road’ or ‘street’, 
evoked an image of a fire-bomb in a busy area full of people. 
Conventional news writing techniques would have concentrated on the deaths 
and the damage and it was an example of propaganda that the third paragraph of the 
story concentrated on retribution. One enemy plane was reported to have been 
brought down close to Old Trafford, Manchester, ‘near to the cricket ground’ – a 
detail that contrasted the Nazi war machine with the peaceful and most English of 
national games. Armstrong and Barth have stated that symbols are crucial to the 
survival of ethnic identification because they act as ‘border guards’ distinguishing 
‘us’ from ‘them’ and there is an implicit evocation of a pre-war idyll of willow and 
leather and the vision of what the nation was fighting for.84 The report also provided 
details of some of the victims. For example, in a ‘rural district’ Miss Harriet Lomas 
was killed by a bomb, while Mr and Mrs Harold Worth died sitting beside the fire in 
their farmhouse. The semiotics of phraseology were designed to paint a bucolic 
picture, to the target audience the victims were people ‘like us’. 
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Like its local rivals, the Evening Chronicle provided role models, conforming 
to Jowett and O’Donnell’s propaganda criteria in which messages seem to be more 
resonant when ‘they seem to be coming from within the audience’.85 The civil 
defence services ‘went quickly into action’, and fire-fighters worked ‘heroically’, as 
did nurses at one of the hospitals, who were ‘heedless of the danger’.86 There was 
special praise for the calmness of the nurses as they worked to transfer patients to 
safety after hospital walls were brought down by a bomb blast and hundreds of 
windows shattered. There were quotations from a soldier in hospital with bomb 
splinter injuries to his face and arms; from a man temporarily blinded by an 
incendiary bomb; and from another man suffering from burns sustained in rescuing 
three children.  One patient was quoted as saying: ‘If only Hitler could see how these 
nurses behaved he would soon realise that all his bombs cannot weaken the spirit of 
the British people.’87 This quotation read like it was made up by the journalist, or, at 
the very least, prompted.  
 
4. The Post-Blitz Editions 
4.1 Manchester Guardian 
There were no newspapers printed on 25 and 26 December 1940, Christmas 
and Boxing Day being traditional journalism holidays until the 1980s, and the 
German bombing offensive on Britain also came to a halt until the night of 27/28 
December.88 The hiatus allowed Manchester’s newspapers an opportunity to reflect 
on the bombing of the city and the Guardian of 27 December was critical of 
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preparations, noting the failures in fire-watching on the night of 22/23 December89 Its 
main criticism was aimed at industry rather than the authorities, however, recalling 
that the Ministry of Information had stated that the people responsible for certain 
buildings apparently neglected their legal obligation to provide an efficient service of 
fire watchers. It suggested that the Fire Watchers Order did not go far enough. 
On page five a survey, dated 26 December, expressed in its introduction the 
propaganda values of carrying on, working together, and thus hitting back. It began: 
‘Manchester men and women have used the Christmas holiday to put right, so far as 
possible, what has been torn down and burnt out by the German bombs.’ The 
‘carrying on’ theme appeared again in the report insisting that the Christmas festivals 
at home have gone ahead ‘somewhat normally’. 90 The reporter stated that it was not 
possible to name the places the bombs hit, implicitly telling the readers that his report 
was censored, but he was able to report that they included churches, chapels, eight 
infirmaries and hospitals, schools, various institutions and many commercial 
buildings, offices and homes. It is worth noting that, apart from ‘homes’, the list 
seemed to be given, consciously or unconsciously, in order of propaganda value. The 
placing of the emotionally-charged word ‘homes’ in the final position may even have 
been done for climactic value. A communiqué from the Air Ministry and Ministry of 
Home Security admitted that ‘considerable damage was done’ in the Monday night 
raid (on a Lancashire town).  But preliminary reports, it was claimed, indicated that 
casualties were not heavy’.91 
Examples of distorted news values were revealed by separate, small items. In 
one Captain David Drummond, chief officer of Manchester Fire Brigade, reported: ‘I 
hope that the authorities will see that fire-watching parties will speedily be brought up 
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to the strength which we had expected, and that they will be kept at their posts night 
and day.’92 There is a lot of implied criticism in that statement and in normal 
circumstances it would be the basis of a big story. Here it was just four centimetres, 
including the headlines. In another report, the sinking of a Royal Navy ship was dealt 
with as a very small paragraph at the foot of the page: ‘The Board of Admiralty 
regrets to announce that HM Destroyer Acheron (Lieut J. R. Wilson RN) has been 
sunk.  The next of kin of casualties have been informed.’93 The ‘voice’ of this piece 
was clearly that of the Admiralty press release, not that of a journalist.  
No Manchester newspaper reported what Home Intelligence was telling the 
Ministry of Information in January 1941, which will be examined in a later chapter, 
but there was evidence of Britain’s ‘Other Fleet Street’ making attempts to improve 
the mood in the city. On 30 January the Manchester Guardian headlines on page six 
read: 
BUILDING THE NEW MANCHESTER 
An Unexampled Opportunity to Tidy Up the City94   
Under it the president of the Royal Institute of Builders and Architects, Mr W. H. 
Ansell, was paraphrased as saying: ‘The dictators would be entirely dis-satisfied if 
they knew that the result of their destructiveness had been to create a high resolve to 
build better cities and better lives.’95  
The Manchester Guardian’s autopsy of the aftermath of the Blitz was equally 
upbeat. A reporter visited a centre housing nearly 1,000 people made homeless by the 
bombing, and quoted a 69-year-old widow saying she had been ‘sleeping warm and 
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comfortable’.96 The piece went on: ‘At all centres visited the catering arrangements 
seem to be admirable. In every shelter in the city turkey was served for Christmas 
Day dinner.’97 The Home Intelligence inspectors, who visited the city, were scathing: 
‘This, like many other press versions, is alas untrue.’98  
 
4.2 Manchester Evening News 
If the Manchester Guardian surprised the Home Intelligence inspectors, the 
last edition extra of the Manchester Evening News probably dismayed its audience. 
The newspaper comprised six pages and the most surprising element was the shortage 
of news about the Manchester Blitz, filling less than 15 per cent of the editorial copy. 
There were no reports on the aftermath of the bombing on the front page, the lead 
story being the report of an attack by the Japanese navy.99  By modern editorial 
standards, which, despite 24-hour news, insist on lingering over disasters whether 
wartime or natural, this inclination to move on from the city’s struggles is a surprising 
example of news values. The other main reports on the page were overt examples of 
propaganda.100 Signs of the hand of the censors, who insisted on minimising reports 
of suffering, were manifest, but a Manchester newspaper could have found news 
stories amid the bombed-out buildings and chose not to. It is as if the Manchester 
Evening News wished to find a new focus as quickly as possible.  
The city’s plight was reserved to page three and a report headed ‘All 
Manchester homeless will be re-housed again in few days time’, although those who 
could detect good news in that headline would also have to contemplate the 
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counterpoint of the report next to it: ‘Last chance for child evacuation’.101 This would 
have been a sobering thought for the parents of the 80,000 Mancunian children who 
had to choose between sending their children to strangers or to keep them in a city 
that might be targeted by the Luftwaffe at any time. The Evening News was 
determined to find the silver lining, however, and the potential boom for one of the 
city’s main thoroughfares, Oxford Road, provided it. It read:  
Manchester’s Blitz is likely to bring an unexpected prosperity to the Oxford Road 
area. It is estimated that about 100 houses and shops are empty in that area and 
already firms are making inquiries with the object of taking over these vacant 
properties.102 
  
A more accurate comment came in the private diary of the Evening News’s editor 
three days later. ‘The city still has not resumed its normal life,’ Haley wrote, strongly 
contrasting what his newspaper was reporting.103 Mancunians could read these 
headlines while witnessing the chaos of their own city that was only hinted at in their 
newspapers – ‘From today it is no longer necessary to boil water for drinking 
purposes’ – and make comparisons with reports of the alleged damage being done to 
German cities and towns.104 For example, the principal headline on 28 December had 
read: 
MORE NEWS OF HAVOC IN BERLIN AND PORTS 
Accuracy of the RAF Bombing105 
Three days later the Evening News was making more mountains from rubble 
in its leader: ‘Hitler has promised complete victory, Churchill promised nothing. 
Therein lies one of the weaknesses of his position. The Dictatorships must have 
triumphs or their hold weakens. Spectacles must take the place of bread. Without 
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conquests they die.’106 Later it read: ‘We, too, have been assaulted and we have not 
cracked.’ The attempt to restore morale included official visits. Wendell Willkie, who 
had stood against Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1940 United States election and who 
became an international ambassador for the American president, toured Manchester in 
February. ‘I’ll tell the States they’re not downhearted here,’ he was reported as 
saying.107 
 
4.3 Evening Chronicle 
Just as the Evening News appeared to abandon normal journalistic practices by 
switching its news focus from Manchester prematurely, the Evening Chronicle also 
moved on in its 27 December edition. There were just six reports on the city’s Blitz, 
which accounted, in terms of column centimetres, for around one page of a six-page 
newspaper, approximately 16 per cent. There were no photographs. Unlike the 
Evening News, the lead story in the Evening Chronicle did focus on the city. The 
headline ‘Manchester Gets Down to Work Behind Boards’ extended over three 
columns, while the introduction read:  ‘Manchester is rapidly assuming its normal 
workday aspect after the Blitz. Its countenance may be scarred and in some parts 
battered, but the people, after the Christmas respite, returned to work with 
determination.’108  The message chimed with the ‘Manchester can take it’ discourse 
and might have stirred admiration in parts of the city that had escaped relatively 
unscathed, but for the grieving and the homeless this must have come across as 
blatant untruths, and possibly offensive. The cross-heads ‘Schools to reopen’ and 
‘Archbishop’s tribute’ were also designed to be upbeat and the only jarring note in the 
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report was the sentence: ‘A mass funeral will be held at Southern Cemetery 
tomorrow.’  
 The propaganda techniques of the Evening Chronicle were to ignore the worst 
aspects of the bombing and to ‘other’ the enemy. On page three the main headline 
read ‘Christmas post beats the Blitz’, stressing a return to normality, while a sports 
report on the following page recorded a new challenge for Manchester United, 
because they were now playing their home games at Stockport County’s Edgeley 
Park.109 There was no mention that United’s ground was unusable because of 
bombing.110 Ten days later there was evidence of an inclination to ascribe animal-like 
language to the enemy as identified by Jowett and O’Donnell.111 ‘Defenders creep out 
of cave’, one headline read, describing surrendering Italians, with the underhand and 
sinister connotations contained in the word ‘creep’. ‘Cave’, too, has a primitive or 
sub-human undertone to it. In comparison, the same report highlighted the overt 
bravery of the Allies, the subsidiary headline reading: ‘Australians went into battle 
singing’.112   
 
5. Conclusion 
This study of Manchester’s newspapers pre and post Blitz reveals that there 
was a wholesale attempt to massage the truth for propaganda purposes. A Home 
Intelligence report in February 1941 quoted a remark ‘(private of course) by a famous 
columnist’.113 It read: ‘Journalists report the cheers. No one dare report the tears’, and 
this was borne out by Manchester’s newspapers from December 1940 to February 
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1941. 114  There was more than one raid on Manchester, although reports suggested 
otherwise; casualties were worse than reported; the destruction to factories and the 
city’s infrastructure was minimised; efforts were made to increase the success of air 
defences; shortcomings in fire fighting were virtually ignored; heroes were plentiful 
and promoted; the Luftwaffe’s successes were dismissed as rare; and it was civilian 
rather than industrial targets that were hit. All were distortions designed to maintain 
morale and demonize the enemy. 
    The censor was sitting in the offices of the Manchester Evening News to 
monitor the copy coming out in the city’s newspapers, but there is little in the editions 
to suggest journalists were pushing at the boundaries of what would have been 
considered acceptable. Indeed senior journalists congratulated themselves on the 
service they provided. On 27 December 1940, with Manchester’s newspapers moving 
their attention beyond local problems, Crozier wrote to his Manchester Evening News 
counterpart Haley:  
You were saying the other night that the appearance of newspapers after a heavy 
raid was a powerful agent in steadying people’s nerves. I have two interesting 
pieces of evidence.  
 
1 An air-raid warden, who at a Christmas gathering said that he and his friends 
were overjoyed when they got the four-page MG [Manchester Guardian], because 
they thought that if the MG came out ‘with all its features’ after such a night, 
Manchester must still be standing firm. 
 
2 At the aircraft place where my daughter works, various directors and bosses 
came up to her, knowing of her connection with me, and expressed high delight at 
having received the paper. Some of them had not received it until pretty late, but 
they felt retrospectively that it had been a great comfort after they had been fearing 
the worst sort of news.115 
 
This tied in with McNair and Boyd-Barrett’s assertions about the shared values of 
political and journalistic elites, but the self-congratulation came at a cost.116 Billig 
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wrote that the metonymic image of banal nationalism ‘is not a flag which is being 
consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging un-noticed on the 
public building’ and, by following Fleet Street’s lead, Manchester’s newspapers 
pushed propaganda to the point that it became so institutionalised in the rhetoric of 
politicians, the editorials in the comment pages and the favoured narratives within the 
reporting of news that it became the norm. Home Intelligence reports showed the 
consequence was that trust in the press was eroded. 
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Chapter 7 
All in this Together? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The expression ‘we’re all in this together’ is a legacy of the Second World 
War and stemmed from the notion that the conflict removed the social barriers of the 
1930s.1 Food was rationed, privilege was removed and if your name was on one of the 
millions of bombs dropped by the Luftwaffe then it did not matter if it was double-
barrelled or prefixed by a title. It is an impression of equality that has been questioned 
by historians, Calder and Gardiner among them. Ponting wrote: 
One of the central myths of 1940, cultivated at the time and embellished since, was 
that Britain was galvanised by crisis to change old ways of working, and became 
united as never before, with a strong bond of equality of sacrifice… The reality 
was very different.2 
 
This chapter will examine the alleged unity of purpose, which is one of the 
myths deriving from the Blitz, setting out the national context before turning to look 
at the situation in Manchester expressed in and through the city’s newspapers. It will 
examine the social conditions in Britain in the Second World War, the support for the 
war, the anti-German and Italian backlash and the psychological consequences of the 
aerial bombardment. One reaction was an increase in crime as individuals across a 
wide spectrum took advantage of the blackout and the reduced numbers of police, an 
indicator of a society fractured by the extremes of war. The chapter will also examine 
readers’ letters, a dialogue between the audience and the press, to examine if the 
strains on the community and voices at odds with the message of togetherness were 
given a forum.  
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2. The Social Divide 
As the previous chapter suggested, Britain entered the war in 1939 with 
considerable social problems. Unemployment had blighted a generation, an economic 
burden that even re-armament from 1938 could not cure quickly. In January 1940 
1.3m people were unemployed, a year later 653,000 were still out of work and the 
figure did not drop to below 200,000 until June 1941.3  The surplus workforce did not 
soothe industrial relations and even in 1941, with Britain near its lowest ebb, more 
than a million days were lost to strikes. This rose to 3.7m in 1944, a figure not 
matched again until 1955.4 Inflation also took a toll on household incomes, average 
prices rising 19 per cent in 1940 compared to an 11 per cent increase in salaries.5 The 
consequence was deep deprivation in some of the poorer areas, MP Russell Thomson 
reporting to Parliament in 1942 that 25 per cent of children in Merseyside were living 
below the poverty line and that a doctor in West Sussex had found that 72 per cent of 
the elementary school children were living below the line of nutrition laid down by 
the Children's Minimum Council.6 Research at Christ’s Hospital, a public school in 
Sussex, revealed that its pupils were 2.4 inches (6.1 centimetres) taller at the age of 13 
than comparable boys at elementary schools. The benefit of a good diet became even 
more pronounced at 17 when the difference in height was 3.8 inches (9.7 
centimetres).7 
Other evidence countered the myth of equality. Hastings stated that: 
‘Privileged Britons remained privileged indeed. “The extraordinary thing about the 
war was that people who really didn’t want to be involved in it were not,” the novelist 
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Anthony Powell wrote afterwards.’8 Affluent parents sent 17,000 children abroad in 
the six months after June 1940, in the army former public schoolboys were 14 times 
more likely to be officers, the navy reserved half of its officer cadet places for public 
schoolboys and the officer class of the RAF were awarded the Distinguished Flying 
Cross and first class rail travel while sergeant pilots, predominantly from the lower 
classes, received only the Distinguished Flying Medal and a third class railway 
carriage.9 Until November 1940 work at the Foreign Office did not start until 11 am 
while at the Ministry of Economic Warfare a memo had to be sent out insisting staff 
were at their desks by 10 am.10  
Knightley wrote that the Blitz was not the great social leveller: ‘The protection 
a Londoner got from German bombs depended on how much money he had.’11 An 
American journalist Ralph Ingersoll recalled visiting a shelter on the Isle of Dogs to 
find just six buckets acting as toilets for 8,000 people. These overflowed on to the 
floor where people were sleeping. ‘The whole experience shocked so that it numbed,’ 
he wrote, before driving to the Dorchester Hotel in the West End where guests were 
housed in individual and comfortable beds in an underground area that had been the 
hotel’s Turkish baths. There he noticed that one berth had a note pinned to its curtain 
reading ‘Reserved for Lord Halifax’, the Foreign Secretary.12  
While the British public largely supported the war – an opinion poll conducted 
by the British Institute of Public Opinion in October 1939 found that 89 per cent 
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favoured fighting ‘until Hitlerism goes’ – the reaction was not uniform.13 Home 
Intelligence reported there was little national unity at the start of the war and, initially 
at least, many had grave misgivings about the conflict.14 In December 1939 a 
Manchester student reported to Mass Observation that the war was a ‘taboo’ subject 
in his family, adding: ‘I still don’t support it, but my family… seem to forget all the 
dirty tricks (in my opinion) which they [the government] played before.’15 Three 
months later a railway draughtsman reporting from Wilmslow, 14 miles south of 
Manchester, wrote: ‘I suppose I must agree that the WAR AIMS [his capitals] of the 
orthodox propagandists are reasonable, but somehow I feel no enthusiasm… I am 
mostly floundering around, undecided and sad.’16 Nationally, the sceptics included 
members of the far left and right, Irish republicans and even miners, who harboured 
grievances against Churchill dating back to the General Strike.17  
There was also the peace movement. Nearly 130,000 Britons had joined the 
Peace Pledge Union by the outbreak of war in 1939 and the above Wilmslow Mass 
Observation correspondent, surveying Manchester’s bomb damage, felt aggrieved 
enough about the government’s efforts to preserve peace to write in January 1941: ‘I 
must say that all this destruction of cities is no more than England deserves for its 
wanton destruction of the League of Nations.’18 The government put pressure on the 
BBC and Fleet Street to ensure that Peace Pledge Union voices remained virtually 
unheard, Bingham noting that Vera Brittain, who advocated a pacifist stance even 
during the war, found it difficult to find space in newspapers to promote her views, as 
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she was ‘perceived to be challenging the “national interest”’. 19 A reader’s letter in the 
Manchester Guardian was a potential indicator of a national mood of intolerance. It 
read: 
By its action in protecting the public from the pernicious singing of the Orpheus 
Choir under the direction of the pacifist Sir Hugh Robertson the BBC has earned 
the plaudits of all prudent patriots. It therefore came as a great shock to read in the 
Radio Times that a lifelong pacifist Sir Arthur Eddington was actually being 
allowed to disseminate his insidious astronomical theories in a talk with the 
significant title ‘Other Worlds’. Should not the person responsible for subjecting 
the nation to so grave a risk be immediately removed from office?20 
    
There is scant indication there of latitude or forgiveness, and little was shown 
to Germans, some of them Jews who had fled their native country to escape Hitler’s 
persecution, and Italians, whose shops, including those in Manchester, were 
ransacked. Many were imprisoned in the Isle of Man or in a makeshift prison camp in 
Warth Mills, a wrecked and rat-invested cotton mill in Bury, nine miles north of 
Manchester.21 In July 1940 more than a thousand of these prisoners set sail from 
Liverpool for Canadian internment on the Arandora Star and 600 perished when they 
were torpedoed by a U Boat off the coast of Ireland. The dead included a well-known 
German socialist opponent of Hitler and the secretary of the Italian League of the 
Rights of Man.22 The Manchester Guardian reported that there had been panic among 
the internees, adding: ‘There was great hostility between the Germans and Italians, 
and even on board the rescue ship they had to be guarded by British troops to prevent 
them from coming to blows.’23According to the Daily Express: 
Soldiers and sailors…told of panic among the aliens when they realised the ship 
was sinking. All condemned the cowardice of the Germans, who fought madly to 
get into the boats. ‘The Germans, fighting with Italians to escape, were great 
hulking brutes,’ said one soldier. ‘They punched and kicked their way past the 
Italians. We had to restrain them forcibly… But the Italians were just as bad. The 
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whole mob thought of their own skins first. The scramble for the boats was 
sickening.’ 24 
 
A subsequent investigation proved this account to be wholly false and this, coupled 
with similar excesses by the press, eventually changed the national mood and the 
proportion of the public in favour of internment fell from 55 per cent in July 1940 to 
30 per cent in August.25  
If the public’s antagonism to British-based Germans and Italians moderated, 
there is evidence that anti-Semitism was more ingrained. Mass Observation found 
evidence of anti-Semitism among more than 55 per cent of respondents in one survey, 
suggesting that Britons could divorce their opposition to Hitler from their anti-Jewish 
sentiments.26 A Home Intelligence report in 1943 stated there was ‘much latent anti-
Semitism’: 
The Manchester Daily Dispatch, for instance, published a letter in which it was 
suggested Jewish names predominated in black market prosecutions, army dodging 
trials, clothing coupon rackets, petrol ramps and the like, the writer suggesting that 
the Jews should be put in their place.27  
    
An investigator reported this letter was widely discussed and quoted various remarks, 
including ‘there’s no doubt they (the Jews) have too much power’, ‘stinking lot of 
cowards they are, the Jews’ and ‘Jews shops are always stocked up’.28 An 
accompanying survey of Mass Observation's national panel of observers – credited in 
the report as: ‘a section of the population more intelligent and better informed’ – 
revealed that only 25 per cent of them felt ‘favourable’ towards Jews and even as late 
as January 1944 another Mass Observation survey revealed that 24 per cent of the 
population wanted stricter controls on the activities of British Fascists but only two 
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per cent saw the need for curbs on anti-Semitism.29 Societies and clubs openly 
excluded Jews and the author Douglas Reed used anti-Semitic themes in his novels, 
including Insanity Fair, published in 1938, the storyline for which had Jews taking 
over London.30 Interestingly for this thesis, Reed ended the war as the foreign editor 
for Kemsley Newspapers, the publishers of Manchester’s Evening Chronicle, despite 
his association with extreme anti-Semitic organisations.31   
 Ironically, the bombing of the capital initially centred on the East End, which 
before the war had provided a geographical foundation for the anti-Semitic British 
Union of Fascists.32 This was a poor area largely comprising Victorian slums and so 
densely populated that 200,000 people lived in Stepney, for example, at an average of 
12 people per dwelling.33 ‘Everybody is worried about the feeling in the East End,’ 
Nicolson wrote in his diary on 17 September, ‘where there is much bitterness. It is 
said that even the King and Queen were booed the other day when they visited the 
destroyed areas.’34 There was profound anger in the bombed areas of Stepney, West 
Ham, Poplar and London Docks that did not spill over into total panic, but was a long 
way removed from the popular image of the wisecracking Cockney undaunted by the 
destruction.35 Bernard Kops, a boy in the East End, recalled the awfulness of seeking 
an undignified and cramped shelter on London Tube platforms: 
Some people feel a certain nostalgia for those days, recall a poetic dream about the 
Blitz. They talk about those days as if they were time of true communal spirit. Not 
to me. It was the beginning of an era of utter terror, of fear and horror. 36  
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Calder stated that certain versions of the Blitz suggested ‘it was a mean and 
pusillanimous Londoner indeed who did not emerge from the debris with a wisecrack 
on his lips’.37 He noted, however, that it was often hysteria that produced the witty 
remarks and often the purveyors of this earthy humour were found sobbing 
uncontrollably a few hours later. For example, William Sansom cited an anecdote 
where an elderly woman refused to leave her stew-pot she was stirring amid the ruins 
of her bombed-out house. To humour her, a stretcher-bearer agreed to taste her food 
only to find the pan was full of plaster and bricks.38  
 When Coventry was badly bombed on 14 November, the Daily Express 
reported the city was stricken ‘but keeps its courage and sanity’.39 Three Home 
Intelligence inspectors disagreed: 
There were more open signs of hysteria, terror, neurosis, observed in one evening 
than during the whole of the past two months together in all areas. Women were 
seen to cry, to scream, to tremble all over, to faint in the street, to attack a fireman, 
and so on. The overwhelmingly dominant feeling on Friday was the feeling of utter 
helplessness… There were several signs of suppressed panic as darkness 
approached. In two cases people were seen to be fighting to get on to cars, which 
they thought would take them out into the country, though in fact, the drivers 
insisted, the cars were just going up the road to the garage.40   
   
Knightley wrote that the reaction of the local population was ignored because it did 
not fit the myth.41 Newspapers were complicit in this, often without urging from the 
authorities yet, curiously, obliquely acknowledged the destruction of Coventry, and 
the German use of Coventration or Coventried, later in the war: 
British newspapers, adept as always at turning the serious into the trivial, made 
many cute usages in aid of morale. One was the term Coventried to describe any 
place as bomb-ruined as Coventry. This led ultimately to such a headline as 
‘Hamburg has been Hamburgered’.42 
 
                                            
37 Calder, People’s War, p. 187. 
38 William Sansom, The Blitz: Westminster at War, 3rd edn (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), p. 63. 
39 “A Very Gallant City’, Daily Express, 16 November 1940, p. 1.  
40 Mass Observation, FR 495. 
41 Knightley, First Casualty, p. 262. 
42 Fussell, Wartime, p.148. 
  
209
One psychiatrist estimated that children who stayed in Bristol were eight times 
more likely to be psychologically disturbed than those who were evacuated and there 
are other disturbing statistics testifying to the mental strain the bombing imposed.43 
There was a 100 per cent rise in the number of teenage girls arrested in the three years 
after 1939, more infants than usual were suffocated in their cots or choked on their 
food, more children were killed on the roads even though there were fewer cars and 
more children drowned. Paradoxically, the suicide rate fell.44 
 
3. Crime and Newspaper Coverage of the Courts  
Reported crimes rose from 303,711 in England and Wales in 1939 to 478,394 
in 1945 and the number of people convicted went up 54 per cent.45 Police numbers in 
England and Wales fell from 82,232 to 59,574 during the war, and the average age 
rose as younger constables were conscripted, but the high number of convictions 
points to a significant increase in criminal acts and to the numbers attracted by 
crime.46 Duncan Campbell, a former crime correspondent for The Guardian, said on 
BBC Radio: ‘In many ways the war was a criminal watershed. Hundreds of 
emergency regulations protected the nation but many were seen as petty, even 
ludicrous, and led to a loss of respect for the law.47   
The imposition of rationing and the consequent black market led to a rise in 
pilfering from work, threefold in Birkenhead docks during 1940, and shortly after the 
outbreak of war 500 policemen had to be sent to France to stop mass thefts from the 
British Expeditionary Force.48 There were looters raiding bombed out houses in 
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search of recoverable booty and on 8 March 1941 a notorious incident occurred when 
two bombs hit the underground Café de Paris, in the West End, when it was packed 
with Canadian nurses and young officers on leave, killing 34.49 Delays by the 
emergency services led to an inquiry and several unsavory incidents, including rings 
and jewelry being stripped from dead bodies by thieves.50  
Although Lord Northcliffe was not the first to realise the importance of crime 
reporting to newspapers – the historian Dr Andrew Cook has put forward the theory 
that Jack The Ripper was a forgery invented by journalists who linked a series of 
unrelated murders in 1888 to boost circulations – the founder of the Daily Mail, did 
articulate the attraction of courts and justice to editors.51 Williams wrote: ‘He placed 
great emphasis on crime stories as a staple feature of the paper. Crime featured 
prominently with interviews with murderers as well as the police. Northcliffe’s motto 
was “get me a murder a day”.’52  
Court reporting is a staple item in every newspaper because it forms easily and 
regularly acquired copy and because ‘courts are a marvellous source of human 
interest and crime stories’.53 Throughout the study period, the Manchester Guardian, 
Manchester Evening News and the Evening Chronicle gave significant amounts of 
space to reporting the courts, devoting approximately a page in the case of the 
evening newspapers and around half a page in the Guardian. In a time when much of 
the news was subject to censorship and travel and communication were complicated 
by air raids and bomb damage, the attraction of guaranteed news stories that could be 
reported without restriction, other than those that normally applied to court reporting, 
was obvious.  
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All three newspapers reported court cases at length, becoming what Keeble 
described as ‘part of the judicial process’, as publicising the crime adds ‘public shame 
to the punishment’. None of the newspapers made the link between the special 
circumstances of war and the degree of lawlessness they provoked, however, and in 
doing so they failed to fulfil the role accorded to journalism that McNair described as 
the ‘orderly reproduction of democratic societies’.54 Hylton noted: ‘There were new 
classes of offence for people to commit in a heavily regulated wartime society, and 
the opportunity to commit them was enhanced by the cover of the blackout and the 
substantial reduction in police numbers.’55 This was reflected in the reports in 
Manchester’s newspapers, most notably on 1 January 1941 when the Guardian 
reported the comments of Noel B. Goldie, the Recorder at Manchester Quarter 
Sessions. The judicial officer noted there were 56 youths before him on indictable 
offences and said ‘something had to be done’. He added: 
I have no doubt that in the first instance it was due to a lack of parental control, but 
I have a strong suspicion that receivers in this great city are using youths for the 
purpose of committing these most serious offences… We are, in Manchester at the 
moment breeding a race of young criminals.56  
 
 On 9 January the Manchester Evening News contributed to this debate under 
the headline ‘Looting becoming serious in Manchester, court told’.57 On the same 
page it was noted that Manchester had suffered a three-fold increase in crime in a 
three-month period, Recorder Goldie blaming a lack of parental control: ‘It is not 
merely an increase in petty pilfering. We are now getting serious crimes such as 
breaking and entering. And the boys who are responsible show complete hardness 
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when they are caught.‘58 Below the story were other headlines: ‘50-mile joy ride in 
van’, ‘Roaming town like wild things’, ‘Gas meters robbed in bombed houses’ and  
‘Father suspected own son’.59 All the accused were aged between nine and 14. 
Later that month the Manchester Evening News columnist Eileen Elias commented:  
The gangsters are here. No, this is not something from an American film. Police, 
parents and magistrates wish it were. It is just a plain statement of fact about the 
country today in the midst of war.  
 
For juvenile crime is on the increase. In Manchester alone during the past three 
months it has trebled. Never before have we been faced with so serious a problem 
in the life of young Britain.60 
 
Other than references to breaks in education and the lack of parental 
control caused by absentee parents, including called-up fathers, no link was made to 
the effect of raids on young attitudes. However, Roy Lee, a teenager in 1940, 
articulated the sense of life’s pointlessness once his best friend Matthew was killed in 
the Manchester Blitz:   
When he went my clock stopped ticking. I remember saying to myself: ‘That’s it. 
No matter what happens now it could be me tomorrow.’ I made up my mind there 
and then to live for me and my mum and to hell with everyone else.61 
 
Lee and his friends would wait for the all clear and then loot bombed-out buildings. 
He added: 
Obviously money was the first thing you looked for, and then, of course, there was 
always food, packets of tea and this, that and the other, anything that had been 
blown up in people’s kitchens. You never handed it back. Anything that was 
worthwhile we just stuck in our pockets and away we’d go.62 
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Lee lived in Manchester but his case was not exceptional. Gardiner said that looting 
was the ‘largely unspoken, unacknowledged underside of the “blitz spirit”, the fissure 
that crazed the pulling together to face a common enemy – and it was widespread’.63  
Had journalists examined this underside they would have noticed it was not 
just youths who were reacting to the war by disregarding the law but people who 
normally would be regarded as pillars of the society. So it was a war reserve 
policeman (aged 34) and a customs office watcher (46) who were convicted of 
stealing 12 bottles of whisky, a 30-year-old soldier who was given a three-month 
prison sentence for looting and a 39-year-old shop keeper charged with stealing £4 10 
shillings in cash and a £20 cash register from a bombed out inn.64 An Air Raid Patrol 
officer was gaoled for ‘neglecting duty’, beginning his one-month’s sentence to the 
words of the Manchester Stipendiary Magistrate, who said: ‘If you had lived under a 
different regime you might have been shot.’65 Violent crime did not end with the 
violence of the bomb either and during the eight-week study period of this thesis the 
Evening Chronicle reported that two soldiers would be executed for domestic 
murders.66 Finally, as the thesis referred to earlier, there was a report of a political 
execution when it was announced Charles Albert van den Kieboom, a 26-year-old 
Dutch clerk would hang at Pentonville Prison for spying.67 He was the third spy to be 
executed in seven days, following Jose Waldberg and Karl Meir to the gallows. All 
three were found in possession of a wireless transmitter. 
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4. Letters to the Editor 
The feedback loops that ensure there is a two-way communication between 
newspapers and their audience were discussed in earlier chapters, but the most overt 
come in the readers’ letters column. These form an important part of a newspaper in 
that they ‘enable both the press and the readership to keep an ear to the ground and 
listen in to some of the leading themes of local conversation’.68 All readers’ letters are 
subject to the gate-keeping of journalists, however, and Karin Wahl-Jorgensen listed 
four criteria by which letters are selected for publication. These are the letter’s 
entertainment value, its brevity, the writer’s authority and command of English and, 
finally, its relevance or news-worthiness.69 All four criteria are open to the kind of 
journalistic judgements that have previously been considered, but the last is 
particularly so as readers’ attempts to introduce their own items to the news agenda 
will ‘almost invariably fail’.70 With newspapers promoting the notion of unity, not 
many letters contradicting this theme would have been allowed in the newspaper.  
Nevertheless, the Manchester Guardian allowed its readers to criticise both 
itself and the government over the suppression of the Daily Worker, a decision that 
prompted a series of letters. The Guardian’s editorial on the subject concluded: ‘The 
Daily Worker did not believe in the war or in democracy; its only aim was to confuse 
and weaken. We can well spare it.’71  This was a surprising position given the 
Guardian’s stance on pre-war freedoms in Nazi Germany and a majority of the letters 
printed on the subject condemned it. The comments included: ‘It is a step which the 
executive of a democratic country should never take’; ‘We have taken a perilous step 
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towards the totalitarian concept of journalism’; ‘Criticism has been driven 
underground’, and ‘Why use a Coalition steam-hammer to crack a Communist nut?’72 
Crozier was forced to defend the Guardian’s position, stating: ‘We would hold 
strongly that freedom to criticise the executive is as vital in time of war as it is in 
peace,’ before adding the critical qualification ‘subject to the inevitable abridgements 
that a virtual state of siege may impose’. This is a key point because Crozier was 
accepting, and transmitting to his readers, the ‘necessary’ role of the press in time of 
war. Later in his response he wrote that the suppression of the Daily Worker was a 
‘choice of evils’.73   
This thesis has shown the Manchester Guardian’s eagerness to criticise was 
overstated by Crozier, but the readers were less inhibited (or the censors were more 
willing to allow them to be). In December 1940 a letter noted that the shortage of 
workers in munitions and aeroplane factories had not prevented advertisements in a 
London newspaper requesting two footmen, at least 5ft 10in tall, for ‘a noblemen’s 
establishment’ and another two footmen to join a ‘large staff’ in London and 
Windsor. This, the writer, wrote was ‘deeply shocking’.74 Three days later another 
letter condemned the sentence of 10 years handed down to two young policemen for 
looting. ‘I read the news with feelings of horror at the severe sentence,’ it read, ‘and 
have since watched the press for some sign of charity and mercy, which I have failed 
to notice.’75 On 30 December 1940 seven students wrote a letter about the conditions 
sheltering in London’s tube stations. ‘Do the authorities really think that 12 sanitary 
                                            
72 ‘The Right of Criticism’, Manchester Guardian, 27 January 1941, p. 8; ‘A Blow at Freedom of the 
Press’, Manchester Guardian, 28 January 1941, p.10; ‘The Right of Public Criticism’, Manchester 
Guardian, 4 February 1941, p. 10; ‘Some Probable Effects’, Manchester Guardian, 6 February 1941, 
p. 10.  
73 ‘Risks of Stifling Criticism’, Manchester Guardian, 1 February 1941, p. 4.  
74 ‘Service and Sahibs’, Manchester Guardian, 16 December 1940, p. 8. 
75 ‘Crime and Punishment’, Manchester Guardian, 19 December 1940, p. 10. 
  
216
buckets are sufficient for 2,000 people?’ they asked.76 These letters point to dis-
satisfaction and hint at a lack of common purpose but were not followed up with any 
vigour by the press. This is more evidence of journalistic participation in the creation 
of the narrative desired by the government.  
Home Intelligence reported that ‘serious, long letters’ were published only in 
The Times, the Daily Telegraph and the Manchester Guardian, and the Manchester 
Evening News, which comprised six pages compared to the Guardian’s 10, gave less 
space to readers’ views, averaging two a week over the study period.77 There was 
little sense of criticism, and what there was referred to the public rather than the 
authorities.78 No letter pertained to the Manchester Blitz until 2 January and the two 
published thanked a team of women voluntary helpers for their work in a rest centre 
and a Mr Eastwood, a greengrocer, who had given the keys of his shop to a local 
rector so that the homeless could have ‘the run of the shop’.79 There were only hints at 
social divisions, the first signed by ‘Query’, who articulated the class antagonism 
noted elsewhere when asking of a woman who employed two maids: ‘Would she not 
be more patriotic if she were merely to do all her own housework and thereby release 
two women for whole-time national work?’ In February ‘Share Alike’ from 
Levenshulme (south east Manchester) wrote that he was pleased to see the 
Manchester Evening News ‘had the courage to criticise landlords who refuse to make 
a contribution towards the cost of long ladders to protect their own property’.80 Given 
that the newspaper had neglected to confront the authorities over their lack of 
                                            
76 ‘Shelter Conditions in Tube Stations’, Manchester Guardian, 30 December 1940, p. 8. 
77 Mass Observation, FR 126.  
78 The observation of December 1940 was typical: ‘So, once more, even in time of war the mails are to 
be cluttered up with Christmas cards.’(Letter’, Manchester Evening News, 21 December 1940, p. 2.) 
79 ‘Letters’, Manchester Evening News, 2 January 1941, p. 2.  
80 ‘Letters’, Manchester Evening News, 5 February 1941, p. 2. 
  
217
preparation for, and reaction to, the Blitz, it would a difficult to endorse this alleged 
‘courage’ with evidence.  
The Evening Chronicle also had relatively few letters and hardly any were 
critical. Some had an almost child-like belief in official communiqués and press 
propaganda, particularly a correspondent named as ‘Chins Up’, who wrote:   
Reading that Germans living in the much bombed Rhineland and Ruhr industrial 
towns don’t bother to go to their shelter now in RAF raids because they have 
learned that British pilots stick to industrial targets, and that when the warning of 
an RAF raid is given factory workers quit their jobs and move into residential 
districts for their safety, one wonders why, in the view of the Luftwaffe’s methods, 
we should take such care to restrict the RAF to military targets. The only way to 
reply to the Nazi tactics is bombs and more bombs. 81 
 
Readers’ letters are subject to the gate-keeping referred to above and there could have 
been other, less belligerent and believing, letters that did not make it to print. ‘Chins 
Up’ could also have been a journalist asked to push the newspaper’s particular point 
of view by an alternative means, but a publication would rapidly lose credibility if 
letters were consistently too far removed from the prevailing mood. On 1 January, for 
example, ‘Chins Up’ was followed by an un-named correspondent, who wrote: ‘By 
far the largest majority of the public are indignant that we do not serve the enemies 
with similar raids to those suffered by our towns and cities.’82 Ten days later 
‘Common Sense’ wrote: ‘They should have the same medicine,’ adding, ‘we have 
been told the number of air raid casualties in this county. Has Germany published her 
figures?’83 These letters pointed to a desire for retribution that Hastings claimed was a 
result of government propaganda: 
Only a limited number of British and American people gave much thought to the 
fate of Germany beneath air bombardment, partly because their governments 
persistently deceived them about the nature of the campaign: the reality of area 
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bombing, the targeting of cities, was concealed beneath verbiage about industrial 
installations.’84 
  
The only hint of criticism of the local authorities in the Evening Chronicle’s letters 
column, came on 24 January when a correspondent questioned the assertion that 
bombed-out families had been rehoused. The correspondent said he knew of one 
family who had been moved in with other people ‘making a total of 10 in one house, 
with three small bedrooms’.85 
 
5. Conclusion 
The above evidence suggests that newspapers allowed their readers limited 
scope to criticise through their letters, although it could be argued these served to add 
to the newspapers’ fictive ‘fourth estate’ mantle. If there had been allegations that 
they were too willing to voice the opinions of the powerful they could have offered 
this as evidence to the contrary. The attack on nameless landlords by the Manchester 
Evening News, for example, was a cheap assertion of the newspaper’s independence 
that would not have cost it nothing in terms of political approval or revenue but would 
have reinforced a notional position of independence. 
      Even before the war started the Daily Mirror was promoting a message of 
constancy. ‘Cheerfulness was the keynote of Britain’s people in the hours of crisis 
yesterday,’ it printed in August 1939. It added: ‘We’ve always come smilin’ 
through.’86 This theme became the default position of the press, local and national, 
but among the wider newspaper reading public there was a more balanced reaction to 
the war that included less positive expressions than smiles. People managed because 
there was no alternative. London was bombed heavily first and the ‘Cheerful 
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Cockney’, precisely because this fiction was established by the press ab initio, 
became the template by which the populations in other cities would judge themselves. 
The hegemonic success of newspapers in persuading readers of this desired 
perspective was revealed when Home Intelligence, a government monitor of the 
public’s mood, reported that people outside London had an exaggerated impression of 
the damage being inflicted on the capital but believed that ‘if London can take it, so 
can we’.87  
With such a determined effort to emphasise and even manufacture good news, 
it is not a surprise that no newspaper properly examined social tensions or the drift 
towards lawlessness by a significant number of people bombed out of their normal 
patterns of behaviour. While it would be overstating the case to say there was large-
scale opposition to the war, the country had suffered deep divisions in the 1930s and 
it would have been remarkable if these merely evaporated under the threat of 
invasion. This chapter has shown that crime was reported and statistics published but 
the link between the effects of the war and criminal activity was never established. 
Crime rose, industrial relations were strained and social tension grew. The Blitz 
exposed shortcomings at local level that, in Manchester’s case, will be examined in 
the next chapter, and the host of regulations that encouraged many to disobey or 
disregard. There were alternative views, but, an occasional letter to the editor apart, 
they were neglected by the newspapers. Marie Price, from Liverpool, remembered an 
atmosphere that differed from what she read on the press and saw in the newsreels:  
Churchill was telling us how brave we all were and that we would never surrender. 
I tell you something – the people of Liverpool would have surrendered overnight if 
they could have. It's all right for people in authority, down in their steel-lined 
dugouts, but we were there and it was just too awful.88 
 
                                            
87 Mass Observation, Box 1, Propaganda, 18 September 1940.  
88 Levine, Forgotten Voices p. 412. 
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Circulations rose between 1939 and 1945 but so did the disillusionment with 
newspapers and, despite the bombing, surveys indicated that the lack of interest in the 
war rose from 10 per cent in spring 1940 to nearly a third by the end of that year.89 
Curran and Seaton summed up the mood in the civilian ranks not so much as all in 
this together as ‘us’ against ‘them’: ‘The opposition was as much to the unbelievable 
bureaucracy of British administration as to the Nazis themselves.’90 This harked back 
to pre-war social tensions and, as a consequence, Britons displayed a complex set of 
attitudes that did not merely reflect the homogeneous and monolithic approval of the 
government and the war. Instead, the general reluctant assent to the conflict was 
sublimated into criticisms of the rich, the press and politicians, only a small amount of 
which was given a platform in Britain’s newspapers.  
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90 Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, p. 126.  
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Chapter 8 
Manchester in the Aftermath of the Blitz 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will use extracts compiled from the Mass Observation and Home 
Intelligence Archive at the University of Sussex to show that the contemporary 
opinions expressed in 1940 and 1941 often were at odds to what was being reported in 
national and local newspapers. The evidence points to people being scared, depressed 
and openly discussing whether the suffering brought on by the Second World War 
was worth it, sentiments never confronted by the press.  
The above records were first compiled to provide evidence for the government 
to test the national mood between 1939 and 1945, but the Manchester focus of this 
thesis means most emphasis will be placed on reports from or about the city. 
Particular attention will be applied to the communiqués of a lorry driver who reported 
from four miles outside the centre and who demonstrated that at times morale in 
Manchester deviated considerably from the official portrayal. His lengthy and detailed 
dispatches also hint at changes in behaviour that may have been the symptoms of 
stress.1  
He noted that the collapse in morale was most obvious in the immediate 
aftermath of the Manchester Blitz, which endorsed another Home Intelligence report 
that looked at public opinion in Manchester in January 1941, a matter of days after its 
principal bombing.2 As previous chapters have shown, no hint of the mood of 
Mancunian despair appeared in the press and these optimistic news columns, 
ironically, were blamed by the official report for making matters even worse in the 
                                            
1 Mass Observation, FR 620. 
2 Mass Observation, FR 538. 
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city. The chapter will also examine the recollections of people caught in the 
Manchester Blitz stored in Stockport Library.  
 
2. Mass Observation 
The initial impetus behind the launch of Mass Observation was provided by 
the Abdication Crisis in 1936. Three men, ornithologist and anthropologist Tom 
Harrisson, poet and Daily Mirror journalist Charles Madge, and film-maker 
Humphrey Jennings, were disappointed by the perceptions of public opinion being 
reported in the press and decided to collect more reliable data.3 Their ambition was to 
construct ‘an anthropology of ourselves’ and monitor the effect of society on 
individuals.4 This was provided by volunteers, who maintained diaries or answered 
questionnaires, and by paid investigators, who anonymously recorded conversations 
and monitored behaviour at work and on the streets. The subjects of the reports and 
the correspondents were not in positions of power, and, beyond their immediate 
family and local communities, had little influence. As one of Mass Observation’s 
leaflets put it: 
Intellectuals find it hard to express themselves [but] observation comes naturally to 
people who are living in the thick of work-a-day existence. Among our best 
Observers are a mechanic, a coalminer, a waiter, a clerk, a housewife (middle 
class) and a housewife (working class). 5 
 
Looking from the context of the twenty-first century, this comes across as 
patronising, and it would be pertinent to question the criteria used to define middle 
and working class, but a modern perspective is not required to find voices for and 
                                            
3 Penny Summerfield ‘Mass Observation: Social Research or Social Movement’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 20, 3 (1985), 439-52 (p. 440); Benjamin Jones, ‘Mass Observation 75 Years 
On: the Extraordinary in the Everyday’ (Guardian, 2012) 
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2013]. 
4 Garfield, We Are at War, p. 1. 
5 Ibid, p. 2. 
  
223
against the project. Mass Observation also had its contemporary supporters and 
critics, some claiming it heralded a new form of social research while others 
complained it was simply snooping. Turner noted: 
Evelyn Waugh complained of ‘pseudoscientific showmanship’. During World War 
Two a minute by an official in the Ministry of Home Security described Mass 
Observation reports on Blitz morale as ‘a most extraordinary mixture of fact, 
fiction and dangerous mischief’ emanating apparently from ‘the intelligentsia’.6 
 
The sense of intrusion was reinforced when the Ministry of Information created the 
Home Intelligence unit at the outset of the Second World War, commandeering the 
Mass Observation reports and investigations by the Wartime Social Survey, an 
organisation established in April 1940 to investigate questions of sociological 
importance.7 These became part of a network of sources supplemented by Home 
Intelligence’s regional officers, who compiled material from shopkeepers, publicans, 
clergymen, shop stewards and others who regularly came into contact with the public.  
On the Channel 5 Dr Jeremy Crang of Edinburgh University said: 
Little did the people of Britain know that the government was secretly opening 
their letters and listening into their telephone conversations and, what I find most 
surprising, is that GPs were monitoring attitudes of their patients and reporting 
these to Home Intelligence. This was in effect the British government 
eavesdropping on the British people.8  
 
Some on the political left felt they were being singled out for attention and on the 
same programme Bill Grave, a trade unionist during the war, expressed his anger: 
Those that knew were incensed. They said we are fighting a war for freedom and 
this stupidity is going on… It was the working class were being picked on by these 
snobby people, from public schools. They picked on the little people and it was 
resented, very much so.9 
 
If the reception was mixed, so was the reaction of the contributors. Some 
correspondents feared that, in a climate where people were being fined or threatened 
                                            
6 E. S. Turner, ‘Snooping’, London Review of Books, 3,18 (1981), pp. 23-24. 
7 Kathleen Box and Geoffrey Thomas, ‘The Wartime Social Survey’, Journal of the Royal Statistical 
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with prison for despondency, they might be laying themselves open to prosecution. 
For example, Christopher Tomlin, a writing paper salesman from Fulwood in Preston, 
wrote in July 1940: ‘I must confess I’m nervous of this diary being in authorities’ 
[sic] hands. It might get me a year or at least six months.’10  Six months earlier, 
however, Tomlin had explained the appeal: 
The reason why I am keen on Mass Observation is because it wants to know and 
inform, tell all classes about the emotions, acts, thoughts and struggles of the 
ordinary or ‘average’ man and woman. Too many articles and books are on high-
flown subjects, there are none about the prosaic things or everyday. 11 
 
Starting in Bolton, Lancashire, the first event that Mass Observation 
monitored was the coronation of George VI on 12 May 1937 when 12 observers were 
asked to move around during the day ‘noting down what they saw and heard’.12 The 
scope and the reach of the reports soon spread, however, so that the whole of Britain 
was covered when the Second World War began in 1939, although its claims that it 
had 2,000 amateur observers were ingenuous. Calder and Sheridan stated that, 
excluding one-off replies, only 1,095 people joined the reporting panel between 1939 
and 1945 and that very few of those did so without a break.13 More typically, between 
200 and 500 were reporting regularly so that the figure of 400 who replied to a 
questionnaire on ‘class’ in the summer of 1939 was not abnormal. Women accounted 
for a third of these respondents, another third was made up of unmarried men aged 
under 25, and 60 per cent of the total were aged under 35.14 Calder and Sheridan 
wrote: 
The ‘typical’ male Mass Observer was a young clerk or student, the ‘typical’ 
female was a teacher or middle-class housewife. Unrepresentative of Britain’s 
population as to age and sex, the Panel was also ‘skewed’ geographically, with a 
very heavy bias towards the South-East of England. Does this mean that the Panel 
                                            
10 Mass Observation, cited in Garfield, We Are at War, p. 1. 
11 Ibid, pp. 1-2. 
12 Summerfield, ‘Mass Observation’, p. 440.  
13 Calder and Sheridan, Speak for Yourself, p. 73. 
14 Ibid, p. 74. 
  
225
was sociologically worthless? Certainly not. It gave… access to the private 
opinions of hundreds of people.15   
 
 The government allied the Mass Observation reports to those being compiled 
by Mary Adams and Home Intelligence to monitor the mood of a population under 
fire. Initially, the government was reluctant to use Mass Observation, some detractors 
charging its members as being ‘a bunch of dangerous pinkos’, and there was a 
preference for using the Secret Service instead.16 Adams argued, however, that Mass 
Observation was more in touch with people’s feelings than any official, writing:  
The results of Mass Observation are, not unnaturally, critical of certain social 
happenings and I do not think that criticism is subversive. The use to which 
criticisms may be put may lead to subversive actions. But it is our business to 
acquaint ourselves with criticisms and direct the attention of those in authority to 
the causes of discontent.17 
 
The private opinions expressed in Mass Observation’s reports showed that, 
contrary to the approved image, many were close to breaking point, something 
Harrisson confirmed in a report in the British Medical Journal in April 1941. In it he 
acknowledged he was a biologist rather than a doctor, but nevertheless he felt that the 
reports of low degrees of nervousness were faulty. There was evidence, he wrote, that 
people had left the bombed areas, found a refuge, ‘and then caved in’. The report 
continued: 
In some cases they have simply taken to bed and stayed in bed for weeks at a time. 
They have not shown the marked trembling of hysteria, but an extreme desire to 
retreat into sleep and be looked after, as if chronically ill. We have found such 
cases mainly among women but also among men and children.18 
 
One of Harrisson’s Mass Observation reporters, LE in Streatham, south London, 
reported in January 1941 that morale was ‘lower than ever before’ and that there was 
                                            
15 Ibid. 
16 Gardiner, The Blitz, p. 169. 
17 Ibid. 
18 British Medical Journal, 12 April 1941, cited in Gardiner, The Blitz, pp. 190-91.  
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a strong feeling of ’how futile it all is’.19 L. E. added: ‘This for the most part has not 
developed into a Stop-the-War feeling, though one local rumour (unfounded as far as 
inv [investigator] can see) reports a Stop-the-War meeting in a local road.’20 This 
wholly contradicted the newspapers, The Times being typical. On the same day it 
reported that the Minister for Labour Ernest Bevin had told the Transport and General 
Workers Union: ‘I sincerely trust that this year will bring us victory.’21 The tone could 
hardly have been more different. L. E. also recorded a ‘typical’ conversation: ‘I don’t 
think I can stand it if it goes on much longer like this, night after night, coming down 
all around us. I must go away.’22 Kathleen Box’s report of a conversation in Fulham 
at the height of the London Blitz on 14 October 1940 was also pessimistic: ‘Sleep! 
You can’t sleep. We can’t go on like this can we? It can’t go on…They’ll have to do 
something about it soon or there’ll be a revolution.’23   
The newspapers did not print these cries of helplessness or mutinous 
belligerence, but Home Intelligence did report on the newspapers. Earlier it was noted 
that a survey in May 1940 reported that distrust in the press had increased and a year 
later Stephen Taylor, in an appendix to a regular Home Intelligence report, Home 
Morale and Public Opinion, wrote that Fleet Street exercised considerable influence 
when it came to foreign news ‘as the public as a whole has no means of cross 
checking’, but at home it was less powerful.24 ‘The public often makes up its mind on 
its own experience before the press knows anything about it.’ Taylor added: 
So far the most calamitous events have been turned to mental profit by the British 
public. Thus, the collapse of France was treated along these lines:– ‘At last, we’re 
on our own and there’s no-one else to let us down; now we’ve really got to get on 
                                            
19 Many correspondents preferred to use initials rather than their full names; Mass Observation, Box 1, 
Propaganda. 
20 Ibid. 
21 ‘Mr Bevin on the Work of Reconstruction’, Times, 14 January 1941, p. 2. 
22 Mass Observation, Box 1 Propaganda. 
23 Calder and Sheridan, Speak for Yourself, p. 85. 
24 Mass Observation, FR 126; Mass Observation, Box 1 Propaganda, 1 October 1941. 
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with the job.’ Again, the Blitz was converted from a thing of terror to a symbol of 
pride and toughness. ‘Our Blitz was worse than yours – and look at us.’25 
 
Taylor drew a distinction between the national and local press, regarding the latter as 
a more reliable indicator, and creator, of public opinion. The reporters, he argued, 
came from the community and therefore were more aware of the pulse beating in the 
surrounding streets, and that the newspapers could devote a greater share of its space 
to local happenings and news, which influenced opinion.26 Taylor’s perception of the 
local press was generous. Haley, the editor of the Manchester Evening News, wrote 
about his journey to work in the post-Blitz city in his diary on 29 December 1940: 
‘For four days afterwards one walked through a line of soldiers with drawn bayonets 
down Piccadilly.’27 That alarming entry not only evokes a striking visual image at 
odds with the propaganda of the time but also implied that the troops were there to 
prevent lawlessness breaking out in the bombed out centre of Manchester.  Not a 
word, or even a hint, of this appeared in Haley’s newspaper and nor did it appear in 
other local or national newspapers. 
  While L. E. and Kathleen Box were writing diary entries in or close to the 
capital, Bill Naughton was compiling reports for Mass Observation from Manchester. 
Not to be confused with the Bolton-born playwright of the same name who also 
reported from London for Mass Observation in the war, Naughton was described as a 
‘very intelligent lorry driver’ by an anonymous official.28 He lived on Wilbraham 
Road, Fallowfield, four miles south east of the city centre, and wrote of a ‘Blitz 
complex’ in January 1941 in the days after the Manchester bombings that was 
exposed by absenteeism from work. He reported that his own firm, a distributor of 
fruit and vegetables, was operating at 20 per cent of the pre-Blitz norm, partly 
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because of the bomb damage that disrupted transport but mainly because of the 
attitudes of the employees.29 He reported that ‘sharp extremes of mental and moral 
feelings were manifest’ and followed geographical lines. 30 Those who lived outside 
Manchester were philosophical about the damage to their city centre, those whose 
homes were closer to the Blitzed areas were near to total dejection. Naughton 
reported: ‘In the bombed areas where homes, personal belongings and relatives were 
lost, the morale was shockingly low. I visited three rest centres... the misery and 
despair of the people were past description.’31 This evidence of contrasting moods set 
by the geographical proximity to the bombing coincided with the response of the 
Manchester Evening News editor, Haley, who, 13 miles away in Disley, Derbyshire, 
reacted in wonder as well as horror to the first night of bombing. Haley wrote in his 
diary:  
The whole Manchester part of the horizon was amazingly lit up by hundreds of 
flares. It was so remarkable a sight that we took all the children up to our bedroom 
to see it, then hurried them back to shelter.32 
 
Compare Naughton’s observations with what was appearing in the local 
newspapers – The Evening Chronicle reported on 27 December 1940: ‘Manchester is 
rapidly assuming its normal workday aspect after the Blitz. Its countenance may be 
scarred and in some parts battered, but the people, after the Christmas respite, 
returned to work with determination.’– and there was little wonder that the public 
began to lose faith in what they were reading. 33 Two months later, on 19 March, 
Naughton recorded conversations in Manchester about the bombing of Merseyside 
and Clydeside: 
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People were shocked by the high death toll. I repeatedly heard the expressions: 
‘It’s not war, just wholesale murder’, ‘it can’t go on long this sort of thing, there’s 
going to be nothing left fighting for’, ‘if they admit 500 dead you can bet it’s 
nearer 5,000’.34 
 
In his Manchester Industrial Survey, Naughton gave an insight into how he 
and other Mass Observation reporters gathered their information. On a week’s holiday 
in 1941 he moved to parts of Manchester and the North where he was unknown and 
had to earn the trust of the locals:  
If one spoke different; wore better or unusual clothes; was alone; a stranger; or 
kept silent (this instantly creates a ‘taking it all in’ impression) or even asked for a 
Worthington Bass or glass of whisky, instead of a mild, then somebody became 
suspicious… In Manchester it is necessary to display a facile use of the only two 
swearing adjectives, and it was my correct use of ‘Fuckin’ and ‘Bleedin’ that gave 
me the hospitality of the conversation in the somewhat esoteric locals. In transport 
cafes and works canteens, I always wore a greasy boiler suit and grubby hands…I 
never ask a question, but often start an argument.35 
 
     His report also gave an insight into how behaviour was changing in the 
war-time conditions. More beer, Guinness in particular, he reported, was being 
consumed and quoted one licensee as saying: ‘I sell more beer in a dinner hour in one 
day than I used to do in a week.’36 Moral and personal values, too, may have been 
affected by the potential of imminent death and Naughton wrote that munitions 
factories had a ‘bad name’ in the North for illicit intercourse during night shifts. 
‘Most girls are ashamed of admitting they work at Risley or Euxton munition 
factories.’37 It is not possible to corroborate these claims, the drinking might be an 
exaggeration and the latter mere gossip, though both are indicators of stress and 
symptoms of suffering that went unreported in the press.38 Hylton wrote: 
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The relationship between warfare and heightened sexual activity had been 
understood long before the Second World War. In his 1917 work Reflections on 
War and Death, Sigmund Freud talked of ‘war aphrodisia’ – the link between 
violence and eroticism. Originally it applied only to those in the armed forces who 
were directly involved in conflict, but the age of total war brought soldier and 
civilian alike into the front line… The sense of living for today, lest there were no 
tomorrow, found its way equally into the civilian population.39  
 
3. Home Intelligence’s Report on Manchester and Liverpool  
The bombings of Liverpool and Manchester in the pre-Christmas period of 
1940 provoked a quick reaction from a government anxious to monitor morale in 
Blitzed cities. Liverpool was visited by four Home Intelligence observers in late 
December and three of that quartet began working in Manchester on 4 January. The 
inspectors reported that they received an ‘exceptional degree of other voluntary 
observational help’ from Manchester’s social workers who were described as ‘high 
quality’ but whose services were ‘practically unused and completely uncoordinated in 
relation to Blitz problems’.40 The contrast between Liverpool and Manchester hit the 
inspectors immediately. ‘MORALE IN LIVERPOOL IS APPRECIABLY HIGHER 
THAN in any other Blitzed town,’41 its report announced (the capitals the observers’ 
own). It was a cheerfulness that Manchester could not match. The observers reported:    
Going from Liverpool to Manchester was like going from an atmosphere of 
reasonable cheerfulness into an atmosphere of barely restrained depression. 
Directly investigators got into the town, only an hour away from Liverpool by 
road, they felt themselves back in the Blitzed town atmosphere with which they 
had grown familiar in the south.42 
 
This clearly contradicted what was appearing in the newspapers, but also revealed that 
other Blitzed towns and cities had also suffered sharp, and unreported, drops in 
morale. It was not just Mancunian newspapers that failed to adhere to normal news 
values; the neglect extended to the whole of England. The good mood on Merseyside, 
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the Home Intelligence report noted, showed itself in many ways, the most obvious 
being the bustling night life and the large amount of singing and whistling in the 
streets, the most popular tune being ‘Bless ‘Em All’. Liverpool’s young, those aged 
under 20, were described as the most cheerful, while the most gloomy were the upper 
and middle classes, who had most to lose. The knock-on effect of that, the report 
noted, was a shortfall in the Women’s Voluntary Service, typically staffed by females 
from the top end of society, upon which rest centres and other emergency services 
largely relied. The reasons for this generally good morale on Merseyside were cited as 
a toughness derived from the harsh economic climate of the 1930s and the city’s 
strong religious background, particularly Roman Catholicism. If people were down, 
they could visit vicars and priests to find solace. The report noted that only one 
section of Liverpool’s population came in for sustained criticism: the dock workers, 
who were believed to be evading work and exploiting overtime rates. Given that the 
dockers comprised 11 per cent of the city’s workforce, this was a matter that required 
‘action and propaganda’.43 The report added: 
Undoubtedly, a considerable proportion of dockers are showing very little interest 
in winning the war or working hard to win it. It should seem that there are 
numerous ways in which the optimum transport of goods from the ship to the 
consumer are delayed.44 
 
   If the report on Liverpool singled out one profession and the upper echelons 
of the city’s society, Home Intelligence stated that Manchester’s gloom spread to all 
classes and all sets of workers. Taking the point-by-point analysis it had also applied 
to Liverpool, it noted that the city was plagued by rumour and that there was ‘constant 
talk about air raids’. The full point-by-point list of symptoms of Manchester’s poor 
morale read:    
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I. Plenty of rumour including Haw-Haw rumours, which were common. 
Some of these rumours are very alarmist, eg. That a female parachutist had 
landed dressed as a nurse and was now working in one of the hospitals. 
II. Consistent talk about air-raids and endless discussion of air-raid damage.  
III. Visible alarm when sirens sounded, people running, hurrying out of pubs 
and dance halls, etc. 
IV. Much staring at burnt-out buildings, etc. 
V. Practically no singing or whistling in the streets 
VI. Night transport difficulties, and no taxis after an alert. Many clubs closing 
at 7 pm, film show failing to come off when advertised, despite absence of 
raid. Open pubs only doing a quarter usual business. Only one dance hall 
open anywhere central, and that containing 60 people as compared with 
500 in a similar hall in Liverpool. 
VII. No night entertainment. 
VIII. Little laughter and joking in the streets, much silence, and at night great 
silence. Overheards on Ypres, peace, rottenness of war etc. 
IX. Dance halls nearly empty – see above. 
X. Higher degree of gasmask carrying. 
XI. Considerable evacuation, though still large number of children left. 
Reported to be a very serious increase in juvenile crime.45 
 
The report did acknowledge that plenty of Mancunians were ‘determined and 
courageous’ but talks with the city’s senior sociologists and social workers also 
pointed to ‘a considerable private opinion of real depression and despair’.46 It added: 
‘Manchester people are definitely on edge, are afraid of the next raid, are beginning 
really to worry about the future with a feeling of crime semi-despair [sic]. All this is 
under the surface.’47 The report said that this could be remedied by adequate 
leadership and encouragement but could find little of either, commenting that the 
‘atrophy of local leadership’ caused by the war-time relationship between local and 
central government led to a weakening of the ‘solidarity of the bigger cities’.48 This 
was not reported by local or national newspapers. 
As this thesis noted earlier, Home Intelligence’s reporters speculated on why 
Manchester had not reacted in a similar manner to Liverpool, quoting ‘selfishness’ 
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and ‘softness’.49 This did not put Manchester in a favourable light, but the report did 
concede that, paradoxically, Liverpool benefitted from being raided more frequently: 
A steady stream of small raids actually helps many people to overcome their 
anxieties and make their adjustments. Then, when a big raid does come, it is only a 
bigger raid than the previous ones. But a big raid on a town which is mentally 
unprepared, which is not in training for the Blitz, is a knockout drop. In 
Manchester, Coventry and Southampton, there has been no such conditioning.50 
 
This lack of conditioning was exacerbated because the pre-Christmas raids 
were concentrated mainly on the city centres of Manchester and Salford as well as 
Trafford Park, which had a profound effect on the area’s infrastructure. Transport was 
more severely damaged than in Liverpool and led to a virtual close-down of the city’s 
hub. ‘The importance of transport in keeping up morale cannot be overemphasised,’ 
the Home Intelligence inspectors noted.51 The observers also reported that the timing 
of the raids, just before Christmas, ‘gave a tragic bitterness to the whole affair’ and 
was unfortunate because many of the voluntary helpers who staffed the rest centres 
had taken time off for the festivities.52 After the bombing, those volunteers often had 
no means of getting back into the city centre. The holiday period also meant that there 
were no newspapers on 25 and 26 December, a period, the report noted, when ‘the 
local press can do so much to rally morale’.53    
The report went on to criticise the local and national press, accusing it of 
exacerbating the problems by creating a false impression of steadfastness and 
optimism. This journalism jarred in the stricken circumstances of January 1941, but 
also amounted to a failure to adhere to one of the principal functions of newspapers 
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articulated by Curran: scrutinising government.54  The report accused Manchester of 
‘over-complacency’, pointing its fingers at the ‘upper classes’ but in particular those 
responsible for preparing for Blitzed conditions. It highlighted several deficiencies, 
including a breakdown in information that led to ‘extraordinary confusions and 
unnecessary hardships’.55 As a consequence, 90 per cent of bomb victims failed to 
apply for help that they should have received from the Assistance Board and, when 
the Lord Mayor of Manchester announced another aid scheme, only four people 
applied in the first two days.56 The chief problem, however, was bad organisation on a 
widespread basis. The report noted that actions taken in the first 36 hours after a raid 
had beneficial effects on morale, but rest centres in Manchester were ‘unsatisfactory 
and unprepared’.57  
One of the self-proclaimed main functions of the press is to hold authority to 
account and no Manchester newspaper reported these deficiencies and they also 
ignored what conventional news values would regard as an even stronger news story: 
that the city’s lack of preparation was a direct result of the interference of Manchester 
City Council. The city had been unprepared, according to the Home Intelligence 
inspectors, partly because the local authority had attacked the city’s emergency 
committee, which had led to the resignation of the chairman and other changes in 
personnel. When Manchester was bombed the new committee had been in place just a 
few weeks and the lack of experience was telling. The report read: 
The delay in taking elementary measures, such as the provision of rest centres with 
bedding and beds, seems incredible to the observer of London or Coventry. It is 
connected, of course, with the general morale of Manchester before the Blitz, 
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which infected all groups; with a particularly striking lack of co-ordination, and 
several notorious local jealousies.58  
 
The report also quoted several examples of incompetence, stating: ‘Many cases of 
errors of judgement and inefficiency which could not be tolerated in a tank or 
battleship, were revealed.’59 An example included the largest rest centre running out 
of registration forms for rehousing on the first morning after the Blitz. Manchester 
Town Hall could provide only five more of these forms when 1,000 people were in 
this main centre. ‘The consequence of this trivial omission, which impacts on 
hundreds of homeless families, adds up in terms of morale to an influence on many 
thousands of people.’60 
Manchester newspapers might have wished to gloss over or ignore ‘local 
jealousies’ because highlighting them would have been seen as an attack on its target 
audience, but failing to pursue incidences of local authority incompetence 
contradicted a basic tenet of news reporting, the public watchdog.61 By comparison, 
newspapers in Manchester and elsewhere in Britain quickly asked questions about the 
adequacy of the fire warden system, that was the duty of private firms to provide and 
could save buildings hit by incendiary bombs, yet ignored the other manifest 
inadequacies of local and central government. Whether this was fuelled by patriotism 
or fear, the consequence was a widespread mistrust of the media.  So great was this 
that in 1941 the Home Intelligence inspectors were moved to criticise the local and 
national media, including the BBC, whose news bulletins on the Manchester Blitz 
were described as ‘clumsy’ and providing an impetus to the darker rumours sweeping 
the city. The report added:  
                                            
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Curran, ‘Press Reformism’, p. 35; Randall, Universal Journalist, p. 22; Cottle, Mediatized Conflict, 
p. 3. 
  
236
There was violent feeling among the middle class and others about the way the 
Manchester raids were handled on the news, and Manchester felt that they ought to 
have been given much more praise and much more emphasis. This is really a point 
which has not been sufficiently considered; how far do the morale effects of Blitz 
censorship outweigh the military necessities of suppression?62 
   
Later chapters will show that newspapers, even those based and printed in 
Manchester, moved on to other news items within days of the city’s bombing, but the 
report noted that even what was printed could have had a negative effect. The Home 
Intelligence observers agreed that they had dwelt on the ‘darker side of the picture’ 
but were unapologetic because the authorities had adopted an attitude of complacency 
and ‘we put up a fine show’ while the local and national press painted a happy 
picture. Individual mention was made of the Manchester Guardian, which, as this 
thesis stated earlier, reported that every rest centre had its turkey as part of the 
Christmas Day celebrations. The observers wrote: 
Had there been turkey for everyone in the rest centres, and a turkey atmosphere in 
Manchester on Christmas day, the morale of this town might have been in a much 
better condition to face any trials which may lie ahead. 63 
 
The rest centres were a persistent concern for the inspectors. Quoting another 
report, written by an ‘expert’ social worker, it was noted that people arrived in 
Manchester’s ‘show’ centre at 11 pm on Sunday, 22 December 1941, and did not 
receive their first cup of tea until more than 12 hours later, at 11.30 am. Bread and 
jam was the lunch and dinner arrived at 5 pm on 23 December but consisted of only 
potatoes and gravy. ‘Tea was expected in the evening but never came.’64 The report 
conceded that the meals improved but ‘ran out’ prematurely; noted that there were no 
cooking facilities ‘not even a primus stove’; and that milk was provided for babies but 
there was no distribution of milk to children even though there was surplus caused by 
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people who had fled the city.65 The inspectors wrote that there were no medical 
services in the centres, adding: 
Old and infirm people suffering from shock, cripples and blind people, had to sit 
all night in the crowded hall. There was no-one to look after them, and it was 
difficult for even an able person to pick his way in and out of the room. The 
lavatories were up steps, which were very dark.66 
 
The report also commented on a lack of bathing facilities – many people did not have 
a bath for a week – room cleaning and ventilation, the last of which was pointed out 
to a representative of the local Welfare Department, who replied: ‘This is a rest 
centre, not the Ritz.’67    
The report’s conclusion listed 13 reasons why Manchester’s morale had 
suffered more than Liverpool’s. It noted the latter had a ‘general conditioning of 
toughness’ and that the former exhibited an ‘astonishing lack of real preparation’ and 
a failure to co-ordinate and harness ‘all the available resources of good will and social 
consciousness’.68  Its final reason was the most damning: ‘A major factor in 
Manchester was the lack of mental preparation, which was surely the responsibility of 
local leadership and central authority.’69 A local reporter in different circumstances 
would have noted that Manchester was singled out because this mental preparedness 
was ‘undoubtedly operating, often subtly, in many other towns’.70   
In a subsequent report, written for Home Intelligence by one of the founders 
of Mass Observation, Harrisson, reported that the raids on Manchester had definitely 
weakened the morale of the people.71 His main target was not the local authorities, 
however, but the press and what he described as its ‘superficial observations’, 
                                            
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Mass Observation, FR 568. 
  
238
underlining that the Manchester press was more culpable than most in the creation of 
myth. He added: ‘Journalists, who are not of the working classes and who have little 
economic or personal experience of the masses, have produced a picture of complete 
courage, determination, carry-onism [sic]; a vast press propaganda of “everything 
is OK with civilians”.’72 The effect of this reporting, he wrote, was that it made it 
‘practically disloyal to suggest that morale is not perfect’ and that the ‘rosy 
atmosphere of 100 per cent morale’ had been so pronounced that Home Intelligence 
inspectors had begun to doubt their findings about weak morale in Manchester, 
Portsmouth and Bristol. He added: ‘Confidence in news and official statements, 
which are vital in keeping morale steady and people wide awake, has strikingly 
declined.’73 
 
4. Contemporary Reaction 
The Home Intelligence report on morale in Manchester and Liverpool 
concluded with an appendix, a subjective account from a Mass Observation diarist, 
Rita Maloney, a 20-year-old female clerical worker in Manchester whose husband 
was a soldier serving overseas.74 She wrote that the attack on the city had been 
unexpected because people had come to believe that the Luftwaffe merely passed over 
Manchester on the way to Liverpool. Such was the complacency that she and most of 
her neighbours had abandoned going to shelters when the sirens sounded.75 This lack 
of real concern continued through the two nights (Sunday and Monday) of the 
Manchester Blitz until she had to walk to work. She wrote: 
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I must have been foolish to imagine after such a raid that I would be able to catch a 
bus as usual. The few that were running were full long before they came in sight, 
and the trams were not running at all. 76 
 
She noticed the reluctance of drivers to give bus-less commuters a lift. ‘I was appalled 
by the lack of co-operation from car drivers,’ she reported, contradicting the 
Manchester Evening News’s cheerful assertion that motorists ‘entered into the spirit 
of the free “lifts” scheme this morning’.77 Mrs Maloney added: 
There were hundreds of us all walking over pavements littered with broken glass 
from the broken shop windows on either side of the road. It was curious that we 
saw these broken windows for a mile, but no sign of any other damage.78 
 
It was not until she cycled to work the following day to find Piccadilly, one of 
Manchester’s main squares, cordoned off and saw local landmarks on fire, that the 
full impact of the bombing hit her. She wrote: 
I didn’t realise the sight would affect me so much that I was near to tears. We were 
all quiet at work, shaken by the sight of so much damage… None of us worked 
again, and early in the afternoon we were paid and sent home… I was glad to get 
away from town.79 
 
She went on articulate the despair harboured by many of her fellow Mancunians, and 
the anger and distrust directed at the media: 
You will hear a lot of talk of Manchester carrying on. I suppose we are, as well as 
any other town at any rate, but as one who lives here, it’s a rather weary carrying 
on. When we heard the BBC’s summing up of our Blitz, making it sound rather 
like a village which had had a stick of bombs dropped on it, along with many 
others, we wondered how true the reports on Coventry and Liverpool were, and all 
the other towns. We are carrying on and ‘taking it’ because we’ve got to, but we 
aren’t very happy about it. 80 
 
On 27 December 1940, the Evening Chronicle had reported that Manchester ‘may be 
scarred and in some parts battered, but the people, after the Christmas respite, 
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returned to work with determination.’81 Weary, untrusting and unhappy would have 
been a more accurate description.   
Other Mass Observation diaries underlined the sense of destruction and 
helplessness in the city. G. W. Shipway, a Mancunian railway draughtsman, referred 
to earlier in relation to the League of Nations, wrote: ‘On reaching Piccadilly a 
terrible scene confronted me – streets of burning buildings. Water was being played 
on some, but it seemed hopeless.'82 Later he wrote that soldiers had cordoned off a 
half-mile zone and, even on Christmas Day, he noted that ‘soldiers were much in 
evidence’.83 Another diarist, Mrs M. Woodside from Northern Ireland, recorded that 
an acquaintance had just returned from bombed Manchester. She reported that the 
blackout was a ‘farce’, stating that the Luftwaffe released incendiary bombs until the 
city was lit up and then proceeded ‘to pick their targets with HE [high explosive] 
bombs practically unhindered’.84  
Even 18 months later the city had not recovered, a story at odds with what was 
being reported in Manchester’s newspapers. Mr G. F. Sedgwick, from Glasgow, 
visited Manchester on holiday for a fortnight on 29 July 1942 and described what 
greeted him as ‘depressing’. He wrote that he did not want to be over-sentimental, but 
added: ‘It was heartrending to see the smashed shells of such notable buildings as the 
Royal Exchange, the Free Trade Hall and the Central Hall.’85 His greatest impression 
was the general deterioration of the city, writing:  
It had been going down hill for some time and strenuous efforts [are] required to 
be made to eradicate the mess which industrialism had made of the place in the 
nineteenth century. Proposals were on hand to rebuild the derelict belt of 
slums...around the city but progress has been sadly interfered with by the war and 
the place looks a ruin. I have never, for instance, seen so many empty shops and 
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dilapidated buildings. Why private shops should have gone out of business in 
Manchester and not in Glasgow is impossible for me to explain.86 
 
5. Looking back on Manchester’s Blitz 
The reports from Mass Observation and Home Intelligence on the Manchester 
Blitz were contemporary, or recorded soon afterwards. There were later accounts, 
including books referred to earlier, many of which were published after the myth had 
been fixed as how things really were. Read, a schoolboy in Manchester in the Blitz, 
was among them:  
Although, according to the Mass Observation reports, morale in parts of 
Manchester was very low after the December raids, in Burnage I never heard any 
complaints from my parents or at school. The Fairey Aviation works were only 
half-a-mile from our house, where warplanes were made, so we accepted that we 
were in a target area. Perhaps this even raised our morale subconsciously, letting 
us feel that we were more than simply a target for indiscriminate bombing, the we 
were on the front line, and in the phrase of the time, we could ‘take it’.87  
 
Read’s predominantly defiant memory was not universally shared. Henry Abraham 
from Salford wrote: 'It was really frightening, and anyone who said he was not 
frightened was lying.'88 Brenda Lees, who lived in Old Trafford, two miles south-west 
of the city centre, wrote a letter to her husband describing a scene of chaos in the 
immediate aftermath of the Manchester Blitz, with no gas, electricity or a wireless to 
let her family know what was happening. ‘Many a time we thought the house was 
caving in on us… We were cramped in the cellar for 12 hours, with our limbs 
trembling with fright.’89  Kathleen Fox (nee Shell), a volunteer nurse in the St John 
Ambulance, recalled running from Manchester Royal Infirmary to a first aid post 
through Seymour Park at the height of the raids. She told of the noise of the 
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detonating bombs, chains of shells from the ack-ack guns exploding in the sky and 
‘the terrifying screams of bombs falling made my dash to the shelter a complete 
horror. Manchester was a raging inferno, encircled by a wall of fire, the sky for miles 
illuminated’.90 Jean Slater, who was five when the war started, spoke of her mother, 
who was so scared by the sirens as she sheltered with 300 other people in Oxford Hall 
in Oxford Road, she had ‘many a personal accident’.91  
Tony Bryan’s memory was of his last words to his mother, who would not go 
to a shelter in south Manchester because she was recovering in bed from an 
appendectomy. When she would not listen to his words of encouragement he retorted: 
‘It’ll serve you right if you get killed.’ A German bomb ensured this was a dreadful 
prophecy and provided him with a lifetime of self-recrimination.92 People with 
relatives in the armed forces had fears beyond the Blitz. Mancunian Margaret 
Gittings, who was 15 in 1941, lost two of her brothers, Arthur and Ralph Stringer, and 
the day her family was informed the first had been killed was so impressed on her 
memory she could remember the weather (crisp and bright), the time (late afternoon) 
and the date (26 October 1941). She wrote: 
I saw my father weeping. I did not realise that men could weep. Nothing in my life 
had prepared me for this sorrow. My father’s silent weeping shocked me into 
thinking I must not weep, in case it made it worse for my parents, and it was quite 
some days before my tears came too.93 
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Women, trembling and wetting themselves, people nearly petrified with fears 
for themselves and loved ones, years of regret. These stories were from Mancunians 
but similar tales would be repeated wherever the bombs fell heavily. They did not 
make contemporary newspapers because they would have contradicted the myth that 
Britain ‘could take it’.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has used Home Intelligence and Mass Observation reports and 
diaries to show that reports in newspapers, both national and local, often did not 
reflect the mood of post-Blitz Manchester. Questions could be asked as to whether the 
number of Mass Observation reports represented a significant sample, and that their 
concerns might be as misleading as to the true mood as the forced optimism of 
newspaper columns, but their evidence is reinforced by the Home Intelligence reports 
and other contemporary accounts.  From these it is clear that instead of maintaining 
the normal reporting conventions as listed by Curran, namely informing the public, 
scrutinising government, staging a public debate and expressing public opinion, 
newspapers in 1940 and 1941 became publishers of propaganda, ignoring official 
incompetence and the senses of panic and desolation felt by many of their 
audiences.94 In short, the press stopped reporting the news. Cyril Dunn, a Yorkshire 
Post journalist who would later work for The Observer, was sent to Manchester on 
Boxing Day 1940 to report on the bombing, making a telling comment in his 
notebook under the heading ‘Bombing is a Messy Business’: 
There were big fires everywhere, the air stank of smoke and the streets were full of 
black ash as if there’d been a volcanic eruption… The destruction was enormous 
and spectacular, but it’s ceased to make any impression on me. Even to see the 
whole of the Royal Exchange gutted and burning, whacking great buildings blasted 
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into ruin, water spurting into the road from burst mains, the cathedral; shattered 
glass everywhere like dirty drifts of pack ice – this scarcely bothered me.  
 
I went around nervously collecting the same old stories. ‘All I want to do,’ said 
one publican who’d been blasted out of his cellar ‘is to get out of here and stop out. 
I’ve had enough.’ And a woman, ‘If only I could feel it was worth it, was helping 
to win the war. But this [the ruins of her pub] is everything we’ve worked for…’ I 
wrote the usual story about the cheerful courage and determined endurance of the 
Manchester folk. 95 
 
Dunn conformed to the myth, just as every journalist reporting the Manchester 
Blitz did. They refused to report that people were not always resilient when their 
houses were destroyed and their loved ones killed and that there were Mancunians 
openly questioning whether the war was worth pursuing. The consequence was a 
lingering resentment against the media and the spread of dark rumours because people 
could see what had been reported bore little relation to what had happened. Harrisson 
reported for Home Intelligence that the 'intense ballyhoo' about wonderful morale 
after each town has been Blitzed had been a formula that 'infuriated each place in 
turn'.96 He stated that the BBC had suffered most because it was most reliant on 
official reports but extended his criticism to the media at large, writing ‘Confidence in 
news is therefore, at present, only moderate. There is much underlying scepticism 
about the news.’97 
That became apparent within weeks of Manchester’s Blitz when the relative 
good shape of Liverpool’s morale disintegrated in May 1941. Repeated bombings 
stripped away the optimism of the previous Christmas and Home Intelligence reported 
a very different picture. An inspector, whose local knowledge was bolstered by his 
growing up in the city, made a follow-up visit and reported that the vehemence of the 
discontent about the local authorities was stronger there than in any city he had 
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visited. He noted an ‘atmosphere of ineptitude’ and ‘lack of energy’. He added: 
‘Residents spoke of ‘no power or drive left in Liverpool to counter-attack the 
Luftwaffe’… For the first time in any town or place a conversation was heard in which 
one side argued in favour of our surrender.’98 
The inspector reported that rumours were rife of peace demonstrations in 
Liverpool, a suggestion that was verified by a Mass Observation diarist, a Women’s 
Auxilliary Air Force member in Preston, writing on 5 May 1941. She reported a 
woman named Jean saying: ‘Everyone’s talking about Liverpool… They say the 
people there want to give in.’99 Twelve days later the diarist accepted a lift in a lorry 
and was told more about Liverpool: ‘There’s 50,917 dead and God knows how many 
wounded, just walking the streets, with their bandages on… There is a lot of military 
with bayonets – they’ve more or less taken it over.’100 On the same day an observer in 
Leek, Staffordshire, also reported rumours of severe disruption in Liverpool, listing: 
train loads of unidentified corpses being sent from Merseyside for mass cremation; 
martial law being imposed in heavily bombed industrial areas; homeless and hungry 
people marching with white flags; food riots.101 On this occasion, newspapers were 
correct to ignore such reports because the rumours were mainly false, but the reaction 
is an indictment of the press. It is indicative of the mood of the British public that the 
rumours were believed because people knew from their own experiences that the 
press had abdicated its responsibility to report objectively. Knowing that newspapers 
and other media would never report anything negative in respect of the fighting of the 
war, imaginations went on wild sorties towards pessimism. In terms of Manchester, 
Rita Maloney articulated the general lack of trust in this chapter, but there were other 
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Mass Observation observers in the city who also questioned what news and 
entertainment outlets were printing and broadcasting. A 17-year-old Mancunian 
wrote: ‘People now turn from the BBC news to the German quite automatically’, 
while R. South, a journalist working in the city, encapsulated the generic feeling that 
attempts were being made to sway public opinion.102 After watching Confessions of a 
Nazi Spy, he wrote: ‘We were left with the impression that it is a good propaganda 
film.’103 
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Chapter 9 
Escaping the War 
 
1. Introduction     
While the previous chapter showed disenchantment towards the media, the 
number of newspapers bought by the public increased between 1937 and 1947.1 This 
seems contradictory, but also implies that the press, for all its perceived shortcomings, 
was satisfying some of the needs of the audience. Fussell argued that one was a desire 
for entertainment because the British public were looking for an escape from the 
grimness of life during the war and McNair pointed out that news values in Western 
democracies are flavoured by the requirement to ‘win audiences with entertainment as 
well as information’.2 Newspaper circulations rose – the daily figure for the national 
press from 9.9 million in 1937 to 15.4 million 10 years later – but other forms of 
entertainment also boomed between 1939 and 1945: cinema audiences grew 58 per 
cent, the number of people listening to the radio increased and more people read 
books from the library.3  
This chapter will chart the public’s increased desire for escapism, exploring 
the press’s motivation for including lighter items in newspapers that had plenty of 
news to print and very few pages to fill. Alternative forms of entertainment such as 
cinema and radio will also be studied briefly. If newspapers were not selling then their 
contribution to a myth of unrelenting fortitude would have been negligible, so the 
non-news reports and features had an important role to play in satisfying an audience 
who, evidence suggests, grew increasingly sceptical of what they were reading about 
                                            
1 Royal Commission, p. 195. 
2 Fussell, Wartime, p. 189; McNair, News and Journalism, p. 40. 
3 Appendix 1; Political and Economic Planning, The British Film Industry (London: PEP, 1952); A. 
Briggs, The War of Words, 1939-45 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 18; Library 
Association, A Century of Public Libraries: 1850-1950 (London: Library Association 1950).  
  
248
the war. A quantitative analysis on the proportions of hard news, war and non-war, to 
comment, business and entertainment, will be applied to the eight Tuesday editions of 
the three Manchester newspapers beginning 17 December 1940 and the findings will 
be considered alongside research undertaken by the 1947-49 Royal Commission on 
the Press that analysed newspaper coverage in The Times, the Daily Mail and the 
Daily Mirror in 1927, 1937 and 1947. 
 
2. Entertaining the Masses 
The mass evacuation of children from cities at the start of the war and the 
nightly journeys into safer, rural, areas provided physical means to escape the 
bombing, but there were intellectual ways too. Mancunians, like most Britons, 
suffered a variety of negative emotions from fright to war-weariness, and many took 
refuge in the diversions provided by newspapers and other media. The press had long 
realised that providing news was not its only role and Conboy identified that, early in 
their development, English newspapers, journals and periodicals had become ‘part of 
a generic hybrid between public information source, topical entertainment, communal 
identity and profit that together constituted journalism’ even by the time of the 
Commonwealth (1649-51).4 This manifested itself in the nineteenth century partly in 
the publication of novels and short stories that promoted the careers of successful 
novelists like Charles Dickens and Arthur Conan Doyle, and by the 1930s in a myriad 
of features that included cookery tips, crosswords, film reviews and gossip, problem 
pages and sport reports.5 Indeed, the proliferation of sport, which Bingham described 
as a ‘central ingredient in the development of the popular newspaper’, was a source of 
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concern for the Royal Commission on the Press in 1949, which noted there was more 
space devoted to sport in The Times, Daily Mail and Daily Mirror of 1927 and 1937 
than to political, social and economic news.6 On the subject of celebrity the 
Commission lamented that the popular press reported ‘the matrimonial adventures of 
a film star as though they possessed the same intrinsic importance as events affecting 
the peace of a continent’.7  
Despite the Commission’s misgivings, Gannon stated that the new mass 
literate newspaper-buying public preferred ‘entertainment to information’ and, with 
the audience demanding to be diverted, newspapers responded and even editions 
reporting the Manchester Blitz contained large amounts of newsprint devoted to non-
war items. For example, 86 per cent of the news coverage in the Manchester 
Guardian’s four broadsheet pages on the 23 December 1940, the first edition with the 
opportunity to report the Manchester Blitz, was taken up by war related material, a 
proportion that was appropriate in the context of the news of the day. But the next 
day, when the newspaper had more time to follow-up the effects of the bombing, this 
amount of war news had dropped to a surprisingly small 43 per cent of the combined 
war, non-war and business copy, and page four had room for half a column on the 
Robinson Crusoe pantomime at the Palace Theatre, with Stanley Holloway and Leslie 
Henson starring.8 This seems extraordinary in the light of the world events happening 
on the Guardian readers’ doorsteps, but with the censor ensuring that details of the 
Manchester bombing, even that it had happened at all, were kept to a minimum, the 
newspaper was faced with either filling its pages with non-war items or with reports 
of bombing elsewhere that would have alienated its audience needing recognition of 
its suffering. 
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The Manchester Evening News, as a local paper, had a greater freedom to 
report the Blitz, but still devoted large amounts of space to non-news items. This 
could be used for a variety of purposes and on 1 January 1941, a week after the 
Manchester Blitz, the Evening News used an entertainment report and picture on the 
front page as a propaganda tool, emphasising a return to normality after the 
Manchester Blitz with the headline: ‘Morning Panto is crammed’.9 Inevitably, the war 
played prominent parts in plenty of entertainment elements, the letter on page four of 
the 19 December issue, headlined ‘He writes: I have met someone else’, being typical. 
‘My sweetheart, who is in the army, has just written to tell me he has just met another 
girl,’ the letter, signed ‘Heartbroken’, read.10 How this would have played to the many 
wives and girl friends left alone because of enlistment is not recorded, but it was part 
of the popular newspaper strategy of reporting melodrama to which its readers could 
relate.  
Most days in the study period the Evening Chronicle carried a short piece of 
fiction, usually with only a slight reference to the war, and every day there was a 
light-hearted entertainment/comment piece headed ‘The Northern Window’ by 
‘Denys’. There was also significant entertainment coverage, the 13 January edition 
carrying three advertisements for Charlie Chaplin’s film The Great Dictator, one for 
pantomime Cinderella, and one for Belle Vue Circus.11 The 15 January edition 
devoted a quarter of page three and half of page four to the January Sales, with page 
five supplementing the paid-for centimetres with a promotional piece headed 
‘Wartime Bargains’.12 There was also a diminished amount of space devoted to sport, 
including a display of dark humour on 20 January when page three reported that 
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Lancashire had posted a message outside its Old Trafford cricket ground reading ‘No 
play today, bad ground’.13 Quite apart from it being outside the normal season of 
April to September, two bombs had blasted the Test pitch. The most insensitive 
advertisement also appeared on the front page of the Evening Chronicle in January 
1941 under large type reading: ‘Lost in Manchester’.14 The absent article in question 
was Cinderella’s glass slipper, but less than a fortnight after the Blitz, with 
Mancunians mourning and some looking for the bodies of relatives, the inclusion 
could be described as ill-timed at the very least and said something about the 
separation between newspapers and their audience. 
Weather, normally a staple of national and local newspapers, proved to be a 
thorny issue for newspapers, as has been seen earlier. The Evening News’s worries 
about revealing details of the weather to the enemy led to the Pilgrim Papers column 
giving false information when it announced the weather had been so good a cricket 
match had taken place between Kent and Lancashire in January:  
The cricket was bright enough to make us forget the war. True, enemy aircraft 
were sighted high over the pavilion about noon, and during lunch a Heinkel was 
brought down near the ladies enclosure, but it was a grand catch that got rid of 
Ames at extra cover.15  
 
The report was intending to demonstrate the absurdity of a country that ‘has no 
weather’ but it did not prevent the columnist, writing under the pseudonym Mr Dare 
Not Lie, from being upbraided by a reader for suggesting Lancashire’s bowling attack 
was so feeble that Kent had scored 509 for 2 on the first day. ‘Were Kent playing 
Bootle Boys Brigade or Oldham Old Age Pensioners?’, Albert from Oswaldtwistle 
asked. ‘I strongly suspect you are a man of Kent or a Kentish man, or both.’16 
                                            
13 ‘’Pitch Hit’, Evening Chronicle, 20 January 1941, p. 3. 
14 Evening Chronicle, 3 January 1941, p. 1. 
15 ‘Phew! Mr Censor’, Manchester Evening News, 22 January 1940, p. 3 
16 ‘Not Out, Sir’, Manchester Evening News, 29 January 1940, p 4. 
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 The press was not alone in being able to point to improving figures, as there 
was a parallel rise in the consumption of all literature. Book sales, particularly 
paperbacks, rose and borrowing from libraries increased, going from 247 million in 
1939 to 359 million in 1953.17 The Manchester Guardian reported that the number of 
books borrowed by young people in Manchester in November 1940 rose to 79,020, an 
increase of 25,790 compared to November 1939.18 The total number of books issued 
in the city was 422,113, a rise of 49,150 on the previous year and a record for any 
November. The most significant increase, however, came in the radio audience. The 
BBC, the only home-based broadcaster in Britain during the war, expanded its staff 
from 4,800 in September 1939 to 11,663 in March 1944, trebled its output in terms of 
hours, increased its transmitter power five times, and expanded its foreign language 
services from 10 to 45 in 1943.19 By 1944 the BBC’s 9 pm news programme was 
estimated to reach 43 to 50 per cent of the population and the BBC recorded its 
audience at 34 million (out of a population of 48 million).20  
This success emerged from an inauspicious start because the BBC’s output at 
the start of the war lacked popular appeal and the first radio personality of the conflict 
was Germany-based. In the autumn of 1939 as many as six million Britons tuned in 
regularly to Lord Haw-Haw’s broadcasts from Berlin and by January 1940, 25 per 
cent of the population said they had listened to his programme the previous day.21 
This failure to engage with the audience was not entirely the BBC’s fault because 
measures to protect the print industry had handicapped its news-gathering in the 
build-up to the war and, once the war had started, the scrutiny of the MOI ensured 
                                            
17 Clarke, Hope, p. 212; Butler and Sloman, Political Facts, p. 313. 
18 ‘Manchester Reading More Books’, Manchester Guardian, 19 December 1940, p. 3. 
19 Briggs, War of Words, p. 18. 
20 Ibid, p. 43. The scale of licence evasion meant the true figure could have been as high as 40 million 
(Nicholas, Echo of War, p. 12). 
21 Williams, Murder, p. 126. 
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bland and dated programmes.22 Mass Observation also reported that the public had 
little trust in what it was hearing on the BBC.23 Nevertheless, by the end of the war ‘it 
was radio, not newspapers, which assumed greatest prominence as purveyor of 
wartime news.’24 This was due in part to the BBC’s refusal to be cowed into 
persistent misrepresentation. Churchill wanted control of the corporation but, with the 
help of the MOI, the BBC argued that a restriction of this nature would be counter-
productive, its 1941 handbook insisting that ‘no permanent propaganda policy can in 
the modern world be based on untruthfulness’.25 There was also a change in the 
programming on the Home Service to copy the successful variety and dance music-
focused Forces Network.26 
Like the BBC, cinemas showed a significant increase in numbers. Gone With 
The Wind was the ‘box office phenomenon of the war years’ and other, hugely 
popular, films included Mrs Miniver and Random Harvest, which topped the UK box 
office numbers in 1942 and 1943 respectively.27 Cinemas were closed in Britain as 
soon as war was declared in an inauspicious over-reaction that was reversed a week 
later in non-urban theatres and even London (until 6 pm) by 15 September 1939. On 4 
October all cinemas were allowed to stay open until 10 pm and from 4 November 
1939 until 11 pm.28 Bomb damage, shortages of equipment and staff and a lack of 
new films caused problems but of Britain’s approximately 4,800 cinemas in existence 
at the start of the war, it has been estimated that ‘the maximum number closed at any 
                                            
22 Pronay, ‘The News Media at War’, p. 182. The output from the BBC in the initial months of the war 
was dominated by official broadcasts, talks by civil servants and experts on topics such as the blackout 
and making the most of rationed food (Williams, Murder, p. 136). 
23 Mass Observation, FR 126. 
24 Carruthers, Media at War, p. 81. 
25 Briggs, War of Words, pp. 32, 10. 
26 Williams, Murder, p. 137 
27 Gone With The Wind, dir. by Victor Fleming (MGM, 1939), Mrs Miniver, dir. by Wiliam Wyler, 
(MGM, 1942), Random Harvest, dir. by Mervyn LeRoy, (MGM, 1942); Aldgate and Richards, Britain 
Can Take It, p. 16.  
28 Mass Observation, FR 24, The Cinema in the First Three Months of the War, January 1940.  
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one stage of the war was probably never more than 10 per cent of the total.’29 Seat 
prices also had to rise thanks to increased taxation in the form of the Excess Profits 
Tax and an Entertainments Tax, which was raised three times during the war and by 
1945 amounted to 36 per cent of gross receipts.30 Nevertheless, there was a dramatic 
increase in average weekly attendance, which rose from 19 million in 1939 to more 
than 30 million in 1945.31 
 
3. Investigating the Newspapers 
This section will examine how much space was allocated by Manchester’s 
newspapers to non-war news and other, lighter, items with a quantitative analysis over 
the eight weeks of the study. The methodology chapter outlined why Tuesday was 
chosen as the most appropriate day for this analysis and the contents of eight editions 
of each of the three newspapers, making 24 in total, were measured. The war was the 
pre-eminent story in 1940 and 1941, particularly after Manchester was bombed in the 
Christmas Blitz, and this was duly reflected in the coverage but other subjects 
intruded on the news agenda. This study divided them into six other categories, five 
of which were: crime and other non-war news; comment, in including editorials and 
leaders; business; photographs and cartoons; advertisements. The final category was 
loosely combined as entertainment. Harcup and O’Neill identified five sub-categories 
making up entertainment –picture opportunities; reference to sex; reference to 
animals; humour; Showbiz/TV – but their news values were framed 60 years after the 
Manchester Blitz and bore little relation to those of the 1940s.32 Sex, for example, was 
barely mentioned outside court reports and instead, for this study, the category 
                                            
29 PEP, British Film Industry, pp. 80-81, cited in Aldgate and Richards, Britain Can Take It, p. 2. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Harcup,and O’Neill, ‘What is News?’, pp. 274-75. 
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comprised: pools coupons; puzzles; gardening and other advice columns; film, book 
and theatre reviews; short stories; sport. Humorous columns were included in the 
entertainment category, while readers’ letters, many of which referred to the war, 
were included in the figures for comment. 
The Manchester Guardian comprised 10 pages in seven of the eight editions, 
the exception being 24 December 1940 that had eight. This might have been due to 
the Christmas holiday or it might reflect the difficult circumstances in which the 
newspaper was published, as the night of 23/24 December was the second of the 
Manchester Blitz. Only advertisements, mainly classified, were on the front page, and 
at least 21 per cent of the content was paid for in all eight editions of the Guardian.33 
In the 31 December edition that proportion rose to 28 per cent.34 This commercial 
input was vital for all newspapers the war because the price of newsprint rose from 
£11 10s (£11.50) per ton in 1938 to £45 10 years later yet profits rose.35 National 
newspapers voluntarily reduced the amount of advertising in 1940 because newsprint 
rationing reduced editions to a third of their pre-war size and, as a consequence the 
reader became the most important source of cash, the London-based dailies deriving 
69 per cent of their revenue in sales in 1943 compared to 30 per cent in 1938.36 The 
Royal Commission on the Press in 1949 reported: ‘The provincial newspapers in 
particular benefited from the greater demand for their advertising space and from the 
reduction of the competitive pressure of the London papers.’37 In 1936 the Daily Mail 
carried 1,308 column inches (3322 centimetres) of advertising, in 1947 it carried only 
                                            
33 Appendix 2. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Royal Commission, p. 5. 
36 The voluntary curtailment was formalised in 1942 when regulations restricted the proportion of 
space newspapers could devote to advertising (Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, p. 
62); Ibid, p. 63.  
37 Royal Commission, p. 5. 
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326 (828).38 Instead of newspapers competing to sell advertising space, advertisers 
had to wait their turn for the limited space available for a number of years. The Royal 
Commission report added: ‘Nationwide advertising pushed out of the London papers 
were glad to find space in the provinces.’39 
The Manchester Guardian benefitted from this commercial movement from 
the capital and the newspaper, appropriately, paid great attention to commerce, 
devoting at least one page and frequently two to news from the City of London and 
Manchester’s Stock Exchange, averaging 13 per cent of the newspaper, and 18 per 
cent of the journalistic copy, over the study period. The proportion of business news 
rose to 25 per cent of the journalistic copy in the 24 December 1940 newspaper, 
amounting to 534 centimetres (out of 2,150 centimetres) in an edition that could 
report the aftermath of the first night of the Manchester Blitz and had the running 
story of the second night of the bombardment.40 War news, most of it from outside 
Manchester, amounted to only 594 centimetres of the 24 December edition, making it 
the second largest contributor to the edition after advertising but still a small amount 
given the context of the local news available.41  
Over the study period, war news comprised 20 per cent of the Manchester 
Guardian and even when non-journalistic elements – cartoons, photographs and 
advertisements – were excluded, the percentage was 28 (Table 1). The editions in 
which war news was most prominent were 7 January and 4 February 1941 in which 
they filled 28 and 26 per cent of the newspaper (45 and 41 per cent of the written 
copy) respectively, but the work of the censor may be detected here because these 
newspapers came more than 20 days after the raids on Manchester on 23 December 
                                            
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Appendix 2. 
41 Ibid. 
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and 10 January.42 Typically, nearly three-quarters of the journalistic copy was devoted 
to news other than the war, with entertainment forming 18 per cent of the total. A 
short story appeared in every edition on the back page, alongside the readers’ letters, 
and a crossword and the radio listings were printed on page two. Sport was severely 
restricted during the war and this was reflected in the amount of space it filled in the 
Guardian, 400 centimetres over eight editions, or 1.4 per cent of the newspaper.43 Its 
peak contribution to the news space was 3.5 per cent of the 21 January edition. By 
comparison, The Times devoted 18, 21 and 16 per cent of its news space to sport in its 
1927, 1937 and 1947 newspapers.44 The figures for the equivalent editions of the 
Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror were 27, 36, 33 and 37, 36, 24 per cent 
respectively.45  
Table 1 
Manchester Guardian 
 Proportions of the newspapers on Tuesdays from 17 December 1940 to 4 
February 1941 
 
 Total column 
centimetres 
Percentage Percentage of journalistic 
copy 
War 5802 20 28 
Non-war 4086 14 20 
Comment 3320 11 16 
Entertainment 3640 12 18 
Business 3670 13 18 
Cartoons/Photographs 1779 6 - 
Advertisements 7003 24 - 
Total 29300 100 100 
 
The Manchester Evening News comprised six broadsheet pages throughout the 
study period, pages four and five of which were made up entirely of advertisements 
and births, marriages and deaths in every edition except 24 December.46 The 
importance of the Evening News in terms of financing the group was mentioned 
                                            
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Royal Commission, p. 250 
45 Ibid. 
46 Appendix 2. 
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earlier in the thesis and advertising in the evening paper was critical for both the 
newspaper and the loss-making sister publication, the Manchester Guardian. Paid-for 
content comprised an average of 56 per cent of the newspaper, never falling below 40 
per cent and rising to 60 per cent of the 7 January edition. War news averaged 15 per 
cent of the newspaper over the eight Tuesdays, reaching its peak on 31 December 
when the censors were relaxing the restrictions on what could be reported about the 
Manchester Blitz (Table 2). War reports comprised 35 per cent of the journalistic 
copy (excluding pictures/cartoons and advertising) for the eight weeks and, as 
business reports made up only three per cent, this meant that more than 60 per cent of 
the written content was filled by non-war, comment and entertainment items, though 
the last was a surprisingly low 10 per cent. 
 
Table 2 
Manchester Evening News 
 Proportions of the newspapers on Tuesdays from 17 December 1940 to 4 
February 1941 
 
 Total column 
centimetres 
Percentage Percentage of journalistic 
copy 
War 2684 15 35 
Non-war 2892 16 38 
Comment 1046 6 14 
Entertainment 734 4 10 
Business 229 1 3 
Cartoons/Photographs 377 2 - 
Advertisements 9990 56 - 
Total 17952 100 100 
 
The Evening Chronicle was also a six-page newspaper throughout the study 
period but it laid greater emphasis on entertainment, devoting 18 per cent of the 
newspaper to lighter elements including a gardening advice and show business news, 
the Northern Window column and the crossword (Table 3).47 This meant 
entertainment filled more of the Evening Chronicle than any other category but 
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Tuesday was the edition that included pools coupons, so the figure might have been 
slightly inflated from the norm. Sports news averaged 1.5 per cent of the paper, rising 
to 5 per cent of the 24 December edition in the build-up to the Christmas holiday 
period.48 War news comprised 17 per cent of the editions, rising to 36 per cent of the 
Christmas Eve newspaper, making up nearly half the journalistic copy.  
 
Table 3 
Evening Chronicle 
 Proportions of the newspapers on Tuesdays from 17 December 1940 to 4 
February 1941 
 
 Total column 
centimetres 
Percentage Percentage of journalistic 
copy 
War 3535 17 31 
Non-war 2399 11 21 
Comment 1079 5 9 
Entertainment 3677 18 32 
Business 673 3 6 
Cartoons/Photographs 524 3 - 
Advertisements 9057 43 - 
Total 20944 100 99 
 
Variations in percentage due to rounding up and down 
 
4. Conclusion  
The key statistic that can be drawn from this analysis is that the war on 
average filled only 20 per cent or less of Manchester’s newspapers. This might seem 
surprising given that it was by far the most important story in 1940 and 1941, 
particularly after the Christmas Blitz, but it tallied with a survey undertaken by Home 
Intelligence that revealed 60 per cent of interviewees read newspapers for items other 
than war news.49 The same report discovered that readers felt there was too much 
propaganda, which was making them feel apathetic about the war. Rising numbers for 
                                            
48 Ibid. 
49 Mass Observation, FR 126. 
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other forms of entertainment suggested the audiences wanted a distraction and this 
was reflected in newspapers’ news values. Jack Fuller wrote: 
Every newspaper, from the most cosmopolitan national daily to the smallest rural 
weekly, is provincial. To survive, a newspaper must reflect a specific audience, 
usually by holding up a mirror to a particular place. It must share with its readers a 
sensibility and a set of interests, tastes and values.50  
 
There were other imperatives. Even without the restrictions on reporting the effects of 
the bombing, weather and so on, the censor’s work elsewhere encouraged newspapers 
to report non-war items. Entertainment and lighter news, like crime, gave 
Manchester’s editors, who were restricted in what they could publish about the war, 
an opportunity to make their newspapers distinctive. The evidence suggests they 
grasped that opportunity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                            
50 Jack Fuller, News Values (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 69.  
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Chapter 10 
The Moving News Agenda 
 
1. Introduction     
Wars are exceptional in that events move quickly and incidents that would 
remain in the news agenda in normal times are swiftly overtaken. In the Second 
World War Germany launched bombing raids on Britain, to a lesser and greater 
extent, for five years, so even hugely significant local events, such as the Manchester 
Blitz, expeditiously descended the news agenda. Within a week of the Christmas raids 
on Manchester, London suffered the big raid on 29 December – during which 
Mason’s famous picture of St Paul’s Cathedral was taken – and what was happening 
in Piccadilly, Manchester, was superseded by Piccadilly in the West End. For national 
newspapers news priorities moved 200 miles south very quickly; what was surprising 
was that Manchester’s newspapers followed just as rapidly. 
The censor was partly to blame. Randall noted that timing is important:  
News, unlike wine, does not improve with keeping. Elapsed time, however, is not 
the most important of factors in itself. If you learn of a major development three 
weeks after it has occurred, the crucial factor is not the delay, but how many 
people have learnt of the development in the meantime. If the story is still not 
public knowledge, the three-week interval will not significantly reduce the news 
value… Timing is more often a negative factor, subtracting value when there are 
delays which allow the story to become widely known.1  
 
With the censor insisting that national newspapers could not name bombed cities until 
it was certain the Germans knew where they had raided, normally meaning a delay of 
two days, and restrictions on identifying localities and damage to buildings for 28 
days, the news value was diminished, particularly when the local population could 
witness the damage with their own eyes. There was also an eagerness to subsume the 
Manchester narrative into the national one constructed around St Paul’s, the City and 
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the East End.2 This meant that even in late December 1940, when the city and its 
people were at their lowest, there was no distinctive northern voice recorded in 
Manchester’s newspapers.   
This thesis has indicated that there was an element within the Manchester 
public who believed their suffering did not get the media attention it merited and the 
newspapers’ inclination to move on contributed to the mythology of the Blitz because 
they did not report the mood of the people over a longer period. This chapter will 
examine whether Mancunians had grounds for their grievance with an analysis of the 
three Manchester newspapers to chart the Christmas Blitz’s fall down the news 
agenda. This will be done by enumerating the references to the air raids of 22/23 and 
23/24 December and the subsequent repair to the city’s infrastructure, the re-housing 
of the homeless, and the lessons learned by the emergency services. A quantitative 
analysis of the references to the raid on the seven subsequent Tuesdays will be 
undertaken. 
 To ensure that the Manchester Guardian, Manchester Evening News and 
Evening were not exceptional, they will be compared to the coverage that appeared in 
other newspapers: two nationals, The Times and the Daily Mirror, and the local 
weekly, the Salford City Reporter. These newspapers were chosen for their 
contrasting audiences. The Mirror was a left-leaning paper that was targeted at the 
working class, while The Times, described by Gannon as ‘incomparably the most 
important British newspaper of the 1930s’, was conservative (and Conservative) in 
nature, regarded as the newspaper for the establishment and had in its editor from 
1929 to 1941, Geoffrey Dawson, a lifelong friend of Lord Halifax, the Foreign 
                                            
2 Calder, Myth, p. XIV. 
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Secretary at the start of the war.3 Dawson was also an acquaintance of Stanley 
Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain. Price described Dawson as ‘the nearest thing 
Baldwin had to a confidant in Fleet Street’, and was very closely connected to the 
Conservative Party. 4 It is easy to stereotype The Times’s readership in 1940 and 1941 
as resolutely reactionary, but the letter printed on 15 January 1941 from Lieutenant-
Colonel R. C. Bingham was not untypical. He wrote: 
Never has the old school tie and the best that it stands for more justified than it is 
today. Our new armies are being officered by classes of society who are new to the 
job. The middle, lower-middle and working classes are now receiving the King’s 
Commission. These classes, unlike the old aristocratic and feudal (almost) classes 
who led the army, never had ‘their people’ to consider. They have never had 
anyone to think of but themselves. This aspect of life is completely new to them 
and they have largely fallen down on it in their capacity as army officers…. Man 
management is not a subject which can be ‘taught’: it is an attitude of mind, and 
with the old school tie men this was instinctive and part of the philosophy of life.5 
 
It is not a letter one might have expected to read in the Daily Mirror in 1941. 
The Salford City Reporter had a narrowly defined, and largely working class, 
audience and its coverage rarely strayed even into other parts of Greater Manchester. 
Formed in 1879 by Peter Hampson, it remained in his family and in the 1940s was 
owned and edited by Capt. Stuart Hirst Hampson.6 A weekly paper published on 
Fridays, it merged with the Salford Chronicle and Telephone in 1926 but never 
threatened the dominance of its Manchester neighbours and the city’s only mention in 
the 1949 Royal Commission on the Press was its distinction as the largest conurbation 
outside Greater London with no daily paper.7 Nevertheless, in the terms of this study, 
it provided an appropriate counterpoint to the above national newspapers and another 
example by which to weigh the reporting in Manchester’s newspapers. 
                                            
3 Bingham and Conboy, ‘Daily Mirror’, p. 643; Gannon, British Press, p. 56; Mass Observation, FR 
126, described The Times as a ‘purely class A-B’ newspaper, while the Daily Mirror’s readers were 
‘predominantly working class’, but with a larger sample than expected of ‘A-B women’.   
4 Price, Where Power Lies, p. 56. 
5 ‘Man Management’, Times, 15 January 1941, p. 5. 
6 ‘S. H. Hampson’, Times, 13 Jan 1956, p. 11. 
7 Royal Commission, p. 11. 
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2. Analysing the News after the Manchester Blitz     
The way the news focus moved quickly away from Manchester was best 
illustrated by The Observer, a national Sunday newspaper whose first opportunity to 
report and reflect on what had happened in the city on 22/23 and 23/24 December was 
in its 29 December issue. Sunday newspapers, according to Hamilton, should analyse 
and amplify the news  – 'On a busy weekday, people wanted newspapers with well-
organised, instantly accessible information. But on Sundays they wanted something 
more.' – yet only three reports contained the word ‘Manchester’ in The Observer on 
29 December and one of those was on the sports page about football results.8 The 
principal story was on page two and comprised only nine short paragraphs and 17 
centimetres of print on the previous day’s mass burial at Southern Cemetery.9 Given 
that The Observer was printed too early to report on the previous night’s attack on the 
capital when the Luftwaffe dropped 10,000 incendiaries – a headline read ‘Quiet day 
in London’ – such neglect reflected the eagerness of all editors to report the latest 
news rather than reflect on past events.10 
The Observer was and is a national newspaper and had to satisfy an audience 
that was far wider than Manchester. Yet, surprisingly, both the Manchester Evening 
News and the Evening Chronicle also failed properly to report the aftermath of the 
city’s Blitz, neglecting to highlight the deficiencies listed by Home Intelligence, to 
report the plethora of human interest stories, or to examine the restoration to 
normality or the rebuilding of the transport and utility infrastructure. By 30 
December, eight days after the first night of the raids, the concentration of the 
Evening Chronicle was on London. The main headline read: ‘Guildhall and other 
                                            
8 Hamilton, Editor-in-Chief, p. 86; ‘Football: Yesterday’s Results Rugby Union, Observer, 29 
December 1940, p. 10. 
9 ‘Mass Funeral in Manchester: Air Raid Victims Buried’, Observer, 29 December 1940, p. 2.  
10 ‘Quiet Day in London’, Observer, 29 December 1940, p. 7. 
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famous buildings damaged’, while the strap line was ‘Nazis’ deliberate attempt to fire 
city of London’. This was complemented by a picture of the wrecked Guildhall, with 
a headline ‘Nazis chose this as a target’.11 The only Manchester reference on page one 
was a small article reporting a message to the city’s people from the chairman of the 
Manchester Emergency Committee.12  
Looking at the Evening Chronicle editions published on Tuesdays from 24 
December 1940 to 4 February 1941 there is a clear pattern of diminishing coverage of 
the Manchester Blitz. On 24 December there were six stories about the attacks on the 
front page and on the back page there was a report headlined: ‘Manchester is keeping 
its chin up.’13 Seven days later, the number of front page reports had fallen 33 per 
cent to four, but the lead story had no reference to the city at all, and concentrated on 
the battle in the north Atlantic.14 This was a surprising choice in news terms because 
the second lead was headlined: ‘City had fewer than 500 dead’.15 The figure was a 
fiction, but normative news values would have concentrated on what was still a huge 
number of fatalities, with a headline emphasising the rising death toll. These values 
were contemporary: Henry Wickham Steed, a former editor of The Times, was quoted 
by Home Intelligence in May 1940 defining news as ‘something exceptional, 
something out of the ordinary run’.16 The death of 500 local people was 
unprecedented. 
 If the coverage on 31 December was clearly affected by the censor, by 7 
January 1941 the editorial judgement of the newspaper was becoming clearer because 
there was not a single report on the Manchester Blitz, a surprise omission given that 
                                            
11 ‘Guildhall and Other Famous Buildings Damaged’, Evening Chronicle, 30 December 1940, p. 1.  
12 ‘Tribute’, Evening Chronicle, 30 December 1940, p. 1. 
13 ‘Manchester is Keeping its Chin Up’, Evening Chronicle, 24 December 1940, p. 6. 
14 ‘Nearer to Beating U-Boat’, Evening Chronicle, 31 December 1940, p. 1. 
15 ‘City Had Fewer Than 500 Dead’, Evening Chronicle, 31 December 1940, p. 1. 
16 Mass Observation, FR 126.  
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the city was only just beginning to recover. Only the advertisements on the back page 
indicated that something extraordinary had happened to the city. One read: 
'Manchester carries on and so do the Fifty Shilling Tailors’, while another, from a 
shoemakers, told customers that its St Mary’s Gate shop would be restored but asked 
customers to ‘kindly make use of the other Manchester branches’.17 There was no 
reference to the Blitz in the 14 January edition, two in the 21 January newspaper, one 
on 28 January and none on 4 February (see Table 4, below). 
The attention of the Manchester Evening News moved even more quickly than 
the Evening Chronicle and there was no reference to the city on the front page of 27 
December, only the third edition after the Manchester Blitz. By 6 January 1941 there 
was not a single domestic report on page one, with every story referring to foreign 
news. Paradoxically, the following day the Evening News led on a follow-up story to 
London’s raid on 29 December, something they neglected to when it came to its own 
city. Reporting the bombing of the BBC, the report began: ‘Today it can be revealed 
that Broadcasting House has twice been hit during raids and has been seriously 
damaged.’18 The BBC was the national broadcaster so the report would have had 
impact on the Evening News’s readers, but the contrast is still stark.  
This reflected the Evening News’s news agenda, no doubt influenced by its 
editor Haley, who was reported as saying that the capital was of prime importance, 
adding: ‘Nothing in the North signified.’19 This was a clear departure from the usual 
framing of local news and was borne out by a quantitative analysis of the references 
to the Manchester raids. The 24 December edition carried three large reports on page 
one and seven days later there was only one reference on the main news page, 
                                            
17 Evening Chronicle, 7 January 1941, p. 6.  
18 ‘BBC Staff Killed, but Programmes Went On’, Manchester Evening News, 7 January 1941, p. 1. 
19 Koss, Rise and Fall, p. 388. 
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highlighting, the need for more firewatchers.20 This edition proved to be a high point, 
however, because the eight reports in total had fallen to one on 7 January 1941 and on 
14 January there was only an advice column on the back page, headlined: '11 tips for 
Blitz victims who have a claim.’21 
As the raids on the city became more sporadic later in 1941, this attention 
wandered even further and an attack on Chorlton-cum-Hardy, an area to the south of 
the city centre, not only failed to make the front page but was relegated to a short 
single-column story on page six.22 A heavier raid received more coverage but the 
emphasis was on Manchester’s air defences rather than the bombers, and any sense of 
objectivity had been surrendered. Indeed, the report could have come from a novel or 
a boys’ comic. It read: 
Twenty three German bombers – a grand new record – were destroyed during 
widespread attacks on Britain last night. Twenty-two fell to our ever-deadlier night 
fighters. AA gunners blasted the 23rd out of the sky, and a number of others were 
damaged. One night fighter pilot chased his quarry 40 miles before sending in a 
deadly burst.23 
 
The Manchester Guardian, as a national newspaper, had a greater interest in 
reflecting the national picture and it, too quickly, switched its focus. On 27 December, 
the first edition when reporters could reflect on the damage to the city, the lead story 
on the main news page was the battle for a town on the Libya-Egypt border, and the 
aftermath of the Manchester Blitz did not even make the top of the page.24 Instead it 
appeared below a separate report headlined:  
CHRISTMAS LULL IN AIR WAR 
No Bombing Attacks on Britain or on Germany.25 
                                            
20 ‘Extend the Watch’, Manchester Evening News, 31 December 1940, p. 1.  
21 ’11 Tips for Blitz Victims who have a Claim”, Manchester Evening News, 14 January 1941, p. 6. 
22 ‘Short, Swift Raid in N-W’, Manchester Evening News, 2 May 1941, p. 6. 
23 ’23 Down in One Night: 22 by Fighters’, Manchester Evening News, 8 May 1941, p. 1. 
24 ‘The Siege of Bardia’, Manchester Guardian, 27 December 1940, p. 5. 
25 Manchester Guardian, 27 December 1940 
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The work of the censor can be detected here because it is a non-story and even the 
report on the city’s bombing, the bulk of which was below the fold, lacked human 
interest in that its headline focussed on a bureaucratic exercise: a survey.26 This 
avoidance of the ‘human angle’ was contrary to accepted reporting norms as defined 
by a Home Intelligence report seven months earlier. It read:  
After news of a battle has been printed and become stale, it is usually followed up 
by accounts of interviews with those who took part in it, what they said, what they 
felt, etc… Getting the ‘human angle’ on news has the advantage of making events 
come alive to the reader, of stirring him by personal detail.27     
 
This anxiety to move on was reflected elsewhere in the Guardian and within a 
week, the main headlines on consecutive editions were: ‘Last night’s heavy bombing 
of London’, ‘Night fighters in action over London’ and ‘Guildhall destroyed: City 
churches suffer’.28 This was in line with the number of references to the Manchester 
Blitz over the study period. On 24 December 1940 the most illuminating aspect of the 
edition was the warning to boil drinking water referred to earlier in the thesis. There 
were four reports on the raids and that increased to five by 31 December and six by 7 
January as the censor allowed more to be reported. That proved to be the peak in 
terms of coverage, because there were only three references to the Manchester Blitz in 
the 14 January 1941 newspaper, one on 21 January and two on 28 January, an 
extraordinary neglect in view of the scope for stories. Visually, the largest coverage of 
the Manchester Blitz in all the Tuesday editions came on 4 February 1941 when page 
three carried five photographs, comprising 182 centimetres, of Wendell Willkie’s visit 
to Manchester. The previous chapters have highlighted that Mancunians felt their 
suffering had been under-reported and it is perhaps a reflection of their need to share 
                                            
26 ‘A Manchester Survey After Attack’, Manchester Guardian, 27 December 1940, p. 5. 
27 Mass Observation, FR 126. 
28 ‘Last Night’s Heavy Bombing of London’, Manchester Guardian, 28 December 1940, p. 7; Night 
Fighters in Action over London’, Manchester Guardian, 30 December 1940, p. 5;  
 ‘Guildhall Destroyed: City Churches Suffer’, Manchester Guardian, 31 December 1940, p. 5. 
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the news of the city’s plight that a Guardian advertisement offered readers the 
opportunity to order reprints of the 14 January edition with a particular story, ‘They 
came to Manchester’, the principal attraction.29 ‘In many cases readers wanted copies 
to send to relatives and friends at home or abroad,’ the advertising copy read.30 The 
article in question, a single column 65 centimetres long, was narrative in tone, the 
introduction being typical:  
Do you remember Manchester? The rain, the soot, the businessmen with their 
bowler hats and their neatly rolled umbrellas, and the trams. Do you remember 
those narrow alley-ways, paved with rough cobbles and perpetually running with 
muddy water which were so proudly and so mistakenly described as streets?31   
 
The report was full of stereotypes – ‘ Every self-respecting Manchester man carries an 
umbrella’ – and propaganda and skirted over much of the damage, yet the initial print 
could not meet the demand. A week later a second reprint was announced because 
‘the first supply was exhausted within a few hours’.32  
Table 4 
 
News stories on the Manchester Blitz on Tuesdays from 24 December 
1940 to 4 February 1941 
 
 Manchester Guardian Manchester 
Evening News  
Evening Chronicle 
24 December 1940 4 4 7 
31 December 1940  5 8 7 
07 January 1941 6 1 0 
14 January 1941  3 1 0 
21 January 1941  1 5 2 
28 January 1941  2 2 1 
04 February 1941  2 0 0 
 
The hunger for news about the Manchester Blitz was clearly there, making the 
decision to leave the aftermath largely unreported more inexplicable in terms of the 
contemporary news values. 
                                            
29 ‘They Came to Manchester’, Manchester Guardian, 14 January 1941, p. 10. 
30 Manchester Guardian, 28 January 1941, p. 4. 
31 ‘They Came to Manchester’, Manchester Guardian, 14 January 1941, p. 10.  
32 Manchester Guardian, 4 February 1941, p. 4. 
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3. The Times, the Daily Mirror and the Salford City Reporter 
The above suggests there was demand for news of the Blitz, but Manchester’s 
newspapers did not linger over their own city’s attack. Were they atypical? Analysis  
of two national titles and the weekly newspaper in neighbouring Salford over the 
same period shows they were not. The Times, typically, comprised 10 broadsheet 
pages over the study period and cost 2d (less than 1 pence). Of those, only five 
contained foreign and domestic news, two were devoted to finance, one was filled 
with births, marriages and deaths and two contained only small advertisements. In 
terms of space, news made up 50 per cent of the newspaper, but war news made up 
only 30 per cent of the entire edition. The main difference between The Times and 
Manchester’s newspapers was the amount of space given to entertainment, just a 
quarter of a page, with sports news amounting to just four shorts that filled eight 
centimetres of newsprint. Closer analysis of the copy showed that news travelled 
slowly to London where the offices of The Times were based, so while the Guardian 
gave extensive reports on the first night of the Manchester Blitz, albeit cloaked as a 
North-West inland town, the only mention of that raid in The Times came in a report 
headed ‘Raids again on Merseyside’ and even that was only in passing: ‘For the third 
successive night enemy aircraft were over Liverpool last evening as well as another 
town in the North-West.’33 The censor’s work was evident but the following night 
restrictions had clearly been lifted because The Times’s lead story was: 
SEVERE RAID ON MANCHESTER 
Many Buildings Burnt Down 
ALL-NIGHT ATTACK34 
                                            
33 ‘Raids Again on Merseyside’, Times, 23 December 1940, p. 4. 
34 ‘Severe Raid on Manchester’, Times, 24 December 1940, p. 2. 
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The report referred to the raid on the Sunday night, rather than Monday, which is why 
the target could be named, but if the censor was relaxing his grip over the use of 
Manchester, there was plenty of evidence of propaganda in the copy in that it 
emphasised civilian targets. The report listed the damage to a large block of shops, a 
clothing store, a theatre and a hotel, while, lower down, it reported: ‘Bombs fell on 
two public shelters, one accommodating nearly 500 people, and casualties were 
caused.’35   
If that suggested to The Times’s readers that things were dire in Manchester, 
readers were reassured in the paper’s next edition, 27 December. Under the headline 
‘Restoring order in Manchester’ a report read: ‘It is serious enough but not as much as 
one would have expected after seeing flames which, besides eating up buildings, 
acted as beacons for the raiders.’36 By it were the headlines: ‘A raid-free Christmas’ 
and ‘Merrymaking in the shelters’, neither of which referred to Manchester. With that 
optimistic postscript, Manchester virtually disappeared from the The Times’s news 
agenda and there were passing references to the raids on the city in only nine more 
reports until 4 February 1941, and one of those was a single sentence announcing the 
abandonment of the New Year’s Day meeting at the local horse-racing track.37 There 
were suggestions of criticism of Manchester’s preparation but only hints, the most 
obvious being a report on 9 January which had the headlines: 
LESSONS OF THE BOMBING 
GATE-CRASHING OF REST CENTRES 
MANCHESTER CRITICISMS38 
                                            
35 Ibid. 
36 ‘Restoring Order in Manchester’, Times, 27 December 1940, p. 2. 
37 ‘Manchester Meeting Abandoned’, Times, 28 December 1940, p. 2. 
38 ‘Lessons of the Bombing’, Times, 9 January 1941, p. 2. 
  
272
The copy, as so often, was less damning. The council agreed that ‘an obvious 
precaution should be to send representatives to learn lessons from cities already 
bombed’ and a councillor reported that too many people had turned up at a shelter 
designed for 700. ‘Over 1,500 persons claimed admittance as having been bombed 
out and all were admitted and given breakfast, the truthful and the untruthful.’39 Both 
elements had the potential for news reports but neither was followed up.    
If the Manchester public felt that their suffering was largely ignored by The 
Times, however, the sense of neglect would have been greater in readers of the Daily 
Mirror, a newspaper that would have had a far larger circulation in a city based on 
manufacture and particularly so in the largely working class areas that felt the brunt of 
the bombing. The Mirror, made up of 12 tabloid pages and costing 1d throughout the 
study period, did not acknowledge that Manchester had been attacked until 24 
December 1940, an edition later than The Times, and the front page story comprised 
only three short paragraphs at the bottom of the page that displayed unusual news 
values.40 The introduction concentrated on the reported shooting down of an enemy 
aircraft – the word ‘reported’ suggests there has been no official confirmation, thus 
weakening the story – yet the second paragraph, which was the obvious news peg, 
read: ‘During a raid on a N-W town a number of people were trapped in cellars. Some 
houses were demolished and some people were killed.’ Even that paragraph had a 
surprising order of information because the deaths should have come before those 
trapped in the cellars and the demolished houses. On page two there was an indication 
of the scale of the bombing that had hit the city on the night of 22/23 December. 
Under the headline ‘Manchester gets its first big bombing’, the report read: 
                                            
39 Ibid.  
40 ‘Raider Down at Manchester’, Daily Mirror, 24 December 1940, p. 1. 
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Seventeen hours after the start of Sunday night’s Blitz on Manchester, rescue 
squads were still working to free people trapped under damaged buildings in 
various parts of the city.41 
 
The time scale, the word ‘Blitz’ and the fact that the bombing was not confined to a 
single area would have been an indicator of the size of the raid. The reporting was 
inadequate given that around 1,000 people died in Manchester, Salford and Stretford 
but from 24 December until the end of the study period the Daily Mirror made only 
one more reference to Manchester’s Blitz and that was in a comment piece in the ‘Tin 
Hat Tales’ column of the 1 January edition. Even that was by way of an introduction 
to a reader’s letter and began: 
You probably heard the reference in a recent BBC news bulletin to a Manchester 
appeal urging people not to crowd into the bombed part of the town to ‘view the 
damage’. 42 
 
That would suggest there was something to see but the Mirror did not report it and the 
main references to Manchester from Christmas were in the football results on page 
10, addresses in advertisements, and in the imprint on page five, the main comment 
page. 
The Mirror in the study period carried news on five of its 12 pages, and 
displayed the characteristics shown in other newspapers studied in this thesis in its 
determination to downplay German success and over-rate British triumphs. For 
example, on 17 December, the RAF was reported as hitting railways, munitions 
factories and power plants in Berlin while, in the story next to it, a 34-year-old 
woman was described as ‘The angel of the shelter’ for her work in Stratford.43 It 
carried far more photographs – averaging six an edition – and put even greater 
emphasis on entertainment than its rivals, pages nine and 10, for example, carrying a 
short piece of fiction and a near full page of cartoons. This was apart from ‘Jane’, a 
                                            
41 ‘Manchester Gets its First Big Bombing’, Daily Mirror, 24 December 1940, p. 2. 
42 ‘Tin Hat Tales’, Daily Mirror, 1 January 1941, p. 4. 
43 ‘Mother To 500 Children’, Daily Mirror, 17 December 1940, p. 7. 
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daily cartoon pin-up that was considered such a circulation booster it appeared with 
the paper’s main commentator, ‘Cassandra’, on page four. Jane ‘was the heroine of 
the British Army’, her contribution to the war effort being ‘to take off an 
unprecedented number of clothes’.44 The sexual theme was continued when a Baptist 
pastor in Weston-super-Mare claimed that the darkness and the close confinement of 
the shelters was leading to personal corruption. ‘It has now become dangerous to a 
young man’s moral reputation for him to be seen coming out of an air raid shelter at 
night,’ the report stated.45  
The newspaper failed entirely to note the rising crime rates that were affecting 
young men far more profoundly than nights in shelters, although it did carry a report 
from Manchester, ‘Sentries guard milk’. The report read: ‘“Milk watchers” have been 
organized in Manchester to break a racket that is robbing babies of their breakfast – 
the theft from doorsteps every morning in the blackout of bottles of milk.’46 The 
report, the reference to babies’ breakfasts designed to incur the reader’s indignation, 
alleged that one supplier had counted 5,000 bottles missing in one week, yet, 
curiously no Manchester newspaper picked up the story, Whether that casts doubts on 
the veracity of the report is debatable, but the Mirror had several tales during the 
study period that provoke scepticism, most notably the crippled woman who had 
survived a night of extreme misfortune. It read: ‘Tin hats off to a brave old lady who 
has been “bombed out” four times in a night.’47 The report did not include the 
identity, the age or where this remarkable old lady lived but she was ‘still smiling’. 
The Salford City Reporter’s initial coverage of the Manchester Blitz almost 
certainly suffered because of the Christmas holiday. Published on 27 December 1940, 
                                            
44 Cudlipp, p. 69; Ruth Dudley Edwards, Newspapermen: Hugh Cudlipp, Cecil Harmsworth King and 
the Glory Days of Fleet Street (London: Secker and Warburg, 2003), p. 180. 
45 ‘Vice Danger in Shelters’, Daily Mirror, 17 December 1940, p. 2. 
46 ‘Sentries Guard Milk’, Daily Mirror, 21 December 1940, p. 11. 
47 ‘Tin Hat Tales’, Daily Mirror, 17 December 1940, p. 4. 
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the four-page edition suggested that many of its pages had been set before the first 
bomb had dropped and it was noticeable that a review of the year on page four 
amounted to more copy in terms of length than a report on page three, the main news 
page, on the air raids that had left more than 200 Salfordians dead and 900 injured. A 
further clue that the review had been compiled some time before publication was 
absence of any mention of the Blitz. The copy in the news report of the attacks was 
deferential to the censor in a manner even more pronounced than the Manchester 
newspapers and the introduction read: ‘A town in the Manchester district had its most 
severe raid of the war on Sunday night. It lasted for many hours during which the 
sound of enemy bombers was heard at short intervals.’48 Later the report went through 
the propaganda almost point by point: ‘The public bore the indiscriminate attack with 
composure. In the morning they went to their occupations as normal. Morale was 
high.’ There were just two reports on the raid and amounted to less than two columns 
in a paper that contained 28, amounting to around seven per cent of the edition. 
This was not atypical. The Reporter, which cost three halfpence (just more 
than half a 1p), did not ape the national and Manchester newspapers by moving its 
news focus to London, but it did not do justice to the very important story on its 
doorstep either. Apart from 27 December, the Reporter comprised six pages 
throughout the study period, with adverts on the front page and reports from the 
courts dominating every edition. The first newspaper of 1941 proved to be the high 
water mark in terms of coverage of the Christmas Blitz, comprising nearly 70 per cent 
of the main news page (although this still represented a surprisingly meagre amount in 
the context of the whole paper). The lead story maintained the anonymity of Salford 
but the adjoining report illustrated the balancing act newspapers had in trying to 
                                            
48 ‘Blitz on N. W. Town’, Salford City Reporter, 27 December 1940, p. 3. 
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appease the censor because it carried a tribute from an un-named Mayor.49 Given the 
parochial nature of the rest of the newspaper, it would have been inconceivable that 
he could come from anywhere other than Salford. 
The following week’s newspaper, 10 January 1941, gave explicit mention of 
the Blitz only twice, an editorial on firewatchers and another report on housing the 
homeless, but that could have been because of censorial pressure. Certainly the 
coverage expanded when the editorial on 17 January announced: ‘It is now possible to 
mention that Salford has recently suffered from air attack by the enemy.’50 This tacit 
acknowledgement of government control would not have been news to the readers of 
the Reporter, who not only could see the city had been attacked but had been reading 
about it in the Manchester Evening News and Evening Chronicle since 23 December. 
Nevertheless, the relaxation of the censorship restrictions allowed the Reporter to 
chronicle the visits of the Duke of Kent and Wendell Willkie and to print some human 
interest stories even if they never strayed from an heroic narrative. Thus there was the 
driver who courageously saved a bus depot; the Salford man who was awarded the 
George Medal for rescuing a woman and three children from a bombed building; and 
the gas foreman who fought a blaze in perilous circumstances.51 The less 
commendable were absent from the Reporter’s pages and by the 7 February 1941 the 
Christmas Blitz was almost as scarce. There were just three mentions, and none was 
substantial.  
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50 ‘After The Raids’, Salford City Reporter, 17 January 1941, p. 2. 
51 ‘Drove Burning Bus into Street’, Salford City Reporter, 24 January 1941, p. 3; ‘Gallantry in Salford 
Air Raids’, Salford City Reporter, 31 January 1941, p. 3; ‘Fought Fire on Top of Gas Holder’, Salford 
City Reporter, 31 January 1941, p. 3.  
  
277
4. Conclusion  
While the Daily Mirror may have had an old lady smiling through the Blitz, 
the evidence suggests she was exception. Just as the East End had been filled with 
plucky souls who could withstand the worst of the Luftwaffe, Mancunians were 
portrayed in the newspapers as a people unbowed by the Blitz of December 1940. 
This was a myth and, while many carried on bravely, a significant number were 
depressed and morale plummeted. Yet, the city’s suffering disappeared off the news 
agenda within a matter of days, compounding a sense of neglect. The sales of the 
souvenir editions of the Manchester Guardian – that included only three references to 
the attack on the city – indicated the demand for news was clearly there, a demand 
that was never satisfied to unfortunate effects. Mancunians felt neglected and their 
suffering ignored, so that they became sceptical of news about the Blitz in general. 
Home Intelligence reported: ‘Lack of news, plus a rather clumsy BBC handling of 
Manchester (both in the news and descriptive broadcasts) facilitated the Haw-Haw 
and rumour processes’.52 
 
 
                                            
52 Mass Observation, FR 538. 
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Part IV: Conclusion 
1. Introduction 
Curran and Seaton have argued that the Second World War was different from 
previous conflicts in that the British public was in the front line for the first time. 
They wrote: 
The strategic objective of the Blitz was to both physically impede war production 
and destroy psychologically the will of the civilian population to service the war 
effort. Extensive censorship controls were needed, it was claimed, in order to 
combat the new, deadly technology of aerial warfare.1 
 
Newspapers, as the principal sources of news at the start of the war, became the focus 
of this censorship and the consequence was a shaping of content so that the press 
became an outlet for government propaganda. This thesis has shown that this applied 
to Manchester and other provincial newspapers as much as to the national press and 
led to the creation of myths that helped boost morale and unify the nation. Among 
them was the civilian reaction to the Blitz.  
 The conclusion will be organised around four main broader themes, related to 
the key original contributions of the thesis. It will start by briefly indicating how the 
research has provided fresh insight into the reporting of the Second World War and 
the dynamics of production by a neglected section of the media, the provincial press. 
Second, it will show it has added a further layer of complexity to our understanding of 
the experience of being bombed during the Second World War. Third, the wider issue 
of the reporting of the Manchester Blitz will be addressed. Fourth, an explanation will 
be offered as to how the study elaborated upon the relationship between newspapers 
and their audience. Finally, a closing example, taken from the Manchester Guardian, 
will reveal forcibly the chasm which had opened between the feelings of Mancunians 
                                            
1 Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, p.56. 
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and the reportage being presented by Manchester newspapers and thus tellingly lay 
bare how censorship, both government and self-imposed, influenced news reporting. 
 
2. Provincial Newspapers 
The first major contribution of the thesis is to the understanding of the 
provincial press between 1939 and 1945. Circulation figures underline the importance 
of local and regional newspapers in the Second World War in that, while the sales of 
national newspapers rose by 5.5 million to 15.4 million between 1937 and 1947, the 
corresponding figure for the provincial, weekly and bi-weekly publications was 10.2 
million (13.5 million to 23.7 million).2 This meant the British public were reading 
more provincial newspapers in comparison to the national press at a rate of between 
36 and 54 per cent. The fact that the censor gave local newspapers more freedom 
when it came to reporting bomb damage underlines the fundamental contribution they 
played in providing a conduit of news and a communication channel between the 
authorities and the public. Other studies have neglected local newspapers and this 
study is further focused by concentrating on Manchester, a city so important in terms 
of newspaper production in Britain that it was known as ‘the other Fleet Street’.3     
The role of the provincial press in the Second World War was trumpeted in 
1946 by Sir William Bailey, the president of the Newspaper Society, when he harked 
back to what he had written in October 1939: 
It is now a matter for each and every one of us to see that… our papers come out 
for the continued information of our readers and the sustaining of their morale in 
what may prove to be a long struggle.4 
 
Seven years on from those words Bailey, whose organisation represented and 
promoted the interests of Britain’s regional and local newspapers, had grounds, 
                                            
2 Appendix 1.  
3 Waterhouse, Other Fleet Street, p. 7.  
4 Fletcher, Never Failed, p. 5. 
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notwithstanding his subjectivity, for leading the chorus of praise in a preface to the 
book with the self-congratulatory title: They Never Failed: The Story of the Provincial 
Press in Wartime. The narrative within local newspapers had provided a vital service 
during the Second World War, carrying important central and local government 
messages into millions of homes, providing entertainment and respite in the face of 
nights of bombing, and keeping thousands of soldiers, sailors and airmen in touch 
with what was happening at home. This was done despite newspaper offices being 
bombed, occasionally to destruction, the rationing of newsprint and ink, shortages of 
staff, and disruptions to transport infrastructure. Bailey added: ‘Provincial newspapers 
overcame their difficulties, and, true to long established tradition, they always came 
out.’5  
This thesis, however, has challenged another of his assertions that appeared in 
that same preface. Namely: 
Now, after nearly six years of war – in which those newspapers have carried home-
town news to men and women in every part of the world, and by their faithful 
reporting of local, national and international events have inspired new confidence 
in their readers – those newspapers enjoy a prestige higher than at any other time 
in their long history.6 
 
This was nonsense. By examining the three most influential provincial newspapers in 
Manchester in 1940 and 1941, this thesis has shown that the reporting was not faithful 
to the events, but chose instead to adopt a narrative that relentlessly stressed the 
positive and, as a consequence, confidence in the press did the opposite to Bailey’s 
assertion and diminished. This was borne out by Home Intelligence inspectors, by 
Mass Observation diarists and by surveys that were commissioned by the Ministry of 
Information.  
                                            
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid, p. 5. 
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Yet the circulations grew, underlining that readers’ motivations for buying a 
newspaper are more complex than a desire to be informed about the war. Non-war 
and lighter news, business and entertainment were also incentives to buy newspapers 
and this was reflected in the amount of space Manchester’s press devoted to these 
items. The quantitative analysis in this thesis demonstrated that war news filled 20, 15 
and 17 per cent of the Manchester Guardian, Manchester Evening News and Evening 
Chronicle respectively during the study period, meaning that at least 80 per cent of 
the editions were filled with other items.7  
        Little attention has been paid in the past to the dynamics of newspaper 
production between 1939 and 1945, something this thesis has gone some way to 
address. Conscription ensured that Manchester’s newspapers had to operate with 
reduced numbers of staff and those who remained were at either end of the age scale. 
This had implications for reporting and sub-editing, but not on the same scale as the 
censorship of the main sources of national and international news, the press agencies. 
This meant that the war news, largely derived from communiqués, was homogenized, 
strictly controlled and heavily laced with propaganda. Rationing of newsprint also had 
a profound effect, reducing all the newspapers to a third or less of their pre-war sizes 
and meaning that many news stories that normally would have been printed had to be 
suppressed. There was also the question of how newspapers balanced their 
commercial interests with their restricted resources and the research confirmed the 
findings of the 1949 Press Commission that reported that advertising migrated away 
from the national newspapers to the provinces.8 Advertising filled 24 per cent of the 
Manchester Guardian, a national, while the corresponding figures for the Manchester 
Evening News and Evening Chronicle were 56 and 43 per cent.  
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3.  The Reaction to Being Bombed  
Another major contribution the thesis makes is to demonstrate there was a 
more nuanced reaction to the bombing than was portrayed by the newspapers. While 
some people displayed stoicism, efficiency and bravery under often appalling 
conditions during the Blitz, there were less-heroic, one could say natural, alternatives 
to this narrative of an unbowed population standing up unflinchingly to extreme 
adversity. The emphasis of many histories, too, has been on London and this thesis 
has helped underline that most cities in Britain endured their own bombings, with all 
the national and regional characteristics that implied. Mass Observation’s files show 
this, just as entries in diaries and reports reveal changes in behaviour, including 
absenteeism, laxer morals and increased alcohol consumption. Dr George Franklin, a 
wartime psychoanalyst, reported that this ‘jaunty behaviour’ was a reaction to 
heightened anxiety and that people used bravado to hide their fears. He added: 
Apparently normal people drank more alcohol. Sexual desire, especially in women, 
was much intensified during the Blitz. A number of men complained to me about 
their wives making excessive demands and I know of very many who were 
unfaithful to their husbands.9  
 
Communities reacted differently to being attacked by the Luftwaffe depending on the 
regularity of the bombing, the demographics, the extent of the damage to housing and 
the city’s infrastructure, local jealousies and the ability of the authorities to react. 
Cities could respond differently at different times, too, as Home Intelligence 
discovered when inspectors recorded contrasting moods in Liverpool in December 
1940 and May 1941.10 
Histories of the Blitz frequently have Manchester as a footnote, despite its 
status as a major urban and commercial centre, important inland port and print centre. 
                                            
9 Gardiner, The Blitz, p. 184. 
10 Mass Observation, FRs 538 and 706. 
  
283
This thesis has addressed this, pointing out that nearly one in 60 casualties of the 
Luftwaffe’s bombing campaign was suffered in the 30-hour period of the Christmas 
Blitz. It also noted that the reaction to the 1940 Blitz was that of shock borne by 
timing and an attitude bordering on complacency. The thesis has shown that 
Manchester’s mood was that of diminishing concern as the city approached the 
holiday period relatively untouched by war. There had been isolated raids but the 
multi-plane Blitzes had been reserved for Liverpool 35 miles to the west and most of 
the children who had been evacuated in autumn 1939 had returned to the city. As 
Maurice Roe, a child in Manchester in 1940, wrote, there was a sense of security: ‘In 
the Manchester area there had been a few sporadic raids, but nothing serious. So 
much so, that we didn’t always go to the shelter when the sirens sounded. But all this 
changed at Christmas 1940.’11 
The shock when the Luftwaffe came on 22 December was profound. Home 
Intelligence inspectors wrote that morale plummeted and there were other reports that 
differed from the heroic accounts that were being printed in newspapers.12 Brenda 
Lees wrote of her limbs trembling with fright; ‘David’, of Old Trafford, of his 
brother, a toddler, who was so traumatised he did not speak for a year; Frank 
Mackegg of the deep shock of walking into Ancoats Hospital to find a waiting room 
‘full of corpses’; and Joan Timms of returning from a shelter to discover burglars had 
broken into her Stretford home and stolen her Christmas presents.13 The need to 
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bolster morale in the face of persistent attack prompted the government eagerly to 
push the message of defiance and the popular image, usually centred on London, of a 
people who refused to be cowed. Many were not, but this thesis has shown that others 
questioned the worth and validity of the war effort when their lives were being 
jeopardised on a nightly basis. Rather than ‘we can take it’, they wondered ‘is it worth 
the misery’? 
 
4. Reporting the Blitz 
Manchester’s newspapers, for reasons including censorial, patriotic, 
hegemonic and financial, neglected to record these reactions and thus abandoned self-
adopted news values. Stephen Bax wrote that three things are expected of a 
responsible press:  
We expect newspaper reports to be accurate, as far as possible. If the facts are 
uncertain, however, the least we expect is that the press show caution and indicate 
any sources of doubt. Thirdly, if there is any hint of propaganda, we expect the 
press to be critical and questioning to ensure their independence and to ensure 
balance.14 
 
This thesis has shown that Manchester’s newspapers were often inaccurate, rarely 
indicated sources of doubt, did not confront the propaganda they were being fed from 
official sources and failed to report municipal deficiencies. These included a lack of 
preparation for the Blitz of December 1940, the shortage of food and shelters, and the 
inability at local government level to react to changing circumstances. All these 
shortcomings were reported by Home Intelligence in January 1941 and were most 
vividly summed up by the city’s buses sticking rigidly to prescribed routes in 
December 1940 even though bomb damage made them impassable.15 There was also 
                                                                                                                             
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/24/a2031724.shtml> [accessed 4 September 
2009] (para. 7). 
14 Stephen Bax. ‘Beware the Press in Times of War’, British Journalism Review, 17, 2 (2006), p. 53. 
15 Mass Observation, FR 538. 
  
285
no mention in Manchester’s newspapers of a shocked population, nor of potential 
unrest, yet Haley, the editor of the Manchester Evening News, wrote in his diary that 
he had to pass through a line of soldiers ‘with drawn bayonets’ on his way to work, 
not just for one day, but four.16   
Newspapers, in Manchester and nationally, ignored these deviations from the 
normal heroic narrative and, instead, they followed the trail laid for them by officials. 
The government drew back from taking advantage of its full censorship powers, 
partly because the ideal of a free press was one of the symbols of democracy Britain 
was defending against the Nazis, but also because newspapers were so compliant. The 
chairman of the Newspaper Emergency Council wrote to the MOI in 1939 that ‘our 
respective tasks and duties are complementary’, while some editors complained that 
the MOI was ‘too permissive in its advisory guidelines’.17          
These duties extended to deliberately ignoring stories that fit the label of ‘big 
news’ under any circumstances. The Daily Telegraph, for example, learned of the 
cracking of the German Enigma Code and chose not to publish the information. Price 
wrote: 
On occasion the papers even helped save the government from itself. Whitehall 
was no less leaky than in peacetime but when journalists obtained highly sensitive 
material they usually buried it rather than publish dramatic scoops that would have 
aided the enemy.18 
 
Given that the deciphering of Enigma Code was the ‘most secret of state secrets’ and 
that Allied lives would have been put at risk by publication, the Telegraph’s decision 
was fully justified, but it is less easy to reconcile the example revealed in this thesis in 
which the Manchester Guardian chose not to report in June 1941 that Hitler was 
                                            
16 Churchill Archives, Haley, 29 December 1940. 
17 Guardian Archive, Ministry of Information, 1/187, Letter to the Censorship Bureau, 10 September 
1939; Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, p. 63. 
18 Price, Where Power Lies, p. 127. 
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preparing to invade the Soviet Union.19 This would not have helped the enemy, if 
anything the publication of this material would have helped the war effort as it could 
have forewarned the Soviets. Churchill – ‘I gave clear and precise warning to Stalin 
of what was coming’ – had been briefing the Kremlin since April.20 The reluctance to 
print other stories, the talks between French generals and Churchill to unite the UK 
and France into one country being a prime example, illustrate the Manchester 
Guardian’s reticence to face the MOI’s fire, partly because the editor, Crozier, feared 
the consequences, but principally because he felt it was part of his duty to promote the 
war effort.  
Manchester’s newspapers were not exceptional. This thesis also analysed 
national newspapers, in particular The Times and the Daily Mirror, and they, too, 
subscribed to the myth of unflinching fortitude, adopting a template first ascribed to 
London and then extended to cover the whole of Britain. The tone was always 
optimistic and there were grounds for questioning the veracity of much of what was 
reported. Allied successes were exaggerated, German raids diminished, and the 
Luftwaffe was indicted for bombing schools, hospitals and houses while the RAF was 
lauded for unerringly destroying the means of war production. Charles Lynch, a 
Canadian reporter assigned to the British Army by the news agency Reuters, provided 
a verdict: 
It’s humiliating to look back at what we wrote during the war. It was crap… We 
were a propaganda arm of our governments. At the start the censors enforced that, 
but by the end we were our own censors. We were the cheerleaders. I suppose 
there wasn’t an alternative at the time. It was total war. But, for God’s sake, let’s 
not glorify our role. It wasn’t very good journalism. It wasn’t journalism at all.21  
 
 
 
 
                                            
19 Ibid. 
20 Broad, Churchill, p.329 
21 Knightley, First Casualty, p. 364. 
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5. Propaganda and the Audience 
Just as there were differing reactions to being bombed, there was a varied 
response by the audience to what was being written in their newspapers. This thesis 
has shown how the circuit of communication between the press and its readers 
changed between 1939 and 1945 so that the reporting of the war became distorted. 
Home Intelligence reported that the British public accepted that the government could 
‘choose’ what war news could be published, but the cost of this acquiescence was that 
trust in the press diminished accordingly.22 Newspapers did not print the truth and the 
public, many of whom in the bombed areas could see with their own eyes, knew it. 
Yet both parties largely accepted this on the basis it was in the national interest. As 
this thesis noted earlier, Bingham argued that neither the journalist nor the newspaper 
buyer is guaranteed to believe what is written or read.23           
This sheds a new light on the propaganda model. Cottle argued that the theory 
of manufactured consent is more complex than the top-down progression propagated 
by Herman and Chomsky in that people ‘obeyed’ for a variety of reasons, including 
tradition, apathy and pragmatic acquiescence.24 He added: 
We cannot simply assume that media propaganda…necessarily succeeds 
ideologically, or, even if it does, that this constitutes the principal explanation for 
popular compliance. Studies of media audiences quickly reveal there is more 
cultural translation, context dependency and active sense-making going on in 
processes of media reception than generalised claims about ‘manufacturing 
consent’ appear to envisage, or investigate.25 
 
This thesis has shown that, for much of the time, the propaganda in the newspapers 
succeeded because the need, identified by Home Intelligence, for readers to cast 
themselves in a heroic mould corresponded with the image they were being presented 
                                            
22 Mass Observation, FR 126.  
23 Bingham, Gender, p. 11. 
24 Cottle, Mediatized Conflict, p.19 
25 Ibid.  
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by the press.26 In Manchester’s case, this same propaganda became an impediment, 
however, when the reporting continued in the same vein after the heavy bombing of 
December 1940 and Mancunians felt their suffering was being neglected and belittled. 
As Home Intelligence reported, this provoked ‘violent feeling’, with middle-classes 
readers particularly aggrieved.27 Rita Maloney, the Mass Observation diarist, 
concurred, writing that the media’s reaction to the Manchester Blitz caused her to 
question the reliability of reports about Coventry and Liverpool.28    
She was not alone in reacting negatively to the propaganda. Ayres wrote it had 
the effect of making some women feel ‘ guilty, apologetic and anxious to justify 
themselves’ if they did not assume some sort of labour on top of their ‘normal’ 
household duties, and this thesis has reported several instances of people wondering 
what was being hidden from them.29 These included: the 12-year-old future editor of 
the Sunday Times and The Times having his faith in the veracity of newspapers 
damaged when he met troops evacuated from Dunkirk; a Preston salesman who was 
so wary of what was being printed he did not believe the casualty figures after the 
Coventry Blitz; and the North-West lorry driver who could give a specific number of 
the dead in a single night in Liverpool, 50,917, as gossip flourished in the space 
perceived between the truth and the propaganda being pushed into the public sphere 
by the newspapers. These were not the comments of people who had discovered 
Bailey’s ‘new confidence’ in the press and, as Hylton, argued, ‘the newspaper 
industry would never fully regain the trust it had enjoyed before Chamberlain’.30 
                                            
26 Mass Observation, Box 1, Propaganda, 18 September 1940. 
27 Mass Observation, FR 538. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ayers, Women at War, p. 24. 
30 Hylton, Darkest Hour, p.136 
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Nevertheless circulations rose and a survey conducted by Mass Observation in 
May 1940 gave indications why.31 The report stated that people looked to war news 
first, but had more permanent interests that overcame the scepticism provoked by the 
stream of propaganda. It also included a table of responses from 118 interviewees in 
Fulham and Silvertown, London, to the question: what items do you like best in your 
daily newspaper? The answers were: 
 
Items Totals 
News 30 
Truth 20 
Articles 19 
Politics (The political attitude of the paper) 19 
Sport   7 
Format 7 
Comics 7 
Pictures 6 
Stories 2 
Astrology 1 
  
This was a London survey, with a relatively low number of responses, but it 
nevertheless was an indicator of the motives behind newspaper buying. It is 
interesting that, at a time when newspapers felt it was important frequently to conceal 
the truth, 20 of the respondents chose that as their principal motive for reading the 
press. 
 
6. ‘Subject to the Inevitable Abridgements’  
An indicator of the Manchester press’s misjudgement of the mood of its 
readers, and its desire not to criticise the authorities was epitomised by a cameo that 
happened on the first anniversary of the city’s Blitz, Christmas Eve 1941. 
Manchester’s centre was full of shoppers, particularly in the Market Street and 
                                            
31 Mass Observation, FR 126. 
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Deansgate areas, Dennis Wood, a retired Manchester policeman from the Heaton Park 
area of the city, among them. He recalled: 
Fresh in everyone’s mind was the awful bombing of the previous year when the 
Blitz had taken such a toll. Following that horrendous period the bombing had 
eased and the people were beginning to relax.32 
 
The festive mood disappeared at 3 pm, however, when three bombers 
appeared low over the roofs, the bomb doors opened, and objects were seen to be 
falling from the aircraft. Wood continued: ‘Everyone dashed to find shelter fearing 
that bombs were falling. In the rush several people including some children were 
injured, some being run over by vehicles.’33 Only when it became apparent that there 
were no explosions and the objects were leaflets bearing a road safety message from 
the Chief Constable did the panic subside. The reaction to this insensitive act was one 
of suppressed anger, particularly as neither the Chairman of the Watch Committee nor 
the Lord Mayor, who was laying a wreath on the communal grave for the victims of 
1940 as the incident happened, had been informed. The Mayor said: ‘It might have 
been wise to have given some warning to the public before carrying out the leaflet 
drop.’34As Freethy noted: 
This was an understatement if ever there was one, but there must have been a great 
deal of pre-planning because photographs of the leaflet-dropping were taken, as 
were shots of civilians reading the leaflets. What had not been properly thought out 
was the insensitive disregard for the feelings of those who grieved for the dead or 
perhaps were injured themselves during the 1940 raid. No wonder there was a mini 
panic.35 
 
The incident, with people so scared that they were injured fleeing, stripped 
bare the myth that had been pedalled by newspapers of the phlegmatic British and ‘we 
can take it’, and perhaps that influenced the reaction of the press. Under normal 
circumstances, and given the Mayor’s indignation, reporters would have berated 
                                            
32 Freethy, Lancashire v Hitler, p. 16 
33 Ibid, p. 18. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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official incompetence, particularly as the drop had happened because a police 
inspector had close friends in the RAF, but the Manchester Guardian instead turned 
its fire on the public. The reaction was so extraordinary the first four paragraphs of 
the report are worth reproducing in full: 
As part of a new campaign to reduce the number of road accidents in the 
Manchester area, three RAF bombers were employed to fly over the rooftops of the 
city on Wednesday afternoon and drop leaflets containing an appeal by the Chief 
Constable for more care on the part of drivers and pedestrians. The planes made 
several runs over the principal shopping streets, which were thronged with people 
doing last minute Christmas buying, and allowed what wind and air currents there 
were to carry the message below. 
 
To the great majority of people the great roar of the aircraft and the sudden descent 
of the leaflets came as a surprise. The only notice given to the public was by means 
of a paragraph in a late edition of an evening newspaper. 
 
Until the markings of the planes were distinguished there was some speculation as 
to whose machines they really were. When the leaflets came down many people, 
drawing the conclusion that they must have been sent in order to read them, went 
into the roadway to collect them. In doing so they paid little heed to the long lanes 
of Christmas traffic, and there were many narrow escapes from accident. Some 
other people, astonished by the unusual display, or interested in seeing a bomber at 
such close quarters, chose the roadway as a vantage-point from which to watch. 
 
This foolishness on the part of the bewildered public was said by a police official 
amply to illustrate that the public is still unaware of the need to take infinite care, 
whatever their circumstances. He added that as all the other forms of propaganda 
seemed to have failed to educate the public sufficiently, it was decided to organise 
the air raid as a ‘novel’ way of attracting attention.36 
 
The Guardian’s report is an extreme example, but the haranguing of people who had 
been scared by an act of insensitive official incompetence epitomises how far 
removed the reports appearing in Manchester newspapers were from what was 
happening on the streets of the city. It is not difficult to understand why readers lost 
trust in what they read, and why, if the self-appointed watchdogs of their society 
could misjudge and fabricate so readily, they could also subscribe to an uncritical 
version of steadfastness under the fire of the Luftwaffe.  
                                            
36 ‘R. A. F. Bombers Over Manchester’, Manchester Guardian, 27 December 1941, p. 4. 
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The myth of the Blitz was a construction formed by an alliance between the 
government and the press that has become so ingrained in society that it has become 
the accepted version of life in the Second World War. The above report was 
indicative of gap that had been opened between newspapers and readers and helps 
answer the questions posed at the start of this thesis. Manchester’s newspapers did 
exceed the demands of the censor and did so because of a number of reasons, the most 
potent of which was a desire to support the war effort. The effect was further to 
damage the reputation of newspapers. Barthes wrote that the journalist, the producer 
of myths, ‘starts with a concept and seeks a form for it’ and between 1939 and 1945 
that form was the unbreakable fortitude of the British under fire.37 Barthes also stated 
that ‘the reader lives the myth as a story at once true and unreal’ and the narrative of 
the newspapers has been so persuasive that it has become the history of the home 
front in the Second World War.38 Such was the scale of the contribution made by 
journalism to the articulation and social negotiation of the myth of the Blitz. As this 
thesis has shown, the Manchester newspapers performed a particularly significant, if 
contingent, role in the writing of that history. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
37 Barthes, p. 128.  
38 Ibid. 
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Appendix 1: Newspaper Circulations 
 
The circulation of national daily newspapers in the UK 
  (in thousands, to the nearest thousand) 
 
 1910 1930 1939 1951
Daily Express 400 1603 2486 4193
Daily Herald - 750 2000 2071
Daily Mail 900 1968 1510 2245
Daily Mirror 630 1071 1367 4567
Daily News 320 900 - -
Daily Sketch 750 1013 850 777
Daily Telegraph 230 222 640 976
D. Worker/Morning Star - - 100 115
Manchester Guardian 40 47 51 140
News Chronicle 800 967 1317 1583
Times 45 187 213 254
TOTAL 4115 8728 10534 16921
39 
 
 
Newspaper circulations in Great Britain, pre and post-war 
 
Class of newspaper Total circulation 1937 Average net circulation per 
issue 
Total circulation 1947 
Average net circulation for 
four weeks ending June 29, 
1947 
National morning 9,903, 427 15,449,410 
London evening 1,806, 910 3,501,599 
TOTAL 11,710,337 18,951,009 
Provincial morning 1,600,000* 2,700,000* 
Provincial evening 4,434,042 6,780,540 
Other weeklies and bi-
weeklies 
7,420,000 14,241,692 
TOTAL 13,454,042 23,722,232 
* to the nearest 100,000, given to the Royal Commission of the Press in round figures 
to avoid disclosure of exact circulations.40 
                                            
39 Butler and Sloman, Political Facts, p. 388.  
40 Royal Commission, p. 195. 
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Appendix 2 
Quantitative Analysis of Newspapers: 17/12/1940 to 04/02/1941 
Figures in centimetres. Variations in percentages due to rounding up and down. 
             
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 
17/12/1940                       
                        
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 TOTAL   
WAR  0 0 0 10 298 130 25 98 0 0 561 15 
NON-WAR 0 145 
32 
100 52 52 221 88 0 140 830 22 
COMMENT 
0 0 63 216 28 0 0 0 0 134 441 12 
ENTERTAINMENT   0 
129 
64 14 0 40 112 0 0 62 421 11 
BUSINESS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 142 358 0 500 13 
CARTOONS/PICS 
0 0 154 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 196 5 
ADVERTS 355 104 65 38 0 114 20 50 20 42 808 22 
TOTAL 355 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 3757 100 
             
             
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 
24/12/1940                       
                        
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8     TOTAL   
WAR  
0 0 0 50 351 165 0 28     594 20 
NON-WAR 0 12 
1 
45 27 86 0 70     241 8 
COMMENT 0 0 85 232 0 0 0 60     377 13 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
145 
54 13 0 19 0 173     404 13 
BUSINESS 0 188 0 0 0 0 346 0     534 18 
CARTOONS/PICS 0 0 189 0 0 0 0 0     189 6 
ADVERTS 
355 33 49 38 0 108 32 47     662 22 
TOTAL 355 378 378 378 378 378 378 378     3001 100 
             
             
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 
31/12/1940                       
                        
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 TOTAL   
WAR  0 0 0 4 378 137 97 186 0 27 829 22 
NON-WAR 
0 72 
54 
36 0 80 78 5 0 138 463 12 
COMMENT 0 0 79 220 0 0 0 0 0 106 405 11 
ENTERTAINMENT   0 
110 
1 78 0 42 108 0 0 51 390 10 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 355 0 380 10 
CARTOONS/PICS 0 0 189 0 0 39 0 0 0 0 228 6 
ADVERTS 355 196 55 40 0 80 95 162 23 56 1062 28 
TOTAL 355 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 3757 99 
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MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 
07/01/1941                       
                        
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 TOTAL   
WAR  
0 32 0 4 378 15 195 351 27 34 1036 28 
NON-WAR 0 25 
19 
36 0 91 4 27 14 71 287 8 
COMMENT 
0 0 83 220 0 0 0 0 0 154 457 12 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
106 
18 78 0 86 80 0 0 59 427 11 
BUSINESS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 307 0 307 8 
CARTOONS/PICS 
0 0 182 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 224 6 
ADVERTS 
355 215 76 40 0 144 99 0 30 60 1019 27 
TOTAL 355 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 3757 100 
             
             
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 
14/01/1941                       
                        
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 TOTAL   
WAR  
0 0 21 0 378 102 63 145 0 11 720 19 
NON-WAR 
0 48 
14 
34 0 114 204 61 0 77 552 15 
COMMENT 0 0 95 230 0 0 0 0 0 97 422 11 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
112 
0 78 0 40 96 0 0 150 476 13 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 126 347 0 473 13 
CARTOONS/PICS 0 0 182 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 224 6 
ADVERTS 
355 218 66 36 0 80 15 46 31 43 890 24 
TOTAL 355 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 3757 101 
              
             
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 
21/01/1941                       
                        
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 TOTAL   
WAR  0 24 0 0 371 91 159 4 0 0 649 17 
NON-WAR 
0 18 
26 
29 7 100 41 104 0 193 518 14 
COMMENT 
0 0 46 234 0 0 0 0 0 74 354 9 
ENTERTAINMENT   0 
135 
64 75 0 70 124 0 0 58 526 14 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 270 345 0 615 16 
CARTOONS/PICS 
0 0 182 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 224 6 
ADVERTS 355 201 60 40 0 75 54 0 33 53 871 23 
TOTAL 355 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 3757 99 
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MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 
28/01/1941                       
                        
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 TOTAL   
WAR  
0 0 0 0 262 44 98 0 4 14 422 11 
NON-WAR 0 38 
26 
39 116 108 140 0 55 148 670 18 
COMMENT 
0 0 46 222 0 0 0 0 0 108 376 10 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
121 
64 81 0 74 105 0 0 60 505 13 
BUSINESS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 315 319 0 634 17 
CARTOONS/PICS 
0 0 182 0 0 74 0 0 0 0 256 7 
ADVERTS 
355 219 60 36 0 78 35 63 0 48 894 24 
TOTAL 355 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 3757 100 
             
             
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 
04/02/1941                       
                        
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 TOTAL   
WAR  
0 19 0 0 378 100 88 66 340 0 991 26 
NON-WAR 
0 26 
39 
29 0 91 182 85 0 73 525 14 
COMMENT 0 0 51 242 0 0 0 0 0 195 488 13 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
148 
34 72 0 76 99 0 0 62 491 13 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 227 0 0 227 6 
CARTOONS/PICS 0 0 182 0 0 56 0 0 0 0 238 6 
ADVERTS 
355 185 72 35 0 55 9 0 38 48 797 21 
TOTAL 355 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 3757 99 
             
             
Totals              
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Manchester Evening News 
 
MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS 17/12/1940             
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  
231 0 50 0 0 152 433 19 
NON-WAR 43 0 
144 
0 0 92 279 12 
COMMENT 
0 57 0 0 0 0 57 3 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
127 
0 0 0 11 138 6 
BUSINESS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CARTOONS/PICS 
0 32 0 0 0 0 32 1 
ADVERTS 
80 162 184 378 378 123 1305 58 
TOTAL 354 378 378 378 378 378 2244 99 
         
         
MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS 24/12/1940             
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  
264 0 30 0 0 102 396 18 
NON-WAR 
24 0 
161 
74 66 168 493 22 
COMMENT 0 67 0 0 0 0 67 3 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
145 
0 74 19 10 248 11 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 116 0 0 116 5 
CARTOONS/PICS 0 11 8 0 10 8 37 2 
ADVERTS 
66 155 179 114 283 90 887 40 
TOTAL 354 378 378 378 378 378 2244 101 
                  
                  
MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS 31/12/1940             
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  232 0 53 0 0 178 463 21 
NON-WAR 
28 0 
113 
0 0 77 218 10 
COMMENT 
0 121 0 0 0 0 121 5 
ENTERTAINMENT   0 
54 
0 0 0 9 63 3 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 0 0 15 15 1 
CARTOONS/PICS 
27 38 0 0 0 0 65 3 
ADVERTS 67 165 212 378 378 99 1299 58 
TOTAL 354 378 378 378 378 378 2244 101 
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MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS 07/01/41             
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  
145 0 7 0 0 125 277 12 
NON-WAR 
113 0 
117 
0 0 125 355 16 
COMMENT 0 168 0 0 0 0 168 7 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
51 
0 0 0 0 51 2 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 
CARTOONS/PICS 17 0 17 0 0 0 34 2 
ADVERTS 
79 159 237 378 378 123 1354 60 
TOTAL 354 378 378 378 378 378 2244 99 
         
         
MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS 14/01/1940             
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  160 0 5 0 0 32 197 9 
NON-WAR 
82 0 
156 
0 0 200 438 20 
COMMENT 
0 156 0 0 0 0 156 7 
ENTERTAINMENT   0 
54 
23 0 0 2 79 4 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CARTOONS/PICS 
22 0 0 0 0 22 44 2 
ADVERTS 90 168 194 378 378 122 1330 59 
TOTAL 354 378 378 378 378 378 2244 101 
          
         
MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS 21/01/1940             
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  
263 0 43 0 0 56 362 16 
NON-WAR 2 0 
148 
0 0 176 326 15 
COMMENT 
0 169 0 0 0 0 169 8 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
49 
0 0 0 2 51 2 
BUSINESS 0 0 0 0 0 46 46 2 
CARTOONS/PICS 
10 0 7 0 0 0 17 1 
ADVERTS 
79 160 180 378 378 98 1273 57 
TOTAL 354 378 378 378 378 378 2244 101 
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MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS 28/01/1940             
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  
244 0 0 0 0 21 265 12 
NON-WAR 0 0 
188 
0 0 184 372 17 
COMMENT 
0 160 0 0 0 0 160 7 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
49 
0 0 0 0 49 2 
BUSINESS 0 0 0 0 0 47 47 2 
CARTOONS/PICS 
26 0 31 0 0 29 86 4 
ADVERTS 
84 169 159 378 378 97 1265 56 
TOTAL 354 378 378 378 378 378 2244 100 
         
         
MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS 04/02/1940             
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  
250 0 0 0 0 41 291 13 
NON-WAR 
6 0 
210 
0 0 195 411 18 
COMMENT 0 148 0 0 0 0 148 7 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
50 
0 0 0 5 55 2 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CARTOONS/PICS 17 13 10 0 0 22 62 3 
ADVERTS 
81 167 158 378 378 115 1277 57 
TOTAL 354 378 378 378 378 378 2244 100 
         
         
Totals 
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Evening Chronicle 
 
EVENING CHRONICLE 17/12/1940               
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  
201 0 99 9 0 35 344 13 
NON-WAR 107 0 
34 
33 0 90 264 10 
COMMENT 
0 162 0 0 0 0 162 6 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
61 
108 191 74 2 436 17 
BUSINESS 0 0 0 0 0 74 74 3 
CARTOONS/PICS 
7 15 9 0 27 0 58 2 
ADVERTS 
103 202 190 207 339 239 1280 49 
TOTAL 418 440 440 440 440 440 2618 100 
         
         
EVENING CHRONICLE 24/12/1940               
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  
352 227 95 36 0 235 945 36 
NON-WAR 
39 0 
143 
15 3 79 279 11 
COMMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
62 
48 197 303 15 625 24 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 97 0 0 97 4 
CARTOONS/PICS 0 0 17 26 0 33 76 3 
ADVERTS 
27 151 137 69 134 78 596 23 
TOTAL 418 440 440 440 440 440 2618 101 
         
         
EVENING CHRONICLE 31/12/1940               
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  274 0 79 0 0 99 452 17 
NON-WAR 
39 0 
84 
20 0 59 202 8 
COMMENT 
0 151 0 0 0 0 151 6 
ENTERTAINMENT   0 
77 
61 112 95 141 486 19 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 18 0 73 91 4 
CARTOONS/PICS 
23 0 29 0 27 0 79 3 
ADVERTS 82 212 187 290 318 68 1157 44 
TOTALS 418 440 440 440 440 440 2618 101 
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EVENING CHRONICLE 07/01/1941               
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  
260 0 84 21 0 91 456 17 
NON-WAR 34 0 
38 
0 0 52 124 5 
COMMENT 
0 163 0 0 0 0 163 6 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
83 
54 228 83 20 468 18 
BUSINESS 0 0 0 50 0 40 90 3 
CARTOONS/PICS 
29 0 0 28 9 0 66 2 
ADVERTS 
95 194 264 113 348 237 1251 48 
TOTALS 418 440 440 440 440 440 2618 99 
         
         
EVENING CHRONICLE 14/01/1941               
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  
215 0 5 0 0 17 237 9 
NON-WAR 
112 0 
152 
0 0 148 412 16 
COMMENT 0 149 0 0 0 0 149 6 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
65 
27 225 80 26 423 16 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 39 0 36 75 3 
CARTOONS/PICS 8 0 0 0 27 0 35 1 
ADVERTS 
83 226 256 176 333 213 1287 49 
TOTALS 418 440 440 440 440 440 2618 100 
         
         
EVENING CHRONICLE 21/01/1941               
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  195 0 91 0 40 93 419 16 
NON-WAR 
85 0 
119 
14 0 121 339 13 
COMMENT 
0 154 0 0 0 0 154 6 
ENTERTAINMENT   0 
77 
45 230 29 5 386 15 
BUSINESS 
0 0 0 84 0 10 94 4 
CARTOONS/PICS 
23 0 0 0 27 0 50 2 
ADVERTS 115 209 185 112 344 211 1176 45 
TOTALS 418 440 440 440 440 440 2618 101 
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EVENING CHRONICLE 28/01/1941               
                
% 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  237 0 28 0 0 107 372 14 
NON-WAR 99 0 
214 
0 0 40 353 13 
COMMENT 
0 155 0 0 0 0 155 6 
ENTERTAINMENT   0 
61 
87 176 74 106 504 19 
BUSINESS 0 0 0 54 0 22 76 3 
CARTOONS/PICS 
7 0 29 0 27 0 63 2 
ADVERTS 75 224 82 210 339 165 1095 42 
TOTALS 418 440 440 440 440 440 2618 99 
         
         
EVENING CHRONICLE 04/02/1941               
                % 
  Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 TOTAL   
WAR  
212 0 30 65 0 3 310 11 
NON-WAR 107 0 
171 
10 0 138 426 16 
COMMENT 0 145 0 0 0 0 145 6 
ENTERTAINMENT   
0 
54 
12 163 73 47 349 13 
BUSINESS 0 0 0 0 0 76 76 3 
CARTOONS/PICS 25 20 0 21 28 0 94 4 
ADVERTS 
74 221 227 181 339 176 1218 47 
TOTALS 418 440 440 440 440 440 2618 100 
 
 
Totals 
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Appendix 3 National Newspapers printing in Manchester in 1940 
 
Daily Express 
Daily Herald 
Daily Mail 
Daily Sketch 
Daily Telegraph 
News Chronicle 
Manchester Guardian 
People 
Sunday Chronicle 
Sunday Dispatch 
Sunday Express 
Sunday Graphic 
Sunday Times 
 
  
